

Appendices

Appendix A

Listed below are specifications for the German, French and British tanks mentioned in this book.¹

German Tanks

Tank Model	Panzer 1	Panzer 2	Panzer 3	35t ²	38t	Panzer 4
Maximum armour thickness (mm/inches)	13/0.5	30/1.2	30/1.2	24/1	30/1.2	50/2
Armament: cannons/ machine-guns	—/2 mgs	20mm/ 1 mg	37mm/ 2 mgs	37mm/ 2 mgs	37mm/ 2 mgs	75mm/ 2 mgs
Speed (m.p.h.)	24	34	25	25	31	25
Weight (tons)	6	9.5	19.5	10.4	9.5	25
Crew	2	3	5	4	4	5
Range (miles)	125	118	103	118	125	125

French Tanks

Tank Model	FCM ³ 36	Hotchkiss 35	Hotchkiss 39	Somua S-35	B1 bis
Maximum armour thickness (mm/inches)	40/1.6	30/1.2	40/1.6	40/1.6	60/2.4
Armament: cannons/ machine guns	37mm/ 1 mg	37mm/1 mg	37mm/1 mg	47mm/ 1 mg	75mm on chassis; 47mm on turret/1 mg
Speed (m.p.h.)	15	16	13	25	18
Weight (tons)	12.3	10.5	12.5	20	31.5

Tank Model	FCM ³ 36	Hotchkiss 35	Hotchkiss 39	Somua S35	B1 <i>bis</i>
Crew	2	2	2	3	4
Range (miles)	140	93	93	144	113

British Tanks

Tank Model	Light Mark VI Tank	Cruiser Mark IV	Matilda Mark I Infantry tank	Matilda Mark 2 Infantry tank
Maximum armour thickness (mm/inches)	14/0.6	30/1.2	60/2.4	78/3.1
Armament: cannons/machine-guns	-/2 Mg	2-pounder/1 mg	-/1 mg	2-pounder/1 mg
Speed (m.p.h.)	35	30	8	15
Weight (tons)	5.2	14.75	11	26.5
Crew	3	4	2	4
Range	130	90	80	70

Appendix B

Number of Soldiers Evacuated from Dunkirk During Operation Dynamo, 26 May–4 June 1940¹

As mentioned in Chapter 30 note 1, several sets of statistics give the number of soldiers evacuated during Operation Dynamo. Listed below are extracts from two.

When referring to the evacuation figures in the main text of this book I have usually used Vice-Admiral Ramsay's so-called Dover Report: see the statistics in the table below. That should not be taken to imply that they are any more reliable than the figures compiled by the Admiralty's Historical Section/Tactical and Staff Duties Department, which were referred to in a subsequent version by Ramsay's report (mentioned in Chapter 30, note 1) and also appear below. All the figures are subject to the warnings about their accuracy in Chapter 30 note 1, and in this Appendix's end note 2.

Dover Report Evacuation Figures

Date ²	British evacuees	French evacuees	Total evacuated for the day	Wounded	Accumulated number of evacuees
26-7 May	3,373	—	3,373	—	3,373
27-8 May	13,948	—	13,948	461	17,782
28-9 May	38,188	655	38,843	1,881	58,506
29-30 May	39,858	8,616	48,474	547	107,527
30-31 May	43,438	14,874	58,312	1,176	167,015
31 May-1 June	25,190	35,013	60,203	2,509	229,727
1-2 June	15,378	16,049	31,427	167	261,321
2-3 June	7,208	19,803	27,011	240	288,572
3-4 June	6	26,989	26,995	—	315,567

Admiralty's Historical Section/Tactical and Staff Duties Department (HS/TSD) Figures

Date	Men evacuated from the beaches	Men evacuated from the harbour	Total evacuated for the day	Accumulated number of evacuees
26-7 May	—	7,669	7,669	7,669
27-8 May	5,930	11,874	17,804	25,473
28-9 May	13,752	33,558	47,310	72,783
29-30 May	29,512	24,311	53,823	126,606
30-31 May	22,942	45,072	68,014	194,620
31 May-1 June	17,348	47,081	64,429	259,049
1-2 June	6,695	19,561	26,256	285,305
2-3 June	1,870	24,876	26,746	312,051
3-4 June	622	25,553	26,175	338,226
Total during Operation Dynamo	98,780	239,446	—	338,226

Dramatis Personae

The following list gives the positions held by some of the senior soldiers and politicians during the period covered by this book. The positions specified are those held on 10 May 1940, except where other dates are given.

British

- Major-General Harold Alexander*: Commander, 1 Division, until 31 May 1940; thereafter Commander, 1 Corps.
- Major Osmund Archdale*: British GHQ liaison officer at Army Group 1 HQ.
- Air Marshal Arthur Barratt*: Commander of British Air Forces in France.
- Leslie Hore-Belisha*: Secretary of State for War, until 4 January 1940.
- Lieutenant-General Alan Brooke*: Commander, 2 Corps, until 30 May; from 2 June 1940, Commander-in-Chief of the second British Expeditionary Force.
- Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Brownrigg*: Adjutant-General.
- Neville Chamberlain*: Prime Minister, until 10 May; thereafter Lord President of the Council.
- Winston Churchill*: First Lord of the Admiralty, until 10 May; thereafter Prime Minister.
- Lieutenant-General Sir John Dill*: Commander, 1 Corps, until April 1940; Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, until 27 May 1940; thereafter Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
- Sir Hugh Dowding*: Air Officer, Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command.
- Anthony Eden*: Secretary of State for War from 12 May 1940.
- Major-General Roger Evans*: Commander, 1st Armoured Division.
- Major-General Victor Fortune*: Commander, 51st Highland Division.
- Major-General Harold Franklyn*: Commander, 5 Division.
- General Lord Gort (Jack)*: Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force.
- Lord Halifax*: Foreign Secretary.
- General Sir Edmond Ironside*: Chief of the Imperial General Staff, until 27 May 1940; thereafter Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces.
- Sir Roger Keyes*: Churchill's envoy to the Belgian King.
- Lieutenant-General James Marshall-Cornwall*: Head of Mission, liaising with French 10th Army until 15 June; thereafter commander of the last British units in France: the so-called Normanforce.
- Major-General Bernard Montgomery*: Commander, 3 Division, until 30 May 1940, thereafter Commander, 2 Corps.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall: Chief of the Air Staff.

Lieutenant-General Henry Pownall: Chief of Staff of the BEF.

French

Admiral Jean Abrial: Amiral Nord (the admiral in charge of naval forces in the north of France). After 23 May 1940 he was in charge of the garrisons, which also included units from the Army, holding Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne.

General René Altmayer: Commander of V Corps.

General Robert Altmayer: Commander of the 10th Army, which was in charge of the British 51st Highland Division when the Germans commenced their offensive south of the Somme on 5 June 1940.

General Robert Barthélemy: Commander of the Secteur Fortifié de Flandres.

General Joseph Baudet: Commander of 71 Division.

Paul Baudouin: Secretary of the War Cabinet.

General Gaston Billotte: Commander of Army Group 1, which included the Belgian Army (when Belgium joined the Allies following the start of the German attack), the British Expeditionary Force, and the following French Armies: the 1st, 2nd, 7th and 9th.

General Georges Blanchard: commander of the 1st Army, until 25 May 1940; thereafter commander of Army Group 1.

General Antoine Brocard: Commander of 3ième Division Cuirassée de Réserve (3rd Armoured Division).

General Albert Bruché: Commander of 2ième Division Cuirassée de Réserve (2nd Armoured Division).

General Marie Bruneau: Commander of 1ière Division Cuirassée de Réserve (1st Armoured Division).

General Pierre Champon: Head of French Mission liaising with the King of Belgium.

General André Corap: Commander of the 9th Army.

Édouard Daladier: Président du Conseil (Prime Minister), until 21 March 1940. Thereafter Minister of Defence, until 18 May 1940, when he became the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Admiral François Darlan: Head of the Navy.

General Aimé Doumenc: Army's Chief of Staff.

General Robert Fagalde: Commander of XVI Corps and, as such, the deputy commander of the garrisons holding Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne, acting under Admiral Abrial (mentioned above).

General Jean Flavigny: Commander of XXI Corps.

General Maurice Gamelin: Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, and of the Allied armies until 19–20 May 1940. As such he was in command of the generals controlling the North-East Front (see General Georges below) and the South-East Front.

General Alphonse Georges: Commander-in-Chief of the North-East Front including Army Groups 1 (see General Billotte), 2 and 3.

- General Henri Giraud*: Commander of the 7th Army.
- General Charles Grandsard*: Commander of X Corps, which was responsible for the area around Sedan when the Germans attacked it on 13 May 1940.
- General Charles Huntziger*: Commander of the 2nd Army.
- General Marcel Ihler*: Commander of IX Corps, whose troops included those in the British 51st Highland Division during the attempted retreat to Le Havre between 8 and 12 June 1940.
- General Louis Koeltz*: Army's Deputy Chief of Staff
- General Henri Lafontaine*: Commander of 55 Division.
- General Benoit de Fornel de La Laurencie*: Commander of III Corps.
- General Maurice Lucas*: Commander of 32 Division.
- General Louis Martin*: Commander of XI Corps.
- Marshal Philippe Pétain*: Président du Conseil (Prime Minister), from 16 June 1940.
- General René Prioux*: Commander of the Corps de Cavalerie, until 25 May 1940; thereafter Commander of the 1st Army.
- Paul Reynaud*: Président du Conseil (Prime Minister), from 21 March 1940 until 16 June 1940. From 21 March 1940 until 18 May 1940, he was also Minister of Foreign Affairs. On 18 May 1940 he handed over the Foreign Affairs portfolio to Daladier (mentioned above), and took over the Defence portfolio from Daladier.
- Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Villedume*: Paul Reynaud's military adviser.
- Captain Melchior de Voguë*: Army Group 1 liaison officer at British GHQ.
- General Maxime Weygand*: Commander-in-Chief of the French Armed Forces, and of the Allied armies from 19–20 May 1940.

Belgian

- Lieutenant-General Édouard Van den Bergen*: Chief of the General Staff, until 2 February 1940.
- Colonel Georges Goethals*: Military Attaché in Berlin.
- Leopold III*: the Belgian King.
- General Oscar Michiels*: Chief of the General Staff, after 2 February 1940.
- General Raoul Van Overstraeten*: King Leopold's aide-de-camp and military adviser.
- Paul-Henri Spaak*: Foreign Minister.
- Pol Le Tellier*: Ambassador in Paris.

Dutch

- General Izaak Reynders*: Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, until 6 February 1940.
- Major Gijsbertus Sas*: Military Attaché in Berlin.
- General Henri Winkelman*: Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, from 6 February 1940.

German

Lieutenant-Colonel Hermann Balck: Commander of Schützenregiment 1.

Colonel-General Fedor von Bock: Commander of Army Group B, entrusted with the northern German attack.

Colonel-General Walter von Brauchitsch: Army Commander-in-Chief.

General Heinz Guderian: Commander of XIX Corps, which included the 1st, 2nd and 10th Panzer Divisions.

General Franz Halder: Army Chief of Staff.

General Erich Hoepner: Commander of XVI Corps.

General Hermann Hoth: Commander of XV Corps, which included the 5th and 7th Panzer Divisions.

General Ewald von Kleist: Commander of Panzer Group Kleist, comprising XIX Corps and XLI Corps (see Generals Guderian and Reinhardt above and below respectively).

Colonel-General Hans-Günther von Kluge: Commander of 4th Army, which included XV Corps (see General Hoth above).

Major-General Alfred Jodl: Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) Chief of Staff.

Colonel-General Walter von Reichenau: Commander of 6th Army.

Lieutenant-General Georg-Hans Reinhardt: Commander of XLI Corps.

Major-General Erwin Rommel: Commander of the 7th Panzer Division.

Colonel-General Gerd von Rundstedt: Commander of Army Group A, entrusted with southern German attack.

Lieutenant-General Ferdinand Schaal: Commander of the 10th Panzer Division.

Colonel Paul Werner: Commander of the 5th Panzer Division's Panzerregiment 31.

Abbreviations

The abbreviations used in the Notes, Bibliography and Illustration sections of this book for archives, archivists, curators and officers from regiments who have provided documents and information are listed below.

Archives

ANP: Archives Nationales, Paris, France
BA-MA: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, Germany
CDH: Centre de Documentation Historique in the Service Général du Renseignement et de la Sécurité, Brussels, Belgium
IWM Documents: Imperial War Museum's documents archive in London, England
IWM Foreign Documents: Imperial War Museum's foreign documents collection in Duxford, Cambridgeshire, England
IWM Sound Archive: Imperial War Museum's Sound Archive in London, England
Keyes Files: private archive held by Lord Keyes's family
Krijsgauditoraat: Archief van het Auditoraat General: Krijsgauditoraat in Brussels, Belgium
LHC: Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London, England
NA/PRO: The National Archives, previously known as the Public Record Office, London, England
NHB: Naval Historical Branch of the Ministry of Defence, Portsmouth, England
SHAT: Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, Vincennes, France
SHM: Service Historique de la Marine, Vincennes, France

Archivists

Crofton/Coldstream Guards: Major Edward Crofton of the Coldstream Guards
Cross/DLI: Major Randall Cross of the Durham Light Infantry
Fletcher/Tank Museum: David Fletcher, archivist at the Tank Museum, Bovington, Dorset
Huygelier/CDH: Jeroen Huygelier, archivist and historian at CDH (see Archives above)
Langmaid/Tank Museum: Nancy Langmaid, a former archivist from the Tank Museum, Bovington, Dorset

- Muys/CDH: Eva Muys, an archivist at the CDH (see Archives section above)
- Rebbeck/Glostors: Major Claud Rebbeck of the Soldiers of Gloucestershire Museum, Gloucester
- Seymour/Mason/Grenadier Guards: Lieutenant-Colonel Conway Seymour and Captain Donald Mason of the Grenadier Guards
- Sinnett/RWF: Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Sinnett of the Royal Welch Fusiliers
- Stanley/Ox and Bucks: Lieutenant-Colonel David Stanley of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry
- Welsh Guards' Sources: Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Stephens, John Beckwith-Smith, Jenny Cronin, Major Ken Lewis, Roy Lewis and Lance-Sergeant Mark Morgan of the Welsh Guards

Notes

The abbreviations used for the archives, archivists, curators and officers from regiments who have provided documents are explained in the Abbreviations section on pp. 547–8.

Introduction

- 1 See Chapter 12 of this book.
- 2 Winston Churchill, *The Second World War, Vol. 2* ('Churchill, *Second World War*'), p. 43.
- 3 See Chapter 30 of this book.
- 4 See Chapter 20 of this book.
- 5 Information from Dennis Alder and Ronald Beckett who served under 2nd Lieutenant Denzil Sebag-Montefiore in a Royal Corps of Signals section.

1: Moment of Truth

- 1 Général André Beaufre, *Le Drame de 1940*, p. 233.
- 2 Doumenc was referring to the 1^{ière}, 3^{ième} and 2^{ième} Divisions Cuirassées de Réserve (the 1st, 3rd and 2nd French Armoured Divisions), in that order. Charleroi is some thirty miles south-east of Brussels.
- 3 Jacques Minart, *P. C. Vincennes: Secteur 4, Volume 2* ('Minart, *P. C. Vincennes*'), p. 141.
- 4 Paul Baudouin, *The Private Diaries of Paul Baudouin* ('Baudouin, *Diaries*'), p. 29.
- 5 Paul Reynaud *In The Thick Of The Fight* ('Reynaud, *Thick Of The Fight*'), p. 319.
- 6 War Cabinet Conclusions for meeting commencing at 6 p.m., 14 May, in NA/PRO CAB 65/7. Chiefs of Staff minutes of meeting at 10 a.m., 15 May, in NA/PRO CAB 79/4, War Cabinet Conclusions for meetings commencing at 11.30 a.m. and 11 p.m., 16 May, in NA/PRO CAB 65/7. It was agreed that four extra fighter squadrons would be sent to France, and six additional fighter squadrons would operate over France each day provided that they returned to England after their patrols.
- 7 Denis Richards, *Royal Air Force 1939–45: Volume 1: The Fight At Odds* ('Richards, *Fight At Odds*'), p. 121.
- 8 Alistair Horne, *To Lose a Battle: France 1940* ('Horne, *To Lose a Battle*'), p. 402.
- 9 Reynaud, *Thick Of The Fight*, p. 320; and War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee,

- in NA/PRO CAB 79/4. Reynaud claimed he rang Churchill at 7.30 a.m., while Churchill said the call came through at 8.30 a.m.
- 10 Journal du Cabinet du Général Georges, SHAT 27N148 ('Georges' Journal') records 12 May 1940 meeting near Mons where it was agreed the BEF would take orders from Billotte. Général Edmond Ruby, *Sedan: Terre D'Épreuve: Avec La 11e Armée Mai–Juin 1940* ('Ruby, Sedan'), p. 147, states that with effect from 13 May General Georges took over the task of giving commands to the 2nd Army's General Huntziger.
- 11 O. A. Archdale's account ('Archdale's Report'), IWM Documents 78/52/1, pp. 10–10A.
- 12 Lord Gort's Despatches in Supplement To The *London Gazette* Of Friday, the 10th of October, 1941, published 17 October 1941 ('Gort, Despatches'), p. 5912.
- 13 Orville H. Bullitt (ed.), *For The President: Personal and Secret: Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt*, p. 426.
- 14 Lord Ismay, *The Memoirs of General The Lord Ismay* ('Ismay, Memoirs'), p. 126.
- 15 Elie Bois, *Truth on the Tragedy of France*, quoted in Horne, *To Lose a Battle*, p. 455, referring to the politician Édouard Herriot.
- 16 Winston Churchill, *Second World War*, p. 40.
- 17 Baudouin, *Diaries*, p. 32.
- 18 Churchill, *Second World War*, p. 42.
- 19 *Ibid.*, pp. 42–3.
- 20 Because there is much debate about the numbers of men and equipment in the rival 1940 armed forces it is wise to assume that all figures quoted here and in other books are best estimates.

It is generally agreed that Germany made available 135–40 divisions to attack in the West, which was approximately the number of Allied divisions opposing them on the North–East Front. The British, Belgians and Dutch supplied ten, twenty-two and ten divisions respectively. (Three British labour divisions and the 1st British Armoured Division, the latter being sent to France after the initial attack, are not included in the aforementioned British figure.)

The crucial difference between the two sides was therefore not the numbers of troops made available. It was the way they were deployed. The Allies were relatively strong compared with the Germans in the Maginot Line sector, and the area north of Namur. But the French 2nd and 9th Armies holding the area between the Maginot Line and Namur included just sixteen divisions, compared to the forty-five divisions the Germans lined up against them in this sector.

The Germans used around 2700 tanks in their ten panzer divisions whereas the Allies appear to have had in excess of 3000. However, the French, who had many more tanks than the British, Belgian and Dutch Armies combined, only used around 1400 tanks in their armoured divisions, sprinkling the remainder among their infantry units, thereby depriving themselves of the means to match the rapier thrusts of the German panzers.

Comparing the aircraft of the two sides is the most complicated calculation of all, since the French appear not to have used many of their available planes, and surviving German records do not reveal precisely how many of their planes were

used by the Luftwaffe. Available statistics suggest that the Germans had around 2500 combat planes available at the beginning of the conflict, whereas the Allies had around 1500, many of them being outclassed by their German counterparts.

It seems that it was the Luftwaffe's ability to achieve constant air superiority during nearly all phases of the 1940 campaign, combined with the Allies' strategic mistakes concerning the deployment of their troops and tanks, that enabled the Germans to win such a decisive victory over a group of armies that had as many if not more men and equipment at their disposal.

The above figures and analysis have been compiled after interpreting statistics and arguments in Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, *1940: Pleins Feux sur un désastre* ('Vanwelkenhuyzen, *Pleins Feux*'), pp. 70–74; Karl-Heinz Frieser, *Le Mythe de la guerre-éclair: La campagne de l'Ouest de 1940* – its original German edition was entitled *Blitzkrieg-Legende: Der Westfeldzug 1940* – ('Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*'), pp. 52–69; and Gérard Saint-Martin, *L'Arme Blindée Française: Tome 1: Mai–juin 1940! Les blindés français dans la tourmente* ('Saint-Martin, *Blindés français*').

2: The BEF Arrives in France

- 1 Major L. F. Ellis, *The War in France and Flanders 1939–1940* ('Ellis, *War In France*'), p. 15.
- 2 Maulde is a village on the Franco-Belgian border around eight miles south-east of Tournai. Halluin is on the Franco-Belgian border around six miles south-west of Courtrai.
- 3 For example, the 5 May return in the 2 Royal Norfolks' war diary, NA/PRO WO 167/794, mentions 744 other ranks. In addition there were around thirty officers.
- 4 Taped interview with the officer from 1st Battalion, the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, who in 1940 was 2nd Lieutenant Donald Callander ('Callander's Tape'), IWM Sound Archive 7166, but brought to my attention by his widow Margaret and son Robin.
- 5 Report by Major-General Roger Evans, commander of the 1st Armoured Division ('Evans's Report'), brought to my attention by his son Major-General Andy Evans. Tank specifications from David Fletcher, archivist at Tank Museum, Bovington ('Fletcher/Tank Museum'), *Fire and Movement*, a Tank Museum, Bovington, publication ('Tank Museum, *Fire and Movement*'), and Saint-Martin, *Blindés français*, p. 328. See also tank specifications in Appendix A.
- 6 Tank specifications from same sources as in note 5 above.
- 7 Gregory Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk: The story of Gort's army* ('Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*'), p. 10.
- 8 Major-General Charles H. Miller, *History of the 13th/18th Royal Hussars (Queen Mary's Own) 1922–1947*, p. 34; Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*, p. 9.
- 9 Brian Bond, *British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars*, p. 300.
- 10 Ellis, *War In France*, p. 19.
- 11 Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*, p. 59.
- 12 Gregor MacDonald, *A Cameron Never Can Yield: A Prisoner of War's Escape from*

- Germany to Gibraltar*, brought to my attention by Saul David, author of *Churchill's Sacrifice of the Highland Division: France 1940* ('David, *Churchill's Sacrifice*').
- 13 Richard Harvey, *Yeoman Soldier Prussian Farmer: an autobiography of the war years*, pp. 13–16.
- 14 Captain F. E. Cayley, IWM Documents 98/19/1.
- 15 William Harding, *A Cockney Soldier: Duty Before Pleasure: An autobiography 1918–46* ('Harding, *A Cockney Soldier*'), and his interview, IWM Sound Archive 6323 ('Harding's Tape').
- 16 P. Lowson, 6 Durham Light Infantry, IWM Sound Archive 12249.
- 17 David Elliott, a stretcher-bearer in the Royal Armoured Medical Corps, IWM Sound Archive 16706.
- 18 Major Toby Taylor sent me this account in 2002 ('Taylor's Report').
- 19 Lieutenant-Colonel Jimmy Langley, *Fight Another Day* ('Langley, *Fight Another Day*'), pp. 29–30, brought to my attention by his sons, Michael and Christopher Langley, and Major Edward Crofton of the Coldstream Guards, ('Crofton/Coldstream Guards'). Jimmy Langley was in the 2nd Battalion, the Coldstream Guards.
- 20 Brian Montgomery, *A Field-Marshal in the Family*, pp. 253–4.
- 21 Nigel Hamilton, *Monty: The Making of a General 1887–1942*, London, 1981, p. 334.
- 22 General Alan Brooke, Notes On My Life Volume 3 ('Alan Brooke, Notes'), p. 108, LHC, Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, file 5/2/15. The trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives have given me permission to quote from Alan Brooke, Notes.
- 23 Taylor's Report.
- 24 Samuel Love, 12th Field Ambulance, Royal Army Medical Corps, IWM Sound Archive 6728 ('Love's Tape'). 'Dreadnought' appears to be a reference to medication that may have been used in the Dreadnought Seaman's Hospital in Greenwich where VD was one of the main complaints treated. This link was made by Dr Gabriel Jaffé, my uncle, a naval doctor during the war.
- 25 Alexander Frederick, IWM Sound Archive 19804.
- 26 Calomel ointment includes calomel, carbolic acid and camphor.
- 27 Love's Tape. Condy's fluid is a disinfectant containing sodium chloride, manganic and permanganic acids, according to Norman W. Blacow (ed.), *Martindale: The Extra Pharmacopoeia*, brought to my attention by Meena Patel, the pharmacist at Hampstead Heath Pharmacy, London.
- 28 *Bulletin of War Medicine*, September 1940, pp. 39–41, brought to my attention by my father, Dr Stephen Sebag-Montefiore, suggests that the medical procedures mentioned in the text of this chapter were by no means standard practice, even if they were used by some doctors during the 1940 campaign.
- 29 Harding's Tape.
- 30 Callander's Tape.
- 31 8 Brigade's war diary, NA/PRO WO 167/362.
- 32 Callander's Tape.
- 33 John A. MacKenzie, 'Forty Years Ago with the 78th To St Valery: Contact with the enemy', in *The Queen's Own Highlander*, vol. 20, no. 58 (Summer 1980), ('MacKenzie's Report'), p. 32, brought to my attention by Saul David.

- 34 Personal Diary of Major Murray Grant ('Grant's Diary'). His family, including his son, James Grant, and his grandson, the actor Hugh Grant, has allowed me to quote from this document, which was brought to my attention by Saul David.
- 35 Alan Brooke, Notes, pp. 104–5.
- 36 2e Division Légère Mécanique: Relation par le Général Bougrain, Commandant De Cette Grande Unité Au Cours De La Campagne 1939–1940 ('Bougrain's Report'), pp. 17–18, in SHAT 32N494 Dossier 4.
- 37 NA/PRO WO 106/1700.
- 38 Brian Bond (ed.), *Chief of Staff: The Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall, Volume 1, 1933–1940* ('Pownall, Diaries'), pp. 283 and 285.
- 39 NA/PRO WO 106/1700.
- 40 Pownall, *Diaries*, pp. 285–8.
- 41 *Ibid.*, p. 285.
- 42 Lieutenant-Colonel de Villelume's notes, ANP 496 AP22; Général G. Roton, *Années Cruciales: La Course Aux Armements (1933–1939), La Campagne (1939–1940)*, ('Roton, *Années Cruciales*'), pp. 130–34; Horne, *To Lose a Battle*, p. 171.
- 43 Pownall, *Diaries*, p. 288.
- 44 Baudouin, *Diaries*, p. 10.
- 45 Horne, *To Lose a Battle*, p. 164.
- 46 The account of the Pillbox Affair is based on the description in J. R. Colville, *Man of Valour: The Life of Field-Marshal The Viscount Gort V.C.*, pp. 157–166.
- 47 *Ibid.*, p. 138.
- 48 *Ibid.*, pp. 157–66.
- 49 9 January 1940 letter from the French Ambassador in England, ANP 496 AP20.
- 50 Pownall, *Diaries*, pp. 283–5.
- 51 *Ibid.*, p. 283. Ironside's failure to consult Gort before agreeing to Churchill's proposals led to problems during the French campaign. See Chapter 14.
- 52 Alan Brooke, Notes, p. 119.
- 53 *Ibid.*, p. 105; Dill's 3 November 1939 note, NA/PRO WO 167/124/1.
- 54 Alan Brooke, Notes, p. 105.

3: The Mechelen Affair

- 1 This information, and other information in this chapter giving Hoenmanns' side of the story, is from the report he wrote while he was a prisoner-of-war, which was brought to my attention by his second wife and son, and from his 29 October 1943 statement, which, like many of the sources describing the part played by the Germans in the Mechelen affair, comes from Reichskriegsgericht documents stored in the Historicky Ustav Armady Ceske Republiky (the Czech Army's Historical Archive), in Prague, Czech Republic. These documents (the 'Huygelier Papers') were brought to my attention by CDH archivist Jeroen Huygelier, ('Huygelier/CDH'). The two Hoenmanns statements mentioned above are referred to subsequently in this book as 'Hoenmanns' Statements'.
- 2 No one knows for sure why the plane stalled. But the isolating of a fuel tank

seems to be the most likely reason, if one takes into account Raoul Hayoit de Termicourt's report, which was handed to Belgian General Van Overstraeten on 31 January 1940. It was brought to my attention by Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen. Under the heading 'The cause of the [crash] landing' on pp. 5–7 of the de Termicourt report he confirms that the plane had not been hit by any bullets, and there was no evidence that petrol had leaked out of the fuel tanks. There was a substantial amount of petrol in the fuel tanks when the plane was examined after the crash. De Termicourt stated that the most likely reason why the engine stalled was that Hoenmanns had inadvertently moved the lever that controlled the flow of petrol going from the petrol tanks to the engine. If the lever was moved as de Termicourt suspected, the petrol in the tanks would have been isolated from the engine. This would have resulted in the engine stopping suddenly, which is exactly what Hoenmanns reported.

- 3 Reinberger's 13 September 1944 statement ('Reinberger's Statement'), from the Huygelier Papers.
- 4 Hoenmanns' Statements.
- 5 10 January 1940 entry in General Alfred Jodl's diary ('Jodl's Diary'), a translation of which is in IWM Foreign Documents, AL 977/2/2 and 977/3/1. It was brought to my attention by Stephen Walton, the Archivist in the IWM Foreign Documents section.
- 6 Hoenmanns' Statements.
- 7 Statements by Leutnant Eberhard Boerger, an adjutant in Fliegerführer 220, on 11 January 1940, and Helmut Berg, from the Huygelier Papers.
- 8 Hoenmanns' Statements.
- 9 This action is based on Hoenmanns' and Reinberger's Statements, and the 1 March 1946 statement by Capitaine-Commandant Rodrique, CDH, File A Farde 2 C111, although they are inconsistent in certain unimportant details.
- 10 Details of Annie Hoenmanns' interrogation are in a 12 January 1940 report among the Huygelier Papers.
- 11 Reinberger's Statement.
- 12 Report of 12 January 1940 conversation, CDH, Overstraeten file.
- 13 Resumé on 1 March 1940 of the letters received by the interned German officers, CDH, Overstraeten file.
- 14 Jodl's Diary.
- 15 13 January 1940 telegram sent at 4.40 a.m. from Brussels, in CDH, File A Farde 2 C111.
- 16 CDH, Overstraeten file.
- 17 Général Raoul Van Overstraeten, *Albert I–Leopold III: Vingt Ans De Politique Militaire Belge, 1920–1940* ('Overstraeten, *Albert I–Leopold III*'), p. 458.
- 18 Report by Colonel R. Monjoie, 1st Section, the Belgian Army, in CDH, Carton A Farde 2 C111 ('Monjoie's Report').
- 19 Van den Bergen's note to the Minister of Defence, dated 21 January 1940, in CDH, Carton A Farde 2 CIV ('Van den Bergen's Report'), and Overstraeten, *Albert I–Leopold III*, p. 456.
- 20 This is admitted in Van den Bergen's Report. Van den Bergen could not remember

- whether he told the King and Van Overstraeten that he was about to order that the barriers should be removed. Van Overstraeten insisted he did not: Overstraeten, *Albert I–Leopold III*, p. 486.
- 21 Monjoie's Report.
- 22 The 13 January 1940 entry in Jodl's Diary states that because of the forecast poor weather on 16 and 17 January, which might possibly last until 19 January, the attack in the West was to be postponed to 20 January at the earliest.
- 23 Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, *Les avertissements qui venaient de Berlin: 9 octobre 1939–10 mai 1940* ('Vanwelkenhuyzen, *Avertissements*'), p. 76.
- 24 Annex 1 to a 16 January 1940 note, SHM, 1BB2 207 Dossier 5. The Belgians also wanted guarantees that after any conflict Belgium's status as a state, including her colonies, would be confirmed, and that Belgium would be assisted financially.
- 25 A description of what Sir Roger Keyes meant to say to Churchill is in 'Record of Conversations with Admiral Sir Roger Keyes at the Foreign Office on February 21st and 22nd 1940', one of the documents handed down by Keyes to his son, Roger, the second Lord Keyes. The documents made available by Lord Keyes are subsequently referred to in this book as the 'Keyes Files'.
- 26 This is revealed by the 14 January 1940 Annex 1 to a 16 January 1940 note, SHM, 1 BB2 207 Dossier 5.
- 27 Annex 3 to the 16 January 1940 note mentioned in note 26 above. The watering-down consisted in only giving the guarantees in so far as Britain had the ability to comply with them after any conflict.
- 28 The telegram from Pol Le Tellier to Brussels mentioning what Daladier told him is in Vanwelkenhuyzen, *Avertissements*, p. 102.
- 29 The transcript is in Daladier's files, ANP 496 AP20. It was brought to my attention by Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen.
- 30 Vanwelkenhuyzen, *Avertissements*, pp. 107–8.
- 31 It is unclear whether Hitler's final decision to change the focus of the attack to the southern arm occurred as a result of a plan formulated by von Manstein, who met Hitler to explain his plan on 17 February 1940, or whether he came to the idea independently. The 17 February meeting was described in von Manstein's *Lost Victories*, pp. 120–22. Whatever the truth of the matter, von Manstein is often said to have been the mastermind behind the new plan.
- 32 B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Other Side Of The Hill*, p. 159.
- 33 Sometimes referred to as Aufmarschanweisung Gelb (Deployment Directive Yellow).
- 34 Sir Lancelot Oliphant, the British Ambassador in Brussels, quoted in NA/PRO WO 371 24397.

4: The Final Warning

- 1 The first tip-off was on 9 October 1939, according to Vicomte Jacques Davignon, *Berlin 1936–1940: Souvenirs d'Une Mission*, p. 221.
- 2 The description in this chapter of how Sas' intelligence was given to the Dutch

and Belgians, and how it was challenged within Holland, is based on the following sources: 1. *Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940–1945, Verslag houdende de uitkomsten van het onderzoek, Deel 1c, Algemene Inleiding/Militair Beleid 1939–1940, Verhoren*, pp. 208–13, ('Enquêtecommissie'); 2. Dr L. de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog 1939–1945, Deel 2, Neutraal* ('de Jong'), pp. 116–42; 3. Series of articles by Sas' son, (Gijsbertus junior), in the Dutch magazine *De Spiegel*, commencing with article 'Het begon in mei 1940, on 17 October 1953 ('*De Spiegel*'). These documents were brought to my attention by Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, and made available by René Kruis of Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, Amsterdam.

Sas' failure to disclose his source's identity, and the fact that he told Reynders that his source was in the Abwehr, is mentioned in *Enquêtecommissie*, p. 209.

- 3 *Enquêtecommissie*, p. 23, and de Jong, p. 139.
- 4 *Enquêtecommissie*, p. 207, Vanwelkenhuyzen, *Avertissements*, p. 40, and 12 November 1939 was mentioned in the 27 October 1939 entry of Arnold Lissance (ed.), *The Halder Diaries: The Private War Journals of Colonel General Franz Halder* ('Halder, *Diaries*'), p. 114.
- 5 *Enquêtecommissie*, p. 209.
- 6 7 November entry in Halder, *Diaries*, p. 121.
- 7 The diplomat who warned the Dutch Foreign Ministry was Britain's man in Holland, Sir Neville Bland, mentioned in Vanwelkenhuyzen, *Avertissements*, p. 33.
- 8 Dirk Jan de Geer was the minister who put this sceptical question. It was mentioned by a Reynders statement in de Jong, pp. 124–5.
- 9 Admiral Furstner was the former head of the Navy visited by Sas, according to *Enquêtecommissie*, p. 208.
- 10 The head of Dutch Intelligence was Major-General J. W. van Oorschot. Sas' visit to him is described in *Enquêtecommissie*, p. 208.
- 11 De Jong, p. 126.
- 12 *De Spiegel*, p. 23.
- 13 2 February 1940 letter to the Maison Militaire of the King of Belgium from Colonel Pierre Diepenrykx in CDH, Overstraeten file.
- 14 *De Spiegel*, p. 24. Colonel Francis Blake was the British Military Attaché.
- 15 Because many documents are missing from Dutch files, and because Sas always shared the warnings given by his German informant with the Belgian military attaché, it is often easier to check the dates of the warnings and their content by looking in the Belgian archives. The warning given to Sas on 7 December 1939 was telegraphed to Belgium on 8 December 1939, and the telegram specifying that the attack was being postponed was telegraphed to Belgium on 15 December 1939, according to Vanwelkenhuyzen, *Avertissements*, pp. 59–61. The 7 December 1939 warning was an echo of Hitler's 6 December decision that the earliest attack date would be 17 December 1939. The latter decision is recorded in Jodl's Diary, 6 December 1939.
- 16 *Enquêtecommissie*, p. 210.
- 17 This and other facts concerning Hans Oster's family life were confirmed by his daughter, Barbara, when I interviewed her during 2002–4.

- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Ibid., reporting a conversation mentioned to Barbara Oster by Oster's driver.
- 23 H. Amersfoort and P. H. Kamphuis (eds.), *Je Maintiendrai: A Concise History of the Dutch Army*, p. 85. General Winkelman replaced Reynders on 6 February 1940.
- 24 Jodl's Diary, 2 April 1940.
- 25 Enquêtecommissie, p. 210.
- 26 Sas' 12 June 1947 memorandum, addressed to the Norwegian Government, in Vanwelkenhuyzen, *Avertissements*, pp. 147–8; the 4 April message that Belgian military attaché Georges Goethals sent to Belgium, in CDH, Overstraeten file. It is possible that Sas misremembered some details: the Goethals message only mentioned an attack on Denmark rather than on both Denmark and Norway, and he stated it was expected during the week commencing 8 April, rather than on 9 April. It is likely that Sas' message to Holland would have contained the same details. Sas' message is missing from the Dutch archives.
- 27 Enquêtecommissie, p. 211.
- 28 My 2001 and 2004 interviews with Heinz Renk.
- 29 Major Léon Buisseret's account ('Buisseret's Report'), dated 15 March 1946, giving this story is filed in CDH, A Farde 2 CV.
- 30 This and the account describing how Sas came to give this final warning are based on Sas' own account in Enquêtecommissie, pp. 211–12.
- 31 According to Buisseret's Report, Goethals stated in his warning that a counter-order could be given before 9 p.m. on 9 May, whereas Sas, in his account in Enquêtecommissie, pp. 211–12, referred to a counter-order before 9.30 p.m. Neither specified whether they were referring to German, Belgian or Dutch time. In the main text, I have used the time specified by Sas, and assumed he was referring to German time, but it is subject to the reservation in this note.
- 32 Enquêtecommissie, p. 211.

5: The Matador's Cloak

- 1 These times are in Colonel James E. Mrazek, *The Fall Of Eben Emael: Prelude To Dunkerque*, ('Mrazek, *Fall of Eben Emael*'), pp. 63–5.
All times in this chapter are Belgian, which, as mentioned in notes to previous chapters, were one hour behind German time in May 1940.
- 2 Storm Group Koch war diary ('Koch Report'), BA-MA RL33/97.
- 3 This time specified in Buisseret's Report may well be only a best estimate, given that the message in question appears to be missing from Belgian archives, and Buisseret wrote his report after the war. Also, Buisseret does not specify he is referring to Belgian time. I have assumed he is.
- 4 CDH, Overstraeten file.
- 5 Vanwelkenhuyzen, *Avertissements*, p. 243.

- 6 Enquêtecommissie, p. 211.
- 7 Vanwelkenhuyzen, *Avertissements*, pp. 257, 264 and 266–71; Enquêtecommissie, p. 211.
- 8 Vanwelkenhuyzen, *Avertissements*, p. 300. The major referred to was Orphée Gierst.
- 9 Jottrand's reaction and the reaction of his officers to the alert are given in Jottrand's 'Souvenirs Personnels' ('Jottrand, Souvenirs'), in CDH; 'PFL IX Fort d'Eben-Emael: Commission des Forts', in CDH, Eben-Emael file, and Commission Militaire Centrale Commission des Forts, 'Rapport sur la défense du fort d'Eben-Emael en mai 1940' ('Eben-Emael Report'), in CDH, Eben-Emael file.
- 10 Eben-Emael Report, p. 161.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 The bridge guards were from the Cyclistes Frontières de Limbourg.
- 13 Commandant Giddeloo's widow's statement, noted down by H. Gilbert on 20 August 1943, in CDH, Albert Canal Bridges file.
- 14 'Les ponts n'ont pas sauté', chief of staff of the Belgian 4th Division, 1947, in CDH, Albert Canal Bridges file.
- 15 Jean-Louis Lhoest, *Les Paras Allemands Au Canal Albert: Mai 1940*, ('Lhoest, *Les Paras Allemands*'), pp. 91–2 and 120.
- 16 Buisseret's Report.
- 17 'Activités de RO1 au début des Hostilités' ('RO1'), in CDH, 3rd Chasseurs Ardennais Regiment file.
- 18 'Rapport sur la Reconnaissance d'Officier no. 4 1939–1940' ('RO4'), in CDH, *ibid.*
- 19 'Des Reconnaissances Frontières du Groupement des Ardennes' ('RO2'), in CDH, *ibid.*; RO1 and RO4.
- 20 Buisseret's Report.
- 21 Vanwelkenhuyzen, *Avertissements*, pp. 320–21 and 325.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 327.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 328.
- 24 The 16 May 1940 report on Operation Stahl–Veldwezelt ('Veldwezelt Report') and the October 1940 report on Operation Beton–Vroenhoven ('Vroenhoven Report') refer to the gliders arriving at the bridges at 4.15–4.20 a.m., Belgian time. The report on Operation Granit–Eben-Emael does not specify a time of arrival at the fort, but states that the German gliders took off at 3.30 a.m., Belgian time, at the same time as those gliders used for the attacks on the bridges. The three reports mentioned in this note are in the Koch Report.
- 25 Jottrand, *Souvenirs*.
- 26 Lhoest, *Les Paras Allemands*, p. 190; Eben-Emael Report, p. 159; Koch Report.
- 27 Corporal Penneman's 6 April 1945 report ('Penneman's Report'), in CDH, Albert Canal Bridges file.
- 28 Lhoest, *Les Paras Allemands*, pp. 113–14.
- 29 Vroenhoven Report.
- 30 Penneman's Report, and statement by Léonard Craemer ('Craemer's Report'), dated 19 April 1945, in CDH, Albert Canal Bridges file.
- 31 Account by Barthelomeus Meers, dated 19 April 1945, in CDH, Albert Canal Bridges file.

- 32 Penneman's Report says he tried to stop Crauwels going upstairs.
- 33 Penneman's Report, Craemer's Report, and the account by Robert Baete, dated 16 April 1940, but which was probably written on 16 April 1945, in CDH, Albert Canal Bridges file.
- 34 Lhoest, *Les Paras Allemands*, p. 89.
- 35 Account by Lieutenant Boyen, Cyclistes Frontières, at Lanaeken, 6 November 1946, in CDH, Albert Canal Bridges file.
- 36 Willem Vranken's account, dated 7 April 1940, in CDH, Albert Canal Bridges file. However, it was probably written on 7 April 1945, i.e., in the same month that accounts by other survivors were written, and given to the Belgian Service Historique de L'Armée.
- 37 Sergeant Leemans' account, referred to in the report 'Les Ponts du Canal Albert dans le Secteur de la 7 D.I. 10 et 11 mai', in CDH, Albert Canal Bridges file.
- 38 Lhoest, *Les Paras Allemands*, p. 146: the testimony of Sergeant Van de Velde.
- 39 Lhoest, *Les Paras Allemands*, p. 113.
- 40 Veldwezelt and Vroenhoven Reports.
- 41 Koch Report, and Lhoest, *Les Paras Allemands*, pp. 120 and 133.
- 42 Koch Report.
- 43 Eben-Emael Report, p. 78.
- 44 Mrazek, *Fall of Eben Emael*, pp. 95–7.
- 45 Eben-Emael Report, pp. 157 and 161.
- 46 Mrazek, *Fall of Eben Emael*, pp. 126–7.
- 47 Eben-Emael Report, p. 164.
- 48 Mrazek, *Fall of Eben Emael*, pp. 161–2; and Eben-Emael Report, p. 138.
- 49 Eben-Emael Report, p.146.
- 50 *Ibid.*, p.152.
- 51 *Ibid.*, p.146.

6: Charging Bull

- 1 Strangeways was adjutant in the 1st Battalion, the Duke of Wellington's Regiment, one of nine infantry battalions in the BEF's 1 Division.
Bachy is around twelve miles south-east of Lille, on the Franco-Belgian border.
- 2 J. M. Breton and A. C. S. Savory, *The History of the Duke of Wellington's Regiment (West Riding) 1702–1992*, p. 31.
- 3 Ellis, *War In France*, p. 19.
- 4 Louvain is some fifteen miles east of Brussels, and Wavre is around twelve miles south-west of Louvain.
- 5 2nd Lieutenant Tim Bishop's diary, made available by his daughter, Sue.
- 6 Captain Nick Hallett, 'A Diary of the Blitzkrieg and After: May 1940' ('Hallett's Report'), was made available by his daughter Nicolette.
Orchies is around six miles south-west of Bachy, the village referred to in note 1 above.
- 7 Captain R. J. Hastings, 'Recollections of the Blitz' ('Hastings's Report').

- 8 According to the 2 Royal Norfolks' war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/794, De Wilton was evacuated on 18 May 1940.
- 9 The AASF initially included eight Fairey Battle and two Blenheim bomber squadrons, and two Hurricane fighter squadrons. Two additional fighter squadrons joined the AASF in France when the Germans attacked. The BEF's RAF Component initially consisted of four Lysander reconnaissance squadrons, two and subsequently four Blenheim squadrons, and four Hurricane fighter squadrons. Two additional Hurricane fighter squadrons joined the Component in France when the Germans attacked. There were ten Hurricane fighter squadrons in France at the beginning of the campaign. Information from Norman Franks, *Valiant Wings: The Battle and Blenheim Squadrons over France 1940* ('Franks, *Valiant Wings*'), p. 18ff. Seven Blenheim squadrons based in Britain, acting under Bomber Command, were also made available for missions over France, as mentioned in Richards, *Fight At Odds*, p. 209.
- 10 Franks, *Valiant Wings*, pp. 40–46.
- 11 Blenheims and Fairey Battles were classed as medium bombers. The sixteen squadrons of heavy bombers, including Wellingtons, Hampdens and Whitleys, were unsuitable for daylight raids in the face of fighter opposition, and were reserved as Britain's strategic striking force to be used at night on targets such as Germany's industrialized Ruhr area, according to Richards, *Fight At Odds*, pp. 110–11.
- 12 Richards, *Fight At Odds*, pp. 113 and 119.
- 13 Franks, *Valiant Wings*, pp. 81–2.
Dippach is some eight miles west of Luxembourg's capital.
- 14 Ibid., pp. 81–2 and 96; Richards, *Fight At Odds*, p. 114.
- 15 Gordon Patterson, 'The Personal Autobiography of Gordon Nelson Patterson' ('Patterson, Personal Autobiography'), citing the interrogation of a German pilot shot down after 10 May 1940.
- 16 Bill Simpson, *One of Our Pilots Is Safe*, pp. 54–61, brought to my attention by 12 Squadron's wireless-operator/air-gunner Len Clarke.
Junglinster is some nine miles north-east of Luxembourg's capital.
- 17 'Notes prises par le Lt Colonel de Villelume sur une conversation avec le général Gamelin', ANP 496 AP22.
- 18 Georges' opposition is mentioned in Chapter 2. Giraud's is mentioned in Roton, *Années Cruciales*, p. 133.
- 19 'Instruction no. 9 pour le général commandant le groupe d'armées no. 1 et le général commandant en chef la BEF', a copy of which is laid out in Roton, *Années Cruciales*, pp. 135–8.
Breda is some twenty-five miles south-east of Rotterdam. St-Lenaarts is some eighteen miles south of Breda.
- 20 Home, *To Lose a Battle*, p. 266. Gennep is some twenty-seven miles north-east of Eindhoven.
- 21 Moerdijk is some seventeen miles south-east of Rotterdam.
- 22 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 258 specifies the number of French tanks in the Corps de Cavalerie. Gembloux is some eleven miles south-east of Wavre, and some nine miles north-west of Namur.

- 23 General René Prioux, *Souvenirs De Guerre, 1939–1943* ('Prioux, *Souvenirs De Guerre*'), p. 63.
- 24 Tirlemont is some ten miles south-east of Louvain, and Huy is some sixteen miles north-east of Namur. Hannut is approximately in the middle of the line stretching from Tirlemont to Huy.
- 25 Jean-Marie de Beaucorps, *Soldat De Plomb*, pp. 35–9.
- 26 See tank specifications in Appendix A on p. 539.
- 27 Ibid. The 3 DLM used Hotchkiss 39s, according to Saint-Martin, *Blindés français*, p. 321.
- 28 Bougrain's Report, p. 5.
- 29 Merdorp is some two miles south-west from Thisnes, and from Crehen, where the fiercest fighting had taken place on 12 May. Thisnes is some two miles west of Hannut. Crehen is one mile south-west of Hannut.
- 30 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 261, specifies the tanks put out of action. The times of the orders to withdraw behind the infantry's principal line of resistance are specified in 'Historique De La 3ième D.L.M.', SHAT 32N498; and Bougrain's Report, p. 39.
- 31 Approximate German tank losses calculated using statistics in Appendices to XVI Corps' war diary, BA-MA RH21-4/527, p. 46; Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 259. Frieser also mentions numbers of Panzer 1s and 2s in the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions.
- 32 XVI Corps' war diary, p. 71, BA-MA RH21-4/518.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 4th Panzer Division's war diary, BA-MA RH27-4/6.
- 35 Ibid.
- 36 XVI Corps' war diary, BA-MA RH27-3/245, p. 29 (using numbers on top right of page), mentions the 10 p.m. 15 May halt order.
Ernage is ten miles north-west of Gembloux. Perbais is six miles north-west of Ernage, and Cortil-Noirmont is six miles south-west of Ernage.
- 37 Pownall, *Diaries*, 16 May entry, p. 317.

7: Into Battle

- 1 Franks, *Valiant Wings*, p. 116.
Amifontaine is fourteen miles north-west of Rheims.
- 2 *Revue de l'aviation française 1939–40: Le Bataille de France, Vol. VIII*, brought to my attention by Luc Vangansbeke.
The Briegden bridge was around one and a half miles north-west of the Veldwezelt bridge.
- 3 My 2002 interview with Len Clarke, a wireless-operator in 12 Squadron in 1940 ('Len Clarke Interview').
- 4 Patterson, *Personal Autobiography*, p. 69.
- 5 My 2002 interview with Neville Harper.
- 6 Richards, *Fight At Odds*, p. 117.
- 7 Ibid.

- 8 Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel F. C. Vandaele, from the Historical Section of the Belgian Ministry of Defence to Denis Richards, author of *Fight At Odds*, quoting the Ministère des Travaux Publics, in CDH, file dealing with the bombing of the bridges.
- 9 *London Gazette*, 11 June 1940. Details brought to my attention by Didy Grahame of the Victoria Cross and George Cross Association.
- 10 Len Clarke Interview.
- 11 Richards, *Fight At Odds*, p. 119; and Franks, *Valiant Wings*, p. 138.
- 12 Franks, *Valiant Wings*, p. 138.
- 13 Richards, *Fight At Odds*, p. 119.
- 14 Alan Brooke, Notes, pp. 138–9.
- 15 The light cavalry battalions acting as a screen in front of the three divisions holding the British sector of the Dyle were, taking them from north to south, 15th/19th The King's Royal Hussars screening 3 Division, 13th/18th Royal Hussars screening 1 Division, and 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards screening 2 Division.
- 16 The 15 May counter-attacks by 3 Division's 1 Coldstream Guards and 2 Royal Ulster Rifles are described in Michael Howard and John Sparrow, *The Coldstream Guards 1920–1946*, pp. 33–4, and Charles Graves, *The Royal Ulster Rifles, Volume III*, p. 47 brought to my attention by Major Edward Crofton of the Coldstream Guards, Captain J. Knox and Terence Nelson of the Royal Ulster Rifles Regimental Museum.
- 17 Gastuche is two miles north-east of Wavre, and La Tombe is one mile to the north-west of Gastuche.
- 18 David Rissik, *The DLI At War* ('Rissik, *DLI At War*'), p. 10, brought to my attention by the DLI's Major Randall Cross, ('Cross/DLI'), and 2 DLI's war diary in NA/PRO WO 167/728. 2 DLI was in 2 Division's 6 Brigade, which occupied the front line between 2 Division's 4 Brigade to the south, and 1 Division to the north.
- 19 2 DLI's war diary.
- 20 My 2004 interview with 2 DLI's Luke Bowden.
- 21 Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*, p. 82
- 22 Rissik, *DLI At War*, p. 11, shows that 2nd Lieutenant Hyde-Thompson's platoon in B Company was to the south-west of Annand's D Company.
- 23 Rissik, *DLI At War*, pp. 12–13.
- 24 *London Gazette*, 23 August 1940. Details brought to my attention by Didy Grahame of the Victoria Cross and George Cross Association.
- 25 The withdrawal was not part of the general withdrawal to the Escaut referred to in Chapters 11 and 12, which was ordered at 10 a.m. on 16 May 1940, according to Gort, Despatches, p. 5912. It was part of the bending back of the right section of the line until it was covered by the River Lasne rather than the Dyle to take into account that the positions held by the French division on the 2nd Division's right (the 2nd North African Division) had been penetrated. This penetration, which would have constituted a serious obstacle to prolonged resistance on the Dyle, even had there been no German breakthroughs at Sedan, near Dinant and

Monthermé, is confirmed by the 15 May entry in 6 Brigade's war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/357.

- 26 Stephen Shannon's booklet *Beyond Praise*, and my interview with Shirley Annand, the fiancée mentioned in the text who later became Dick Annand's wife. Cross/DLI put me in contact with the Annands and Shannon.

8: Over the River Meuse

- 1 Général Maurice Gamelin, *Servir: La Guerre (Septembre 1939–19 Mai 1940)*, Vol. 3 ('Gamelin, *Servir*'), p. 401, states that the French high command believed that the Ardennes forest was impracticable for tanks if they could not advance on the roads.
- 2 Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader* ('Guderian, *Panzer Leader*'), p. 90.
- 3 Report by Capitaine de Vielder of the 1st Battalion, the 5th Chasseurs Ardennais, brought to my attention by Eva Muys, an archivist at CDH ('Muys/CDH'), and Général Camille Duffet, commander of French 18 Division, '18 D.I. Campagne de 1939–40' in the 18 Division file, SHAT 32N99 ('Duffet's Report'), p. 74, refer to the 4.02 p.m. (Belgian time) blowing up of the Dinant bridge, and the German attempt to cross it before the explosion. It should be noted, however, that a 7th Panzer Division war diary document refers to these events taking place at '16.45', which appears to be 3.45 p.m. Belgian time, in BA-MA RH27-7/215, pp. 3–4 (using numbers in centre of page).
- 4 Duffet's Report, p. 74.
- 5 My 2002 interview with Michael Berthold, who was in the 7th Company of the 2nd Section of the 25th Panzer Regiment.
- 6 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 244. There are differences of opinion concerning the exact time of the blowing up of the Yvoir bridge. Anton von Plato, *Die Geschichte Der 5. Panzerdivision 1938 bis 1945* ('Plato, *Geschichte Der 5 Panzerdivision*'), p. 46, specifies 5.30 p.m. German time (4.30 p.m. Belgian time), which is in line with the 1st Battalion, the 5th Chasseurs Ardennais' war diary supplied by Muys/CDH, and two Belgian witnesses cited in Capitaine-Commandant Georges Hautecler, 'Défense et sautage du pont d'Yvoir' in *L'Armée et La Nation* (May 1959) ('Hautecler's Yvoir Article'), which was brought to my attention by Peter Taghon, author of *Mai 40*. The report by one of these witnesses. Sous-Lieutenant José Dumont, was supplied to me by Muys/CDH. However, General Dunoyer, the French 5 Division's infantry commander, in SHAT 32N15 ('Dunoyer's Report'), p. 17, mentions 5.45 p.m., while the report by Capitaine Foque, an officer in 1 Company of the 129th Regiment's 1st Battalion, part of 5 Division, in the 129th Regiment file, SHAT 34N130 ('Foque's Report'), p.3, specifies 4 p.m.
The description from the Belgian viewpoint of the blowing up of the Yvoir bridge is based on Hautecler's Yvoir Article.
- 7 According to Hautecler's Yvoir Article, the Belgian soldiers were from the 1st Battalion, the 5th Chasseurs Ardennais, and the 1st Company of the 31st Bataillon du Génie.

- Foque's Report, p. 3, specifies that Colonel Tachet des Combes was the senior French officer who crossed the bridge.
- 8 My 2001 interview with Lieutenant Heinz Zobel, one of the tank crew. I was introduced to him by Wolfgang Guttmann, who runs the 5th Panzer Division's Veterans' Association.
- 9 Houx is some two miles south-east of Yvoir.
- 10 The war diary for the 1st Battalion, the 5th Chasseurs Ardennais, see note 6 above.
- 11 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, pp. 244–5.
- 12 Report by Claude Gamber, a lieutenant in the 2nd Battalion of 5 Division's 129th Regiment, in the 129th Regiment file, SHAT 34N130 ('Gamber's Report').
- 13 Report by Commandant Gouvello, the French 18 Division's chief of staff, in the 18 Division file, SHAT 32N99 ('Gouvello's Report'), p. 2.
- Anhée is some three miles north-west of Dinant, and Insemont is some five miles south-west of Dinant.
- 14 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, pp. 245–6, who states that the German troops were from the 3rd Company of the 8th reconnaissance group of the 1st Battalion, the 5th Panzer Division's Schützenregiment 13. There is still some debate over whether it was acting under the command of the 5th or 7th Panzer Division when the first crossing of the river at Houx was made.
- 15 Gamber's Report.
- 16 Plato, *Der Geschichte Der 5 Panzerdivision*, p. 49. The first German units that crossed at Houx on 13 May were the 1st and 2nd Battalions of Schützenregiment 14, and the 1st Battalion, Schützenregiment 13, units within the 5th Panzer Division.
- 17 Report by Ornano, 'La 18e Division dans la bataille de la Meuse', p. 20, in the 18 Division file, SHAT 32N99.
- 18 Duffet's Report, pp. 78–80 and 84.
- 19 Colonel Véron, deputy chief of staff of the 9th Army, 'Notes sur La 9ème Armée: Les Opérations Auxquelles Elle A Participé' ('Véron's Report'), p. 24 in the 9th Army file in SHAT 29N441, states that Corap was informed about the Houx incursion at 11.30 a.m. 13 May, but the 1 p.m. 13 May entry in Georges' Journal suggests that Corap still did not know of it at 12.15 p.m. Georges' Journal states that his own staff first heard the news at 12.05 p.m.
- In relation to the 9th Army, Map 5 on pp. 516–17 only specifies positions held by corps and divisions. The sector running from Yvoir to Dinant was held as follows, from north to south:
- 129th Regiment (part of 2 Corps' 5 Division), the river line from Yvoir to, and including, the railway bridge south of Anhée and north of Houx. This bridge represented the boundary between 2 and XI Corps.
- The following units were under XI Corps' 18 Division:
- 2nd Battalion, 39th Regiment, (a 5 Division unit placed under 18 Division's control), the river line south of the abovementioned railway bridge, including the area opposite Houx; 66th Regiment, the area south of Houx to Bouvignes (Bouvignes is just to the north-west of Dinant); 77th Regiment, Dinant.
- 20 Horne, *To Lose a Battle*, p. 313, referring to General Georges' situation report during the evening of 12 May.

- 21 According to Général Charles Grandsard, *Le 10e Corps D'Armée Dans La Bataille: 1939–1940* ('Grandsard, 10 Corps'), p. 26, and Ruby, *Sedan*, pp. 49–50, the following deficiencies existed in the Sedan sector:

<i>Planned equipment</i>	<i>Equipment possessed on 10 May 1940</i>
104 25mm anti-tank guns	9 25mm anti-tank guns. (The units had larger less mobile guns.)
80 machine-guns/mile	51 machine-guns/mile
100,000 mines	2,000 mines all unusable by 10 May 1940!
30 large shelters/mile	3 large shelters/mile. (There were more smaller shelters/blockhouses.)

- 22 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 163, and map of pillboxes and blockhouses in SHAT 32N253.
- 23 The French 55 and 71 Divisions, which were ordered to hold the crucial Sedan sector, were both B Divisions, which means they were packed with older reserve soldiers. Commandant Crousse, commander of the 3rd Battalion, the 147th Fortress Regiment, maintained that his regiment lost its best men: see his report in the 147th Fortress Regiment file, SHAT 34N145 ('Crousse's Report'), pp. 2–4.
- 24 The French 71 Division was in the area around Vouziers, according to Ruby, *Sedan*, p. 103, which is eighteen miles south-east of Reethel.
- 25 Grandsard, *10 Corps*, pp. 108–9.

- 26 Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, p. 9, confirms that his XIX Corps' 1st Panzer Division was to be the spearhead of the German attack in the south. Its vanguard crossed the German border into Luxembourg at Wallendorf, some thirty-eight miles east of Neufchâteau, Belgium, at 4.30 a.m. on 10 May (French/Belgian time, as are all the times in this note), and headed west flanked by XIX Corps' 2nd and 10th Panzer Divisions to its north and south respectively. Neufchâteau is some twenty-four miles north-east of Sedan. The 1st Panzer Division would have attempted to take Neufchâteau that same day, had it not been for the unexpected consequences of special operation 'Niwi', which involved landing Fieseler Storch planes full of infantry at Nives and Witry, that is, between Neufchâteau and Bodange, the latter village being some twelve miles east of the former town. The German infantry did their job, cutting off communications between Belgian commanders and their troops in the front line further to the east, but ironically this increased the resistance encountered by the German panzers: the Belgian commanders wanted the Bodange garrison in the 1st Panzer Division's path to withdraw. Instead, cut off from its commander, it held out for most of 10 May.

Nevertheless troops supporting the 1st Panzer Division were able to take Neufchâteau the next day. They did this without defeating the 5ième Division Légère de Cavalerie (5 DLC), French cavalry holding an east-facing line including Neufchâteau. The panzers carried out a left-hook manoeuvre to the south, culminating in the capture of Petitvoir and Biourge to the west of Neufchâteau. Fearing that the 5 DLC would be surrounded, its commander ordered his men to withdraw westwards to the River Semois.

5 DLC's hurried retreat led to the disintegration of the French east-facing screen. When the commander of the 3ième Brigade de Spahis, which had been

holding the area to the north, learned that 5 DLC was retreating, he ordered his men to go back to the Semois as well. However, some German troops captured a small bridge over the Semois at Mouzaive, seven miles north-west of Bouillon, before the Spahis reached it, and this upset their commander again. Unable to contact the 9th Army commander, his superior officer, or to find out whether the 5 DLC was still holding the line of the Semois to his right, the Spahis' commander Colonel Marc gave his troops the order to retreat to the Meuse at 2.30 a.m. on 12 May.

It is hard to determine from surviving documents whether it was the fact that the Germans had crossed the Semois at and to the south of Mouzaive, and the fact that the Spahis had retreated, or whether it was the hurried attack by the 1st Panzer Division at Bouillon during the night of 11–12 May that led to the French retreat from the area in and around that town. Bouillon is some nine miles north-east of Sedan. Whatever the principal reason, at 11 a.m. on 12 May, 5 DLC's commander also gave his troops the order to abandon the Semois with the intention of making a stand at the *maisons fortes* (fortified houses) at St Menges and near Fleigneux (respectively some two and three miles north and north-east of Sedan). Resistance at these *maisons fortes* did not delay the Germans for long, and by around 5.15 p.m. on 12 May the 1st Panzer Division's tanks had reached the portion of Sedan that is north-east of the Meuse. The 5 DLC rearguard crossed the Meuse to join the French troops on the other side of the river between 5 and 6 p.m., and by 10 p.m. the remainder of the units making up the 2nd Army's screen had also crossed to the French side of the principal position of resistance. The 2nd and 10th Panzer Divisions reached the Meuse shortly after the 1st Panzer Division.

From the above, it can be seen that it took Guderian's spearhead just two and a half days to reach the Meuse, whereas the French high command had hoped its screen could delay the Germans for five days.

Sources consulted for this note in addition to those listed above include: Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, pp. 133–49; Home, *To Lose a Battle*, p. 306; Robert Allan Doughty, *The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940* ('Doughty, *Breaking Point*'), pp. 73–93; '2e Armée 3e Bureau Comptes Rendus journaliers de l'Armée du 10 mai au 25 juin 1940', in SHAT 29N51; 'History of 5 DLC', in SHAT 32N489; and 'Journal de Marche et Opérations de la 3e Brigade de Spahis', in SHAT 34N456.

- 27 71 Division took over the south-eastern portion of the area previously held by 55 Division, and the north-western portion of the area previously held by the division to the south-east of 55 Division: the 3rd North African Division, which was also under the command of the 2nd Army's X Corps.
- 28 In relation to the 2nd Army, Map 5 on pp. 516–17 only specifies the 13 May positions of corps and divisions in the area around Sedan. The 2nd Army's principal line of resistance stretched from Vrine-Meuse along the south and south-west banks of the Meuse until the point where it joins with the Chiers. Thereafter the front stretched along the south and south-west banks of the Chiers to Longuyon. Vrine-Meuse is some four miles west of Sedan, and Longuyon is some thirty-six miles south-east of Sedan.

- 29 Ruby, *Sedan*, pp. 114–15.
- 30 Crousse's Report, p. 9.
Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 174, refers to around 1500 planes being at Group Kleist's disposal. They included 600 bombers, 250 Stukas and 620 fighters.
- 31 L'Étadon is south-west of Wadelincourt, which is itself to the south-west of Sedan. The Marfée heights referred to by Michard include Height 247, which is west of Wadelincourt, according to his report, in the 147th Fortress Regiment file, SHAT 34N145.
- 32 Stuka is an abbreviation used for the Ju-87 'Sturzkampfflugzeug' (dive-attack plane).
- 33 Lieutenant Michard's account, in Paul Berben and Bernard Iselin, *Les Panzers Passent la Meuse (13 May 1940)*, pp. 226–7.
- 34 Anonymous account, under the heading 'Aus dem Kriegstagebuch der 2. Kompanie' (subsequently referred to in this book as the 'Hanbauer Report', Hanbauer being the name of the lieutenant in charge of the writer's section within the 2nd Company of the 10th Panzer Division's Schützenregiment 86), p. 23, in BA-MA RH37/138.
- 35 This is according to French time. German time was one hour later.
- 36 Report by Capitaine Carribou of the 147th Fortress Regiment's 2nd Battalion, p. 7, the 147th Fortress Regiment file, in SHAT 34N145.
- 37 Doughty, *Breaking Point*, pp. 153–4; and Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 183.
Bazeilles is some three miles south-east of Sedan.
- 38 Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Pinaud, commander of the Frénois sector ('Pinaud's Report'), p. 4, in the 295th Regiment's file, SHAT 34N174.
- 39 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, pp. 185–6, and Doughty, *Breaking Point*, p. 157, agree that the crossing in question took place south of Pont de la Gare as shown in Map 6 on p. 518), but they do not agree on the crossing's exact location.
- 40 Hanbauer Report, pp. 24–6.
- 41 Panzerpionier 49 war diary, p. 11 (using numbers in the middle of the page), BA-MA RH46/743. Rubarth's unit was the 2nd company of the 49th battalion of storm engineers which had been attached to the 1st Battalion of the 10th Panzer Division's Schützenregiment 86.
- 42 See comment concerning the crossing location in note 39 above.
- 43 Doughty, *Breaking Point*, pp. 155–6.
- 44 Albert Schick, *Die Zehnte P.D.: Die Geschichte der 10. Panzer-Division 1939–1943* ('Schick' *Die Zehnte P.D.*), p. 132, and Doughty, *Breaking Point*, p. 162.
- 45 Doughty, *Breaking Point*, pp. 153–4.
- 46 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, pp. 186–8, and Doughty, *Breaking Point*, pp. 133 and 162–4.
- 47 Crousse's Report, p. 10.
Donchery is around two and a half miles west of Sedan. Bellevue is one mile east of Donchery.
- 48 The crossing-point for the 1st Panzer Division's Schützenregiment 1 was in the Gaulier gap where there were no blockhouses. According to the report by Captain Foucault of the 2nd Battalion, the 331st Regiment ('Foucault's Report'), p. 13, in SHAT 34N178, the crossing at this point took place at 3 p.m. on 13 May. Two

sections of the 43rd Battalion of storm engineers under Lieutenant Korthals then made the all-important breakthrough, capturing the Bellevue artillery casemate referred to in the text of this chapter at or shortly after 5 p.m., according to Crousse's Report, p. 11, and other reports mentioned in Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 413, before proceeding west to capture a series of blockhouses including number 102. (Blockhouses and other features referred to in this note can be found on Map 6 on p. 518.) This thrust enabled the remainder of Schützenregiment 1 to push on southwards, without being bothered by the blockhouses to the west. They reached Height 301, known as La Boulette, at around 10.40 p.m.

The crossing-point for Grossdeutschland Regiment's 2nd Battalion was near Pont-Neuf, the northern Sedan bridge. At first the attackers were forced back by French guns firing from Blockhouse 211, and it was only after an 88mm gun knocked it out, and after a second well-concealed blockhouse was put out of action as well, that the crossing could proceed. One company of men under Lieutenant von Courbière, acting under the covering fire of a second company, then captured Blockhouses 104, 7 bis and 7 ter. The battalion went on to capture Height 247, known as La Marfée (the hill mentioned in Lieutenant Michard's account as confirmed by the source quoted in note 31 above), at 8 p.m.

The above descriptions take into account information in Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, pp. 177–83.

49 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 188.

50 Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, p. 102; Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, pp. 163, 172 and 176–83; and Doughty, *Breaking Point*, pp. 133 and 137–51.

51 Drapier was commander of the 9th Company, the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment.

52 Montimont is some two miles north of Donchery.

53 The Bellevue crossroads are one mile south-east of Donchery, just to the north of the artillery casemate.

54 Foucault's Report, pp. 13–14.

55 'Extraits D'Une Lettre Du Lieutenant Drapier', Cdt la 9ième Cie. du 147ième RIF, in the 147th Fortress Regiment file, SHAT 34N145 Dossier 4.

56 Cheveuges is some four miles south-west of the crossing-point near Gaulier.

57 Appendices to 1st Panzer Division's war diary, p. 417, in BA-MA RH27-1/5.

58 My 2002 interview with Wolff-Rüdiger Guercke, who was in the 7th Company, the 2nd Battalion, Schützenregiment 1. I contacted Herr Guercke and found documents on the 1st Panzer Division thanks to Rolf Stoves of the division's veterans' association and author of *1 Panzer Division 1935–1945*.

9: Flight

1 Chef d'Escadron La Barbarie, 'Historique' ('La Barbarie's Report'), p. 33, in the 55 Division file, SHAT 32N251.

2 Bulson is some six miles south of Sedan. Chémery is three miles south-west of Bulson.

- 3 La Barbarie's Report, p. 33.
- 4 Haraucourt is two miles east of Bulson.
 Capitaine Daumont's report, 'Replis Successifs de l'Artillerie Durant Les Journées des 13 et 14 Mai 1940' ('Daumont's Report'), p. 3, in the 55 Division file, SHAT 32N295, states that most of these fugitives were from X Corps' IV/110ième Régiment d'Artillerie Lourde, and from the 111/185ième Régiment d'Artillerie. Daumont was on the staff of 55 Division.
- 5 Daumont's Report, p. 3.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Ibid., p. 5, and report by Chef de Bataillon Arnoul, who in May 1940 was chief of staff of 55 Division's 295th Regiment ('Arnoul's Report'), p. 7, in the 295th Regiment file, SHAT 34N174.
 Chaumont is one and a half miles to the north of Bulson.
- 9 Maisoncelle is some two miles east of Chémery, whose location is specified in note 2 above. Raucourt-et-Flaba is some two miles east of Maisoncelle, and Artaise-le-Vivier is around one and a half miles south-east of Chémery.
- 10 Report by Captain Megrot, of the 10th Company of 55 Division's 213th Regiment, p. 2, in the 213th Regiment file, SHAT 34N165.
- 11 Daumont's Report, p. 5.
- 12 Senuc is twenty-one miles south of Chémery.
- 13 Ruby, *Sedan*, p. 145.
- 14 Claude Paillat, *Dossiers secrets de la France contemporaine: Tome V: Le Désastre de 1940: La Guerre-éclair: 10 mai–24 juin 1940* ('Paillat, *Désastre de 1940*'), pp. 273–5.
 Grandpré is some twenty-five miles south-west of Sedan. Buzancy is some eight miles north-east of Grandpré.
- 15 Vouziers is some twenty-four miles south-west of Sedan.
- 16 Crousse's Report, p. 16.
- 17 Foucault's Report, p. 17, referring to Lieutenant Véron's testimony.
- 18 Ibid. Glaire-et-Villette is around one mile north-west of Sedan.
- 19 Arnoul's Report, p. 9.
- 20 Daumont's Report, p. 2, states it was the commander of 155 Battery (IV/45ième Régiment d'Artillerie) whose guns were in position at La Fontaine de Bulson.
- 21 Daumont's Report, p. 2, states that the soldier who confirmed that the report about tanks was wrong was Lieutenant-Colonel Pinaud, commander of the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment, who about half an hour later appears to have made the same comment to Lafontaine's staff, according to La Barbarie's Report, p. 2.
- 22 Lieutenant-Colonel Dourzal was the commander of X Corps' heavy-artillery unit, referred to as Le Groupement B.
- 23 Report by L. Duhautois ('Duhautois' Report'), p. 3, in the X Corps file, SHAT 30N82, cites Capitaine Fouques, commander of Batteries B7 and 8 in the 169ième Régiment d'Artillerie, as the man who heard the guns firing.
- 24 Flaba is four miles south-east of Bulson.
- 25 Duhautois' Report, pp. 12–13.
- 26 Ibid., p. 3.

- 27 Ruby, *Sedan*, p. 363.
- 28 Duhautois' Report, pp. 4–6.
- 29 Grandsard, *10 Corps*, p. 133.
- 30 *Ibid.*, p. 134.
- 31 Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, pp. 100–101.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 102.
- 33 Hermann Balck, *Ordnung Im Chaos*, pp. 276–7 cited in Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 235.
- 34 La Barbarie's Report, p. 35, states that the 3.15 p.m. order made by Grandsard required the 213th Regiment to move up to the line running through the Chéhéry cemetery, the Bois de Minières, Côte 298, Bulson, and the north of the Bois Rond Caillou. Chéhéry is two and a half miles north-west of Bulson; Bois de Minières is one and a half miles north-west of Bulson, and Bois Rond Caillou is around half a mile south-east of Bulson. At the time the order was given the 213th Regiment battalions were at Chémery, Artaise-le-Vivier, and Le Vivier (the latter being one mile to the south of Artaise-le-Vivier).
- 35 La Barbarie's Report, p. 36; and Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre Labarthe, 'Déroulement des Événements' ('Labarthe's Report'), pp. 3–4, in the 213th Regiment's file, SHAT 34N165.
- 36 Labarthe's Report, p. 4.
- 37 The commander of the 7th Tank Battalion would not move from Les Alleux (fourteen miles south-west of Bulson) during daylight hours in case the tanks were bombed. Consequently the battalion only travelled at night, and arrived at Chémery between 4.30 and 5.30 a.m. on 14 May.
- The commander of the 4th Tank Battalion, after being warned at Yoncq (four miles south-east of Raucourt-et-Flaba) that German tanks had reached Chaumont, halted near Raucourt-et-Flaba.
- The 205th Infantry Regiment stopped near the Bois de Raucourt (one and a half miles south of Raucourt-et-Flaba), south of where it had been ordered to go, possibly because another officer, who was never identified, gave the commander an order to halt.
- This information all comes from General Grandsard's account ('Grandsard's Report'), pp. 70–71, in the X Corps file, SHAT 30N82.
- 38 *Ibid.*, p. 54, mentions that the staff officer in question was Lieutenant-Colonel Cachou.
- 39 La Barbarie's Report, pp. 38–9.
- 40 Arnoul's Report, p. 9.
- 41 'Récit des Événements vécus par l'I.D. 55 du 10 au 15 mai 1940' ('Récit des Événements ID 55') in the 55 Division file, SHAT 32N254, p. 21, which appears to be by a 55 Division staff officer. A manuscript note on the first page of the report states that it 'appears' to have been written by Colonel Chaligne.
- 42 Grandsard's Report, p. 57.
- 43 Récit des Événements ID 55, p. 24, and La Barbarie's Report, p. 39.
- Stonne is some six miles south of Bulson.
- 44 Récit des Événements ID 55, pp. 22–3.
- 45 *Ibid.*, p.24.

- 46 Labarthe's Report, p. 5.
- 47 Récit des Événements ID 55, p. 26.
- 48 Labarthe's Report, p. 6.
Connage is three miles west of Bulson.
- 49 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 204.
- 50 *Ibid.*, p. 207.
- 51 Die 'Schwarzen Husaren' Bei Bulson, Oberleutnant Heinrich Krajewski, in *Mit Den Panzern In Ost Und West*, pp. 136–9. Krajewski was in the 4th Company of the 1st Section of the 1st Panzer Division's 2nd Panzer Regiment.
- 52 Lieutenant Beck-Broichsitter's accounts, in BA-MA RH37/6332 and RH37/6391.
- 53 FCM stands for Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée.
For tank specifications, see Appendix A, pp. 539–40.
- 54 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 207.
- 55 Labarthe's Report, p. 7.
- 56 Ruby, *Sedan*, p. 153.
- 57 Duhautois' Report, p. 6.
- 58 Home, *To Lose a Battle*, p. 385.

10: Battle of the Bulge

- 1 Saint-Martin, *Blindés français*, pp. 320 and 328. See also my Appendix A, pp. 539–40.
- 2 Mont Dieu is some five miles north-east of Le Chesne. Le Chesne is some eight miles south-west of Chémery.
- 3 'La 3ième Division Cuirassée Dans La Bataille Des Ardennes' ('3ième Division Cuirassée History'), pp. 30–37, in the 3ième Division Cuirassée file, SHAT 32N470; and General Flavigny, in 'Journal de Marche de la 21ième Corps' ('Flavigny's Report'), p. 11.
- 4 3ième Division Cuirassée History, pp. 5–8.
Rheims is some thirty-eight miles south-west of Le Chesne, the first assembly area.
- 5 Senuc is some fourteen miles south-east of Le Chesne, the first assembly area for the tanks.
- 6 3ième Division Cuirassée History, pp. 35–7; and Flavigny's Report, p. 11.
- 7 Flavigny's Report, pp. 9–10.
Stonne is some four miles south of Chémery, and four miles east of the Canal des Ardennes.
- 8 'Relation chronologique des opérations effectuées par la 3e DIM du 10 mai au 18 juin 1940', p. 2, in SHAT 32N8.
Briquenay and Thénorgues are respectively some nine and ten miles south of Mont Dieu; Monthois and Savigny-sur-Aisne are respectively some eighteen and fifteen miles south-west of Mont Dieu.
- 9 Flavigny's Report, p. 7.
- 10 *Ibid.*, pp. 10–11.

- 11 Tannay is some six miles south-west of Chémery.
- 12 Flavigny's Report, pp. 13–14.
- 13 3ième Division Cuirassée History, pp. 42–4; and Flavigny's Report, pp. 15–17.
- 14 3ième Division Cuirassée History, pp. 53–6; and 'La Journée de 14 mai 1940', p. 10, in SHAT 32N470.
- 15 Saint-Martin, *Blindés français*, p. 320. See also my Appendix A, pp. 539–40.
- 16 Flavigny's Report, pp. 21–2.
- 17 'Journal de Marche et Opérations du 49ième Bataillon de Chars de Combat', pp. 6–7, in the 49ième Bataillon de Chars file, SHAT 34N439, states that in fact the eleven B1 bis tanks advanced east of the Chémery to Tannay road from their base north of the Bois du Mont Dieu, and retreated again after the battalion's commander realized that they were being attacked with numerous anti-tank guns.
- 18 ZOAN was the section of the French air force supporting General Billotte's Army Group 1.
- 19 Général d'Astier de la Vigerie, *Le Ciel N'Était Pas Vide: 1940*, pp. 107–8.
- 20 Franks, *Valiant Wings*, p. 144.
- 21 Richards, *Fight At Odds*, p. 121.
- 22 Franks, *Valiant Wings*, p. 149.
- 23 Len Clarke's report, which he gave me, and an account by Sergeant Pilot Reg Winkler, brought to my attention by Clarke in 2002.
- 24 Richards, *Fight At Odds*, p. 120, and Franks, *Valiant Wings*, p. 167.
- 25 Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, p. 106.
- 26 According to Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, pp. 224–31, some of the fiercest fighting by the French in 1940 took place on 15–27 May in and around Stonne, a village perched on a hill with impressive views over the surrounding countryside, against troops from the Grossdeutschland Regiment and the 10th Panzer Division. During this period the village changed hands no less than seventeen times. Four of these captures and recaptures took place during the first three hours of combat. At first the French 3rd Armoured Division's Char B1 bis tanks appeared to be invincible. However, the village was not held by the French after their tanks forced their way in because they did not co-ordinate their tanks' attacks with their infantry. The reason for this is unclear, but it may be down to the defective radios used by the French tanks.
- According to the report by Lieutenant Beck-Broichsitter, p. 18, in BA-MA RH37/6332, whose guns had repulsed the French tanks near Connage (see Chapter 9), and that in the 'Journal de Marche et Opérations du 49ième Bataillon de Chars de Combat', in SHAT 34N439, a turning point in the battle for Stonne occurred at around 10 a.m. (French time) on 15 May when a group of three anti-tank guns took on three Char B1 bis tanks. The first anti-tank gun was destroyed by one of the tanks, but then a gunner noticed and fired at a ribbed square in the side of one of the tanks, which he presumed was part of its cooling system. The tank, hit in this square patch, was stopped in its tracks. After that, the other tanks were put out of action in the same way, and the Germans at Stonne, like the German tank crews at the battle of Flavion, described later in this chapter,

having discovered the Char B1 bis' Achilles heel, were able to hold their own even against the best French armour.

The Germans eventually retained possession of Stonne after seizing it for the last time on 17 May, but the strategic victory had already been achieved during the previous two days. Just as the French high command was diverted by the matador's cloak in the north, so Flavigny appears to have been attracted by this feint to the south, which was not the main German thrust. The fact that the French 3rd Armoured Division's tanks were sucked into the battles for Stonne contributed to Flavigny's inability to field enough of his heavy tanks to put in a viable counter-attack to the north on 15 May. Flavigny's subsequent decision to use the 3rd Armoured Division tanks to attack Stonne on 16 May, reported by Commandant Bézanger in '45ième Bataillon de Chars', p. 2, in SHAT 34N437, and the 3ième Division Cuirassée History, pp. 61–2, effectively denied him the possibility of ever using the division against the Sedan sector bridgehead while it was being built up. By 17 May the moment for an effective counter-attack had passed.

27 The exact boundary between the Corps is specified in note 19, Chapter 8.

28 General Martin's attempt to stage a counter-attack on 13 May was delayed as follows: first he had to send a courier to the 39th Regiment's Colonel Dugenet in Denée telling him to come to Falaën (some six miles north-west of Dinant) to pick up his orders. Dugenet duly received his summons at 10 a.m., but the journey to Falaën (six miles to the south-east) took three and a half hours. Frustrated by the delay, Martin and 18 Division's commander, General Duffet, possibly not believing Dugenet's excuse that he had been held up by German gunfire and bombing raids, decreed that one of the 39th Regiment's battalions should counter-attack with some tanks at 5.30 p.m. without taking into account Dugenet's objections. He had warned them that it would be impossible to march the battalion from Ermeton (one mile north-west of Falaën) to the start line near Montaigne (some two miles east of Falaën) by the specified time.

When at 8 p.m. Dugenet's troops had still not arrived, the tanks started off alone and advanced eastwards towards the Meuse, occupying a wood west of the river that was to have been a staging post before the counter-attack proceeded further east to the river. The tanks waited in the wood for the infantry. Dugenet sent his battalion into the wood later that night only to find that German tanks and infantry surrounded his men the following day before they could carry on their advance north of Grange to the river. Grange is one and a half miles to the west of Houx. Those who were not killed were captured. When on 14 May Corap heard what had happened, he was 'furious', according to Duffet's Report. Corap branded the counter-attack a 'joke', said that the French soldiers involved should be ashamed of themselves, and that General Duffet, who was responsible, should be told that he would be held to account. (The sources for the above are Dugenet's account, pp. 2–7 in the 39th Regiment file, SHAT 34N68; Général Martin, 'Notes Sur Les Engagements Du 11 Corps Du 10 Au 23 Mai 1940' ('Martin's Report'), pp. 17–20, in the XI Corps file, SHAT 30N123; and Duffet's Report, pp. 85–7.)

The counter-attack ordered by 2 Corps' General Bouffet at 9 a.m. was likewise

- delayed by air raids. Had it not been for the Luftwaffe, the 2nd Battalion of 5 Division's 129th Regiment, backed by tanks, would have taken Haut-le-Wastia (some three miles west of Houx) on 13 May. As it was, the advance from Bioul (some three miles to the north-west) took the infantry six hours, and as a result the village was only secured the next day. By then it was too late to use it as a springboard for another advance to the river, which had been the original intention, because the battalion had to withdraw to fall in line with the other troops pushed back by the German onslaught. (The sources for the above were the account by 5 Division's infantry commander General Dunoyer, pp. 18–24, in SHAT 32N15, and Gamber's Report, pp. 4–6.)
- 29 Gouvello's Report; 2nd Battalion, Schützenregiment 7, war diary ('2/Schützenregiment 7 War Diary'); and the account by Lieutenant Walsberg, both of which were made available by Helmut Gutzschhahn, an officer in the battalion in May 1940, who was introduced to me by the 7th Panzer Division's Gerhard Hohensee.
- 30 Onhaye is three miles south-west of Bouvignes.
- 31 'Extrait du Rapport du Général Libaud' ('Libaud's Report'), pp. 4–5, in the XLI Corps file, SHAT 30N247. XLI Corps' front line is shown in Map 5 on pp. 516–17.
- 32 Army Group 1 war diary, entry for 2.50 a.m. 15 May, in SHAT 28N2; Véron's Report, p. 36, and Libaud's Report, p. 5. XLI Corps was to hold from Forge du Prince to Signy-l'Abbaye. Signy-l'Abbaye is some twenty-four miles west of Sedan. Forge du Prince is eighteen miles south-west of Givet.
- 33 Monthermé is sixteen miles north-west of Sedan.
- 34 The French troops were the 2nd Battalion of the 42nd Half Brigade, an infantry regiment within XLI Corps' 102nd Fortress Division.
- 35 Paillat, *Désastre de 1940*, pp. 284–5, citing a report by a Commandant Verdier.
- 36 Véron's Report, and Georges' Journal, 15 May entry.
- 37 Georges' Journal, 13 May entry, 18.30.
- 38 *Ibid.*, 14 May entry, 10.30 a.m.
- 39 *Ibid.*, 14 May entry, 11 a.m.
- 40 'Journal des Marches et Opérations de la 1 Division Cuirassée', 14 May entry, p. 2; 'Journal des Opérations', pp. 17–18, in the 11ère Division Cuirassée file, SHAT 32N447 (together referred to as '1 DCR JDM').
- 41 *Ibid.*
Flavion is some nine miles west of Dinant.
- 42 Martin's Report, p. 26.
- 43 Duffet's Report, p. 96.
- 44 Martin's Report, p. 28; Véron's Report, p. 36.
Philippeville is some sixteen miles south-west of Dinant, and Givet is some ten miles south-west of Dinant.
- 45 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 254.
- 46 1 DCR JDM: pp. 22–3 of second document specified in note 40 above.
- 47 Chef de Bataillon Pinot, 'Compte Rendu de Combats du 28 Bataillon de Chars du 14 au 17 mai 1940', p. 1, dated 29 May 1940, in SHAT 34N432; 'Journal de Marche du 37 Bataillon de Chars B', p. 3, in SHAT 34N435.

Anthée is seven miles west of Dinant. Ermeton-sur-Biert is some three miles north of Flavion.

- 48 My 2001 interview with the man who in 1940 was Lieutenant Heinz Zobel, and Plato, *Geschichte Der 5. Panzerdivision*, pp. 51 and 53–5.
- 49 Saint-Martin, *Blindés français*, pp. 320 and 328; see also my Appendix A, pp. 539–40.
- 50 Plato, *Geschichte Der 5. Panzerdivision*, pp. 56–9.
- 51 Martin's Report, p. 30.
- 52 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 256; and documents in note 47 above.
- 53 Horne, *To Lose a Battle*, p. 428.
- 54 The other commander was General Touchon who had been ordered to stabilize the gap between the 2nd and 9th Armies.
- 55 Hirson is some nine miles north-east of Vervins.

11: Lambs to the Slaughter

- 1 The Oise is some twenty-eight miles west of Montcornet.
- 2 Army Group A war diary, English translation ('Army Group A War Diary'), 15 May 1940 entry, in IWM Foreign Documents, AL 1428, brought to my attention by Stephen Walton, the Archivist in IWM Foreign Documents.
- 3 Army Group A War Diary, 16 May 1940 entry.
- 4 Von Rundstedt's fear that the French might successfully counter-attack had also been worrying commanders lower down the hierarchy. The concern became so acute that it was to lead to a dramatic confrontation between two generals who were masterminding operations from just behind the front. Guderian believed his XIX Corps should strike out to the west on its own, rather than waiting for reinforcements. This view was not supported by General Ewald von Kleist, Guderian's immediate superior, whose Kleist group controlled the panzer divisions in both XIX and XLI Corps. Ever since Guderian had decided to advance towards the west on 14 May, the day after the crossing of the Meuse, von Kleist had been trying to slow him down. On two occasions he actually ordered Guderian to stop, only to backtrack after Guderian voiced strong objections. (Sources for this are summarized in Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 273, and it is mentioned in Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, p. 107.) On 16 May, von Kleist was reining in Guderian again. At 4.40 p.m. on that day, von Kleist, this time acting in accordance with instructions from von Rundstedt, sent an order telling Guderian not to pass the line running approximately north–south, and centring on Montcornet, except with his advance troops which were only to be permitted to go west of the line in order to seize the bridges over the River Oise between Guise and La Fère. (Guise is some twenty miles west of Hirson, and La Fère is some nineteen miles south-west of Guise.) The line referred to by von Kleist ran through the following points: Beaumont (on the Franco-Belgian border, fourteen miles west of Philippeville), Hirson, Montcornet and Guignicourt (eleven miles north of Rheims). However, by the time Guderian received this order at the front, more than seven hours later, his forces had already passed to the west of Montcornet. This gave him the opportunity

to assume, somewhat cheekily, that because the order was out of date, it could be ignored. He sent a message back to von Kleist, stating that he would carry on advancing to the west on 17 May.

It was this act of defiance that led to a rift between the two generals. Guderian was told to meet von Kleist at the airport at Montcornet at 7 a.m. on 17 May, and when they met, von Kleist ticked off Guderian for disobeying orders. Guderian retaliated by handing in his resignation. ‘General von Kleist was momentarily taken aback,’ Guderian wrote in his memoirs, ‘but then he nodded and ordered me to hand over my command to the most senior general of my corps.’ (Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, p. 110.) Guderian’s resignation was only withdrawn after a compromise was hatched with the agreement of the commander of the 12th Army, von Kleist’s immediate superior. The Kleist group had been placed under the 12th Army on 15 May, according to the Army Group A war diary, 15 May 1940. Guderian’s panzers could reconnoitre in force towards the west as long as his corps’ headquarters remained where they were, just to the east of Montcornet. Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, p. 109, states that the headquarters for Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps were at Soize, east of Montcornet. Guderian, who was not entirely satisfied by the compromise, made it more advantageous from his point of view by having his signalmen run a wire from the headquarters at Soize to his own personal advance headquarters, which carried on moving westwards as his panzers advanced. He was only to be given back his complete freedom of movement on 20 May according to Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, p. 111.

5 *Halder Diaries*, 17 May, noon.

6 Laon is some fifteen miles south-west of Montcornet, and some sixteen miles south-east of La Fère, the southernmost point on the River Oise, which Guderian’s panzers were to capture, according to the ruling by von Rundstedt on 16 May, mentioned in note 4 above.

7 According to ‘Journal de Marche de la 4^{ième} DCR’, in SHAT 32N47, and Saint-Martin, *Blindés français*, pp. 214–31, the 4th Armoured Division’s 17 May thrust from Laon to Montcornet was made in two discrete waves. Because there was no effective radio contact between the commanders of the two waves, their attacks could not be synchronized.

The first wave, which reached Montcornet during the late morning, consisted of some fifty light Renault 35 tanks in the 8th Half Brigade. It dominated the village, but had to retreat at about 3 p.m. when the tanks’ fuel ran out.

The second wave, which reached Montcornet after 4 p.m., consisted of the forty heavier Char B1 bis and D2 tanks in the 6th Half Brigade. One reason why this group of tanks arrived later than the first wave was that it had to refuel on the way to Montcornet, which took some three hours. The heavy tanks also had to break through a German reconnaissance convoy they encountered. Having arrived at Montcornet, the tanks’ fuel began to run low again, and it was this that persuaded the tank commanders to retreat from the village.

Montcornet could not be held since the infantry allocated to the operation, deprived of adequate transport, failed to reach the village in time. On the way back to the south-west, the tanks were attacked by the Luftwaffe, leading to

additional tanks being put out of action. During the operation, the division lost twenty-three tanks.

On 19 May the 4th Armoured Division, with some 150 tanks at its disposal, made a second thrust from the Laon region, aiming further to the west, at the bridges over the Serre at Crécý and Mortiers. (Crécý is some seventeen miles west of Montcornet, and Mortiers is around one and a half miles east of Crécý.) This time the lack of infantry not only denied the force the opportunity to hold the target it had captured. It also made it impossible to capture the target in the first place.

Two tanks broke through a barricade to reach the bridge at Crécý, only to be blown up by mines. The remaining light tanks, on seeing that the bridges were mined and defended by anti-tank guns, did not attempt to force a crossing.

The heavy tanks attempting to reach the bridge at Mortiers were dispersed by bombing attacks. Only three tanks eventually reached the area by the bridge, which was also defended by anti-tank guns.

The attack was eventually called off after German forces began to push forward towards Laon, threatening to cut off the tanks from the rear, as well as breaking through to the south, but by the end of the day the 4th Armoured Division had lost twenty-eight more tanks, plus ten armoured cars.

- 8 Sources summarized in Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, pp. 288 and 423.

All times in this chapter are French and Belgian, i.e. one hour before the German times cited in the German sources quoted.

- 9 The message in the 7th Panzer Division documents, in BA-MA RH27-7/10, suggests that a preparatory order was given verbally at 1.45 p.m. on 16 May, stating that 7th Panzer Division's next target was Avesnes. No time for the advance was mentioned in this document. The written order confirming what had been passed on verbally had restrictions in it, according to the 7th Panzer Division documents, in BA-MA RH27-7/213, and XV Corps' documents, in BA-MA RH21-3/38: the advance to Avesnes was not supposed to begin until 7 a.m. on 17 May.

The content of these documents is not easily reconciled with B. H. Liddell Hart (ed.), *The Rommel Papers* ('*Rommel Papers*'), p. 17, which describes how von Kluge told Rommel on 16 May he was surprised that the division had not already advanced.

- 10 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 288.

Cerfontaine is five miles west of Philippeville, and Clairfayts is ten miles west of Cerfontaine.

- 11 *Rommel Papers*, p. 18.

- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 20.

- 13 'Annexe No. 1 au Journal de Marche du 84ième Régiment d'Infanterie De Forteresse', pp. 1–4, in SHAT 34N95, states that the 1st Groupe de 105 modèle 1913 du 104 RALA had two guns to the north of the road leading from Clairfayts to Le Rocinsart, and at least seven guns to the south of this road. Its commander, Captain de Vergeron, had failed to collect the ammunition for these guns. The first German tanks were said to have arrived at 5 p.m. on 16 May. Eighty-four German tanks were said to have passed through the fortifications.

Le Rocinsart is three miles west of Clairfayts.

- 14 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 290. Clairfayts to Avesnes is some eight miles, Avesnes to Landrecies is some ten miles, and from Landrecies to Le Cateau is some six miles.
- 15 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 291.
- 16 *Rommel Papers*, p. 21, and Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 291.
- 17 *Rommel Papers*, p. 22.
- 18 7th Panzer Division file, BA-MA RH27-7/213, p. 13.
- 19 7th Panzer Division file, BA-MA RH27-7/11, Document 321; and Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 292. Avesnes was reached at 1.50 a.m. on 17 May, according to the XV Corps war diary, p. 22 (numbers on right of page) in BA-MA RH21-3/36. It is some nineteen miles west of Cerfontaine where Rommel had started the previous day.
- 20 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 292.
Other attempts to stop Rommel are recorded in the 7th Panzer Division file, BA-MA RH27-7/11. In Document 325 there is an order after 3 a.m. on 17 May from 7th Panzer Division's headquarters to Rommel saying: 'Corps orders you to stop advancing.' See also Document 337 where there is a message sent after 4 a.m. on 17 May, which states: 'Corps order to stop immediately.'
- 21 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 292. It should be noted that *Rommel Papers*, p. 21, states that Rommel was trying to contact XV Corps via his division's headquarters, but was unable to do so because there was no wireless contact.
- 22 *Rommel Papers*, p. 22 specifies that he arrived in Le Cateau at 5.15 a.m. on 17 May. 'Rommelalbum: Geschichte der 7 Panzer Division: Kurzer Abriss Über den Einsatz im Westen', in BA-MA RH27-7/220, states that by 5 a.m. on 17 May the division was in Landrecies.
- 23 *Rommel Papers*, p. 25.
- 24 *Ibid.*, p. 26.
- 25 According to GHQ's file, in WO 167/28 ('GHQ's War Diary'), there were three branches of GHQ. Gort and Pownall occupied the Battle Post, which was the branch nearest the fighting. Advanced Brassard was further to the west, and Brassard was further west still. The branch of GHQ at Arras was Brassard.
- 26 Arleux is twelve miles east of Arras.
- 27 Viscount Bridgeman's account ('Bridgeman's Report'), pp. 299–300. It was made available to me by Robin Bridgeman, his nephew, the third Viscount Bridgeman. I was introduced to him by my editor Eleo Gordon.
- 28 War Cabinet Defence Committee (Operations) minutes for 19 May and the attached 19 May letter from General Sir John Dill, in NA/PRO CAB 69/1.
- 29 Gort, *Despatches*, p. 5912.
- 30 Richards, *Fight At Odds*, pp. 125–7.
- 31 The 20 May note from Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall to General Ismay confirming that there were 480 fighters in Britain is in NA/PRO AIR 8 287.
- 32 GHQ's file, in NA/PRO WO 167/28; it was brought to my attention by Robert Chown, an expert on the battles fought by 'Petreforce's' battalions.
- 33 The account written by Major Arthur West, written while he was a prisoner-of-war, was made available by his sons Valentine and Cecil West. I was put in touch with the West family, and given other contacts and information relating to the

- Bufs, by Major Denis Bradley and Major Terry Gammons of the Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment, W. Adams and Major Peter White, editors of the Queen's Own Bufs Newsletter, as well as Robert Chown.
- 34 Colonel C. R. B. Knight, *Historical Records of the Bufs (Royal East Kent Regiment) 3rd Foot 1919–1948* ('Knight, *The Bufs*'), p. 70, states that the 5th Bufs had been acting as labourers in Alizay, south of Rouen, from the time they arrived in France in April 1940 until they were ordered to take the train to Doullens, which they did on 18 May 1940.
- 35 Doullens is twenty miles south-west of Arras.
- 36 From the 5 Bufs' war diary, entry for 20 May, the report by Lieutenant-Colonel Nash, commanding officer of the 6th Royal West Kents ('Nash's Report'), in NA/PRO WO 217/20, and the report by Lieutenant-Colonel Allen, commanding officer of the 5th Bufs ('Allen's Report'), in NA/PRO WO 217/28, it can be deduced that the line in front of the road from Doullens to Arras was held as follows: 6 Royal West Kents held from Doullens to just to the south-west of Pommera (Pommera being some four miles north-east of Doullens), and 5 Bufs held from Pommera to L'Arbret (L'Arbret being some six miles from Pommera, and just to the east of Saulty, which features in the next episode in this chapter about the Tyneside Scottish). There was no unit on 5 Bufs' left.
- 37 One of Hugh Swinburne's accounts ('Swinburne's Report') was brought to my attention by his daughter, Lalage Swinburne.
- 38 Péronne is twenty-eight miles south-east of Doullens. Cléry is some two miles north-west of Péronne. Contacts and other information relating to the Royal West Kents were given to me by Colonel Blick Waring and Colin Roberts at the Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment Museum, Major Gammons, and Ted Dennard, editor of *62* magazine.
- 39 Report by CSM C. H. Baggs ('Baggs's Report'), in IWM Documents 94/49/1.
- 40 Swinburne's Report.
- 41 Neuville-Vitasse is some three miles south-east of Arras town centre.
- 42 Saulty is nine miles north-east of Doullens.
- 43 The brigadier was Brigadier Kirkup.
- 44 Ficheux is three miles south-west of Neuville-Vitasse.
- 45 Hugh Swinburne's second account filed in IWM Documents 74/47/1. Swinburne's Report (the other Swinburne account) states that 135 of his men were killed. Some fifty soldiers from the 10th Durham Light Infantry, and an unknown number of other soldiers with these units, are also thought to have been killed according to *Harder Than Hammers*, a history of the 1st Battalion, the Tyneside Scottish, brought to my attention by Arthur Whitehead.
- 46 Baggs's Report.
- 47 The description of what happened at Albert is based on Lieutenant-Colonel Clay's obituary in the December 1981 regimental newsletter ('Clay's Obituary'), and the 7th Royal West Kent's war diary, including the account by the battalion's Captain Newbery, in NA/PRO WO 167/765, brought to my attention by Robert Chown.
- 48 Clay's Obituary.

- 49 Nash's Report.
- 50 War diaries for 5th Buffs and 6th Queen's Own Royal West Kents in NA/PRO WO 167/718 and WO 167/764; and Colonel H. D. Chaplin, *The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment 1920–1950* ('Chaplin, *Royal West Kent Regiment*'), pp. 139–41.
- Nash's Report states that his battalion was attacked at 12.30 p.m. on 20 May for the first time, and the battalion held out in Doullens itself until 8.30 p.m. when the survivors surrendered.
- Allen's Report states that the 5th Buffs was first attacked at 1.15 p.m. on 20 May, and after the Buffs' line was quickly penetrated, an attempt was made to order the front-line companies to withdraw. The order only reached one of the companies, which was able to retreat. The others were overrun.
- These reports were brought to my attention by Robert Chown.
- 51 Lucheux is three miles north-east of Doullens.
- 52 Account by Brigadier George Roupell, which was made available by his son Peter Roupell to whom I was introduced by Robert Chown. Nash's Report mentions that he was in his headquarters at Grouches-Luchuel, less than a mile south-west of Lucheux, when this incident took place.
- 53 My 2001 interview with the 5th Buffs officer who in 1940 was Captain Eric Scott.
- 54 Allen's Report.
- 55 Robert Chown's interview with Dr Jean-Pierre Ducellier, the son of the driver of the third car in the column, who was made to follow the first two German armoured cars, possibly being used as a kind of human shield.
- 56 Chaplin, *Royal West Kent Regiment*, p. 142.
- 57 Knight, *The Buffs*, p. 76.
- 58 My 2004 interview with Jim Brook of the 263 Army Field Company, Royal Engineers. I was given contacts and other assistance in relation to the Royal Sussex Regiment by Major Ewan Christian, Colonel Robin McNish from the regiment, David Lovell, Alan Readman of the West Sussex Record Office, as well as by all branches of the Regimental Association.
- 59 My 2004 interview with Richard Wilson of the 7th Royal Sussex Regiment.
- 60 Ibid.
- 61 G. D. Martineau, *A History of The Royal Sussex Regiment: A History Of The Old Belfast Regiment and the Regiment of Sussex 1701–1953*, p. 232.
- 62 Ibid.
- 63 Doug Swift's account was brought to my attention by his wife, Phyllis.
- 64 Pownall, *Diaries*: entry for 16 May 1940, p. 317.
- 65 Pownall, *Diaries*: entry for 20 May 1940, p. 324.

12: The Arras Counter-Attack

- 1 Cambrai is some nineteen miles south-east of Arras.
- 2 Archdale's Report, p. 28.
- Folembay is fourteen miles west of Laon.

- 3 Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*, pp. 92 and 98, describes the original plan that was supposed to enable the BEF to retreat from the Dyle to the Escaut in the following three hops with the Belgian and French armies remaining in contact on either flank: on the night of 16–17 May, retreat from Dyle to River Senne; on the night of 17–18 May, retreat from the Senne to the River Dendre; on the night of 18–19 May, retreat from the Dendre to the Escaut. A message from General Georges postponed the retreat from the Senne to the Dendre for one day, and Billotte agreed to comply without first consulting Gort. Gort objected, but then after the French agreed to adhere to the original plan for the night of 17–18 May (retreat from the Senne to the Dendre), he discovered Billotte would not stick to the original plan for 18–19 May (retreat from the Dendre to the Escaut): this time Billotte was insisting that the French must retreat more quickly than was specified in the original plan, and he would not change his mind even when Gort complained it would leave the BEF's right flank unprotected. The difficulties with Billotte are mentioned in the 17 and 18 May entries in GHQ's War Diary.
- 4 Two of the actions fought during the retreat are mentioned below. On 18 May, sections of the 15th/19th The King's Royal Hussars, which had been the rearguard in and around Assche (Asse on Belgian maps), some fourteen miles north-west of Brussels, were cut off, and their men captured, wounded or killed before they could reach the River Dendre. Many of the 166 casualties suffered by this regiment during the campaign occurred during this action, according to Major G. Courage, *The History of 15/19 The King's Royal Hussars 1939–1945*, pp. 26–34, brought to my attention by Captain Gary Locker of the Light Dragoons. This account was based in part on the report by the regiment's 1940 commanding officer Lieutenant-Colonel Donald Frazer, brought to my attention by his son Simon.
- The following day it was the turn of a troop of the 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards (RDG) to make an important stand: they staunchly stopped the Germans crossing the partly destroyed bridge over the Dendre at Lessines, some twenty-six miles south-west of Assche. For some three and a half hours this thirteen-man troop (3rd Troop, C Squadron), led by 2nd Lieutenant Ian Gill, held the Germans back until they were relieved, even though by the end there were just four men, including Gill, not wounded. Gill was later awarded the Military Cross. Information provided by Major-General Ian Gill; Margaret Tohill (niece of Trooper Albert Grigg, killed in the action); C Squadron's war diary, brought to my attention by the RDG officer who in 1940 was 2nd Lieutenant Bill Riley, Major John Etherington, Regimental Secretary of the Royal Dragoon Guards, and Captain Alan Henshall, their archivist.
- The infantry unit that suffered the most casualties during the retreat appears to have been the 1st Coldstream Guards, the northernmost battalion on the Dyle. According to Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*, p. 94, they lost around 120 men in the Dyle area, many of them during the withdrawal during 16–17 May after the Germans swept past their left flank and cut into their line of retreat.
- 5 Archdale's testimony, in Archdale's Report, pp. 16–18.
- 6 GHQ's War Diary, 19 May entry.
- 7 Pownall, *Diaries*, pp. 327–8.

- 8 Lens is some eight miles north of Arras.
- 9 War Cabinet Defence Committee (Operations) Meeting on 19 May; minutes, in NA/PRO CAB 69/1; and Colonel R. Macleod and Denis Kelly (eds.), *The Ironside Diaries: 1937–1940* ('Ironside, *Diaries*'), p. 320.
- 10 Pownall, *Diaries*, pp. 323–4.
- 11 Ironside, *Diaries*, p. 321.
- 12 Gamelin, *Servir*, p. 434; and General Maxime Weygand, *Recalled To Service: The Memoirs of General Maxime Weygand of the Académie Française* ('Weygand, *Recalled To Service*'), p. 51.
- 13 'Notes prises par le Capitaine de Vogue Officier de liaison entre le GA1 et le BEF sur la période du 10 au 29 mai', dated 14 July 1940 ('De Voguë's Report'), pp. 2–3, in SHAT 1K130 (Weygand's documents), Carton 3 Dossier 11.
- 14 Miles Reid account ('Reid's Report'), IWM Documents 83/37/1.
- 15 De Voguë's Report, pp. 3–4.
- 16 Archdale's Report, p. 25.
- 17 Reid's Report.
- 18 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 304. This scene is also described, stripped of some of its drama, on p. 3 of De Voguë's Report.
- 19 Archdale's Report, p. 25.
- 20 De Voguë's Report, p. 4.
- 21 Franklyn, who later claimed that Gort gave him orders with a very broad brush, and that Gort never even mentioned the French arm of the attack, was told that he was to gain as much 'elbow room' as possible to the south of Arras, and the 20 May written order given to him by Lord Gort told him to 'block the roads to the south of Arras, thus cutting off the German communications from the East'. He was also to occupy bridgeheads south of the River Scarpe to the east of Arras so as to be ready to advance south from these bridgeheads to cut off German communications from the south and south-east. (The GHQ file, in NA/PRO WO 167/29/3, and General Sir Harold E. Franklyn, *The Story of One Green Howard In The Dunkirk Campaign* ['Franklyn's Report'], which was brought to my attention by Lieutenant-Colonel Neil McIntosh of the Green Howards.)
- Acting within the broad remit given to him, Franklyn decided that his armour, backed with infantry, should move from the Vimy area (Vimy being around six miles north-east of Arras) up to the Arras–Doullens road, before continuing around the south-west side of Arras. The town was still being held by a British garrison. The counter-attack was then to continue towards the south-east until it reached the line of its first objective, the River Cojeul, and its second objective, the Sensée. The French 31ème Division Légère Mécanique, whose tanks would have given the counter-attack the extra punch it lacked, were only to be given a defensive role: they were to cover the right flank of the British attack. If this thrust succeeded, 13 Brigade infantry would cross the Scarpe to the east of Arras, and would then occupy the area between that river and the Arras–Cambrai road (Cambrai being south-east of Arras). The orders given by Franklyn are in 'Notes of Conference held by Comd. Frankforce 0600 hrs. 21 May 1940', NA/PRO WO 167/29/3.

- 22 The infantry included 151 Brigade's 6th and 8th Battalions, the Durham Light Infantry (50 Division units), plus two motorcycle companies from the 4th Battalion, the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, with twenty-one scout cars and some anti-tank units, as mentioned in Brigadier C. N. Barclay, *History of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers In The Second World War* ('Barclay, *Royal Northumberland Fusiliers*'), p. 36, brought to my attention by the regiment's Captain Peter Marr.
- 23 B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Tanks: The History of the Royal Tank Regiment and its predecessors Heavy Branch Machine-gun Corps, Tank Corps and Royal Tank Corps 1914–1945, volume 2, 1939–1945* ('Liddell Hart, *Tanks*'), p. 12; and Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*, p. 139, which states that 7 RTR attacked with twenty-three Mark 1 and nine Mark 2 Infantry tanks, and 4 RTR attacked with thirty-five Mark 1 and seven Mark 2 Infantry tanks. Because some of these figures have been contradicted, it is best to regard them as approximate.
- 24 Saint-Martin, *Blindés français*, pp. 320 and 328, and Tank Museum, *Fire and Movement*. See also my Appendix A, pp. 539–40.
- 25 See note 23 above.
- 26 Wailly is some four miles south-west of Arras.
- 27 According to the Rommelalbum, in BA-MA RH27-7/220, 7th Panzer Division's Panzer Regiment 25 under Oberst Rothenburg set off towards the west at around 3 p.m. German time (2 p.m. French time), ending up at Acq, some six miles north-west of Arras.
- 28 Beaumetz-les-Loges is some six miles south-west of Arras.
- 29 Bac du Nord is some two miles north-east of Beaumetz-les-Loges.
- 30 *Rommel Papers*, pp. 30–32.
- 31 *Ibid.*, p. 32.
- 32 Rommel's telegraphist Otto Hansl mentioned this in his account, which he made available to me.
- 33 Mercatel is some two miles south-east of Wailly and some two miles south of Arras.
- 34 John King's 25 November 1943 account ('King's Report'), made available and brought to my attention by Nancy Langmaid from the Tank Museum ('Langmaid/Tank Museum'). Fletcher/Tank Museum gave me permission to quote from it.
- 35 Letter from Sergeant B. T. Doyle, dated 15 November 1944, made available and brought to my attention by Langmaid/Tank Museum. Fletcher/Tank Museum gave me permission to quote it.
- 36 7 RTR's war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/460, states that there were just thirteen Mark 1 tanks on 22 May, the day after the attack. However, because other reports contradict this figure it should be treated with caution.
- 37 David Hunt interview, in IWM Sound Archive 7197.
- 38 Peter Vaux, quoted in Bryan Perrett, *Armour In Action 2: The Matilda* ('Perrett, *Armour*'), p. 19, brought to my attention by Fletcher/Tank Museum.
- 39 Perrett, *Armour*, p. 20.
- 40 Beaurains is some one and a half miles south of Arras.
- 41 My 2002 interview with Peter Vaux ('Peter Vaux Interview'). Vaux has stated that he saw the 'dead' tanks south of the road running from Beaurains to Tilloy-les-Mofflaines (Tilloy-les-Mofflaines is one and a half miles north-east of Beaurains).

The precise location indicated by Vaux should, however, be treated with caution since it has been contradicted by another account.

42 Achicourt is around one mile north-west of Beaurains.

43 Peter Vaux Interview.

44 Peter Vaux Interview, and report by Cracroft in 4 RTR's war diary, NA/PRO WO 167/459.

45 7 RTR war diary. These statistics should be treated with the same reserve that I have recommended for all the tank statistics in this chapter.

Vimy is some six miles north of Arras.

46 It seems that the sight which so cheered the men in 8 DLI was the result of the attack carried out by the armoured cars of the 12th Royal Lancers, whose C Squadron had, at about 10 a.m. on 21 May, surprised and destroyed a column of German 5.9 Howitzers. This is described in Captain P. F. Stewart, *The History of the XII Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales's)* ['Stewart, *History of the XII Lancers*'], p. 360, brought to my attention by Colonel Alex Twickel of the Royal Lancers, and supplied by Angela Tarnowski and Angela Kelsall, Curators, Military Collections at the Derby City Council's Museum and Art Gallery. The 12th Royal Lancers were also included within Frank Force for the 21 May operation.

47 Warlus is some four miles west of Arras. Agny is some two miles south of Arras.

48 Harry Moses, *The Faithful Sixth: A History of the Sixth Battalion, the Durham Light Infantry*, pp. 130–38, describes the 6 DLI's route during the attack. The battalion arrived in the Agny–Beaurains area at around 6 p.m. As German panzers closed in, some 6 DLI men and 4th Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, aided at first by retreating 4 RTR tanks, provided the rearguard while the remaining 6 DLI troops retreated to Vimy Ridge.

Majors P. J. Lewis and I. R. English, *The 8th Battalion: The Durham Light Infantry 1939–1945*, pp. 15–19, describes 8 DLI's route during the attack before it arrived at Warlus. They were bombed there at 5.30 p.m., and shortly before dark they were attacked by tanks and infantry, but managed to hold on in spite of being encircled. They only escaped in the surviving trucks and carriers thanks to six French tanks, which burst through the German cordon and then escorted them back to Petit Vimy (five miles north of Arras), leaving Warlus in the early hours of 22 May.

The above-mentioned books, their authors, and other DLI soldiers were brought to my attention and introduced to me by DLI's Major Randall Cross and Malcolm McGregor. Ian English also brought to my attention his own personal account and the documentation of a 1970 battlefield tour of the area.

49 According to the 7th Panzer Division file, in BA-MA RH 27/7–44, p. 21, the battle between the German panzers and the French tanks took place at Agnez-les-Duisans, six miles west of Arras, where seven French tanks and at least nine Panzer 3s and 4s were casualties.

50 Barclay, *Royal Northumberland Fusiliers*, p. 36, states that the 170 4 Royal Northumberland Fusiliers casualties (i.e. killed, wounded and missing) accounted for more than half of the battalion's fighting personnel.

51 *Rommel Papers*, p. 33.

52 7 RTR's war diary.

13: We Stand and Fight

- 1 Archdale's Report, pp. 18–25, and 4 Brigade's war diary ('4 Brigade's War Diary'), 20–22 May entries, in NA/PRO WO 167/352.
- 2 Marcus Cunliffe, *History of the Royal Warwickshire Regiment 1919–1955* ('Cunliffe, *History of the Royal Warwickshire Regiment*'), p. 36, and 4 Brigade's War Diary, 20–21 May entries.
- 3 Oudenarde is some eighteen miles north-east of Tournai, and Maulde is some eight miles south-east of Tournai, in both cases as the crow flies.
- 4 4 Brigade's War Diary. Barclay was the commander of 2 Royal Norfolks' A Company.
Chercq is some 2 miles south-east of Tournai.
- 5 Peter Hart, *At The Sharp End: From Le Paradis to Kohima: 2nd Battalion The Royal Norfolk Regiment* ('Hart, *At The Sharp End*'), p. 32.
- 6 The entry for 21 May in the 3 Grenadier Guards' war diary states that the artillery barrage opposite the battalion's position commenced at 7.30 a.m. on 21 May. The war diary was made available by Lieutenant-Colonel Conway Seymour, and the regimental archivist Donald Mason. They are subsequently referred to together as 'Seymour/Mason/Grenadier Guards'.
3 Grenadier Guards were part of 1 Division's 1 Brigade, 1 Division, like 3 Division on its left, being under the command of 2 Corps for the action on the Escaut. According to the 1 Brigade war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/346, 1 Brigade was responsible for the river line from just to the south of Esquelmes to the bridge just north of Pecq, with 3 Grenadier Guards holding the right sector and 2 Coldstream Guards the left.
Pecq is some five miles north-west of Tournai. Esquelmes is around one and a half miles south of Pecq, and one mile east of Bailleul. Bailleul is around five miles north-west of Tournai.
- 7 Dilip Sarkar, *Guards VC: Blitzkrieg 1940* ('Sarkar, *Guards VC*'), p. 109. This book alerted me to many of the sources I have used to describe the 3 Grenadier Guards' actions mentioned in this chapter. However, reference has been made to the original sources wherever the notes for this chapter do not mention Sarkar, *Guards VC*.
- 8 Les Drinkwater's 'Reminiscences' in *Grenadier Gazette*, issue 5, 1982, pp. 32–4 ('Drinkwater's Report').
- 9 Hauptmann Ambrosius, 'Der Schelde-Übergang des II./I.R.12 am 21. Mai 1940' in Albert Bollmann und Hermann Flörke, *Das Infanterie-Regiment 12 (3. Folge von 1933–1945): Sein Kriegsschicksal im Verbands der 31. (Löwen-) Division* ('Ambrosius' Report'), pp. 76–9. It was brought to my attention by Peter Taghon.
- 10 Drinkwater's Report.
- 11 Account by the officer who in May 1940 was Lieutenant Nigel Forbes.
- 12 Drinkwater's Report.
- 13 Sarkar, *Guards VC*, p. 116.
- 14 Ambrosius' Report.

- 15 Patrick Forbes, *The Grenadier Guards In The War Of 1939–1945: Volume 1: The Campaigns in North-West Europe* ('Forbes, *Grenadier Guards In The War*'), pp. 26–7, and Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. S. Adair's report, '3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards: An account of the operations in Flanders 10 May–2 June 1940', brought to my attention by Seymour/Mason/Grenadier Guards.
- 16 Ambrosius' Report.
- 17 The *London Gazette* citation on 30 July 1940 was made available by Didy Grahame, the Victoria Cross and George Cross Association.
- 18 Sarkar, *Guards VC*, pp. 35–6.
- 19 *Ibid.*, p. 36.
- 20 Ambrosius' Report.
- 21 *Ibid.*
- 22 Ambrosius wrongly concluded the Duke of Northumberland was a lieutenant-colonel.
- 23 *Ibid.*
- 24 Forbes, *Grenadier Guards In The War*, p. 28.
- 25 Sarkar, *Guards VC*, p. 131.
- 26 According to 4 Brigade's War Diary, 2 Royal Norfolks, being on the left of the brigade's front, were responsible for the half-mile of river frontage commencing half a mile south-east of Tournai and running down towards Chercq.
- 27 Hart, *At The Sharp End*, p. 33.
- 28 *Ibid.*, pp. 33–4.
- 29 Sarkar, *Guards VC*, p. 137.
- 30 Victoria Cross citation published in the *London Gazette* on 23 August 1940. It was brought to my attention by Didy Grahame of the Victoria Cross and George Cross Association.
- 31 Hart, *At The Sharp End*, pp. 34–5.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 35.
- 33 *Ibid.*, pp. 56–7, states that Gristock died on 16 June 1940.
- 34 Cunliffe, *Royal Warwickshire Regiment*, p. 28.
 Antoing is some two and a half miles south-east of Tournai.
- 35 Cunliffe, *Royal Warwickshire Regiment*, pp. 32–3.
 The entry for 20 May in 5 Brigade's war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/354, states that the relief of 8 Royal Warwicks was delayed because there was a misunderstanding concerning the order to take over the front. The original order from 2 Division, telling 5 Brigade's 1st Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders to assemble at Ere, some two and a half miles west of Calonne, arrived after the subsequent verbal order from 5 Brigade's brigadier instructing the Camerons to advance to the front via Bruyelle. Bruyelle is just over a mile to the south-west of Calonne. The division's command was assumed to be the correct order, and as a result the advance by the Camerons did not take place until the afternoon of 21 May. By then the Germans were over the Escaut in force and, according to the 5 Brigade war diary, the Camerons only made it to Antoing at 6 p.m. They were unable to recapture Calonne, according to *Historical Records of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders 1932–1948: Second World War: Volume 1* ('Cameron

Highlanders' *Historical Records*'), p. 128, which was brought to my attention by George Burns from the Camerons' Regimental Association.

- 36 Cunliffe, *Royal Warwickshire Regiment*, p. 36.
- 37 Captain Holdich's account was made available by his daughter, Rosemary.
- 38 Augustus Muir, *The First of Foot* ('Muir, *First of Foot*'), pp. 61–2, including this account by the Royal Scots' Major A. Harvey, who in May 1940 was a platoon sergeant. It was brought to my attention along with other material on the Royal Scots by the regiment's Lieutenant-Colonel Dick Mason.
- 39 Hauptmann Weller, 'Calonne 1940' ('Weller, Calonne'), an article unearthed by Henri Bourgeois, the writer of an account about the 27–8 May battle on the Comines Canal, also featuring the Royal Warwickshire Regiment. They were given to me along with other material on the 8th Royal Warwicks by the officer who in May 1940 was the regiment's Captain Denis Dodd.
- 40 Cunliffe, *Royal Warwickshire Regiment*, p. 39.
- 41 Muir, *First of Foot*, p. 64.
- 42 Weller, Calonne.
- 43 There were many German attempts to cross the Escaut in the BEF's sector. If the actions involving 8 Royal Warwicks and 3 Grenadier Guards were the Germans' two most threatening advances in 1 and 2 Corps' Escaut areas respectively, the attack south of Oudenarde against the sector held by 44 Division's 131 Brigade was the most worrying attack on 3 Corps' Escaut front. Oudenarde is some thirty-two miles west of Brussels. The Germans crossed the Escaut near Elsegem, three miles south-west of Oudenarde, as early as the afternoon of 20 May only to be thrown back by the 1st/6th Queen's Royal Regiment's counter-attack.

The 2nd Buffs, on the Queen's left, were not so fortunate when the Germans crossed east of Petegem (two miles south-west of Oudenarde), also on 20 May, and during the morning of 21 May they had to retreat from Petegem. The 1st/6th Queen's were also forced to withdraw from the Escaut, which they only did after suffering in excess of four hundred casualties (men killed, wounded or missing). The 2nd Buffs had some two hundred casualties. Although 131 Brigade's 1st/5th Queen's counter-attacked and made a stand east of Petegem later that day, they were in their turn driven back, leaving a battalion from another of 44 Division's brigades, 133 Brigade's 2nd Royal Sussex, to plug the gap along with 5th Royal Sussex and a composite battalion of 1st/5th and 1st/6th Queen's, and 2nd Buffs men until the order was given to withdraw from the Escaut. Thus were the Germans held, but only after coming up against the third layer of the defences in this sector. (Major R. C. G. Foster, *History of The Queen's Royal Regiment, Volume VIII, 1924–1948*, pp. 73–8; Knight, *The Buffs*, pp. 51–6; and documents made available by the 2nd Buffs officer who in 1940 was Captain Ernest Edlman. Additional information on the Queen's was supplied by Major Terry Gammons, of the Princess of Wales Royal Regiment, and Major Maurice Nason of the 6th Queen's Royal Regiment Old Comrades Association.)

The failure to hold the line along the river near Oudenarde was considered so serious that Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Bridgeman was sent to Ypres as soon as

GHQ's staff heard about it on 21 May to tell Gort, who had gone there to attend a conference with the King of Belgium: Bridgeman's Report, p. 315. The conference is described in Chapter 14.

14: Escape from Arras

- 1 Archdale's Report, and Alan Brooke, Notes, p. 67.
- 2 Weygand, *Recalled To Service*, p. 62.
- 3 Overstraeten, *Albert I–Leopold III*, pp. 649–50.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 660.
- 5 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, 'Diary of Belgian Campaign' ('Keyes, Diary'), in the Keyes Files.
- 6 Ironside, *Diaries*, p. 319.
- 7 Weygand, *Recalled To Service*, p. 61.
- 8 Overstraeten, *Albert I–Leopold III*, pp. 652–3.
Ghent is fourteen miles north-east of Oudenarde, and Terneuzen is some twenty-one miles north-east of Ghent.
- 9 Pownall, *Diaries*, p. 330, and Gort, Despatches, pp. 5918–19.
- 10 Overstraeten, *Albert I–Leopold III*, pp. 658–60.
- 11 *Ibid.*, pp. 654–5.
- 12 The link-up with troops south of the Somme is mentioned in Chapter 12.
- 13 Bridgeman's Report, p. 317, and see Chapter 12 and the sources in Chapter 12's note 9.
- 14 Overstraeten, *Albert I–Leopold III*, p. 656.
- 15 Bridgeman's Report, p. 317.
- 16 Pownall, *Diaries*, p. 329.
- 17 Ellis, *War In France*, p. 108.
- 18 Keyes, Diary.
- 19 Archdale's Report, p. 28.
- 20 Gort, Despatches, pp. 5913–18; 'Summary of Composition, Moves and Dispositions of Macforce 17–25 May' (the 'Macforce Report') in NA/PRO WO 197/118; 'Report on the operations of Polforce 20–25 May' ('Polforce Report') in NA/PRO WO 197/118.
- 21 L. F. Ellis, *Welsh Guards At War* ('Ellis, *Welsh Guards At War*'), p. 11, and Eric Cole, 'The Hell Where Youth and Laughter Go' ('Cole's Report'). They, like all the other Welsh Guards material in this chapter, were brought to my attention by the Welsh Guards' Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Stephens, Jenny Cronin, Roy Lewis, Major Ken Lewis, Lance-Sergeant Mark Morgan and John Beckwith-Smith, who are subsequently referred to in this book as the 'Welsh Guards' Sources'.
- 22 George Griffin's account, '1st Battalion Welsh Guards At Arras – May 1940' ('Griffin's Report'), completed on 19 April 1990, was made available by the Welsh Guards' Sources.
- 23 'Toss of the Coin', by Tony Younger, who later became Major General Tony

- Younger, was brought to my attention by Dr Peter Liddle, the director of the Second World War Experience Centre in Leeds, and his researcher Robert Carrington, with additional details from my interview with Tony Younger.
- 24 Griffin's Report, and 1st Welsh Guards' Prince of Wales 1st Company war diary ('Welsh Guards 1st Company War Diary'), brought to my attention by Welsh Guards' Sources.
- 25 1st Welsh Guards' 2nd Company war diary written by the company's commander, Captain Jocelyn Gurney, and brought to my attention by Welsh Guards' Sources.
- 26 Guardsman Austen Sneed's verbal report during the Welsh Guards' visit to Arras on 19 May 1991, the transcript for which (the 'Arras Visit Transcript') was brought to my attention by Welsh Guards' Sources. The Welsh Guards unit involved in this action was the 5th Platoon, 2 Company, commanded by 2nd Lieutenant Rhidian Llewellyn.
- 27 Guardsman Bill Williams's account, Arras Visit Transcript.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 It was the 8th Battalion, the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, and the 5th Battalion, the Green Howards.
- 30 Major Denis Whitehead, 'From The Desert – May 1942: 5th Green Howards, BEF' ('Whitehead's Report'), brought to my attention by Lieutenant-Colonel Neil McIntosh and Major Roger Chapman of the Green Howards.
- 31 Welsh Guards 1st Company War Diary.
- 32 1st Welsh Guards' 4 Company war diary, brought to my attention by Welsh Guards' Sources.
- 33 The officer who in 1940 was Lieutenant Hamish Forbes told me that Lieutenant-Colonel Copland-Griffith, commanding officer of the 1st Welsh Guards, was particularly depressed.
- 34 After the failed counter-attack around the west of Arras on 21 May, General Franklyn protected the principal roads leading into Arras from the north, north-west and north-east as follows: the north-west line held by 5 Division's 17 Brigade ran from Arras via Maroeuil (some three miles north-west of Arras) to just to the south-east of Mont-St Eloi (some five miles north-west of Arras). The French were responsible for holding Mont-St Eloi. The line running out towards the east from Arras, held by 50 Division's 150 Brigade at the western end of this line and by 5 Division's 13 Brigade at the eastern end of this line, ran along the northern banks of the Scarpe from Arras via Athies (some three miles to the east of Arras' northernmost suburb) to Biache-St Vaast (some five miles east of Athies).
- On 23 May, German panzers captured Mont-St Eloi, and from this vantage-point, the Germans were able to attack 17 Brigade, forcing them back to the Arras to Béthune road, and cutting off the exit route to the north-west.
- On the same evening, Germans crossed the Scarpe and pushed 150 and 13 Brigades towards the north, so that as darkness fell they were struggling to hold the Arras–Douai exit route. The Arras garrison and its supporting troops were gradually being surrounded. (Franklyn's Report.)
- 35 Whitehead's Report.
- 36 Griffin's Report.

- 37 £1 million in 1940 was worth around £36 million in 2005, according to Janet Henry, an economist at HSBC.
- 38 Information about Furness provided by Sir Stephen Furness and his son, Mike ('Furness Family').
- 39 Thelma Morgan and Gloria Vanderbilt, *Double Exposure*, p. 307, brought to my attention by the Furness Family.
- 40 Furness Family.
- 41 Cole's Report.
- 42 Griffin's Report.
- 43 Franklyn's Report.
Vimy is some six miles north of Arras.
- 44 Buckland's report was brought to my attention by the Welsh Guards' Sources.
- 45 This quotation is from George Griffin's most detailed account, which was included in a report: 'Welsh Guards 1st Battalion: Carrier Platoon War Diary, Dunkirk May 1940', compiled by 2nd Lieutenant H. Lister, completed on 28 October 1940 ('Welsh Guards' Carrier Platoon War Diary') with extra details inserted from Griffin's other accounts.
- 46 Welsh Guards' Carrier Platoon War Diary.
- 47 Ibid.
- 48 Furness's VC citation, in the *London Gazette*, 7 February 1946, and made available by Didy Grahame, the Victoria Cross and George Cross Association.

15: Boulogne and the Useless Mouths

- 1 Bridgeman's Report, pp. 301–2.
- 2 De Vogue's Report, p. 1.
- 3 Paul Le Tallec's report, dated 8 October 1949 ('Le Tallec's Report'), in Weygand documents, in SHAT 1K130 Carton 3 Dossier 11.
- 4 Report by Colonel de Cardes, Voruz' chief of staff ('Cardes' Report'), in SHAT 27N188.
- 5 General Voruz' 28 June 1940 report, in SHAT 27N188.
- 6 Le Tallec's and Cardes' Reports.
- 7 General Brownrigg, 29 May 1940 report ('Brownrigg's Report'), in NA/PRO CAB 106/243.
- 8 Capitaine de Vaisseau MacGrath, 25 May 1940 report ('MacGrath's Report'), in SHM TTE 6.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 5 September 1947 report ('Dutfoy's Appeal'), SHM TTE 6, given on behalf of the Ministre de la Marine to Monsieur le Garde des Sceaux, Ministre de la Justice Maritime (Direction des Affaires Criminelles) in connection with the judicial procedure at the Service Central de la Justice Maritime.
- 11 MacGrath's Report.
- 12 Lieutenant de Vaisseau de Forton's report, dated 30 December 1941, in SHM TTE 6.

- Quai Chanzy is on the western side of Boulogne's Port de Marée. The *quai* runs between the Gare Maritime and the Pont Marguet.
- 13 MacGrath's Report.
- 14 The commander of the sea front was a Capitaine de Frégate Poher.
- 15 Report by l'Enseigne de Vaisseau G. Granier, commander of Boulogne's Fort du Mont de Couple (to the south of Boulogne), in SHM TTE 6.
- 16 Lieutenant de Vaisseau de Saint-Remy's report, in SHM TTE 6.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 'Report On The Operations Of The 2nd Battalion Irish Guards In The Boulogne Area From Tuesday 21st May 1940 To Thursday 23rd May 1940' ('Irish Guards' Boulogne War Diary'), brought to my attention by Lieutenant-Colonel Robin Bullock-Webster of the Irish Guards.
- 19 Major D. J. L. Fitzgerald, *History of the Irish Guards In The Second World War* ('Fitzgerald, *History of the Irish Guards*'), p. 87, brought to my attention by Captain Vince McEllin of the Irish Guards.
- 20 Report by an unnamed member of 20 Brigade's staff ('20 Brigade's Boulogne War Diary'), and presented to me by Bill Heber Percy, son of the 2nd Welsh Guards' Captain Cyril Heber Percy.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 My 2002 interview with Stanley Pearson of the Irish Guards.
- 23 Ellis, *Welsh Guards At War*, p. 97; and report 'Welsh Guards 2nd Battalion: Boulogne May 1940', author unknown, which was brought to my attention by the Welsh Guards' Sources.
- 24 Transcript of interview with Brigadier Billy Fox-Pitt – later Major-General Fox-Pitt ('Fox-Pitt's Transcript'), IWM Sound Archive 7038, pp. 12–13, brought to my attention by the Welsh Guards' Sources.
- Wimereux is three miles north of Boulogne.
- 25 Fox-Pitt's Transcript, p. 15.
- 26 Irish Guards' Boulogne War Diary, p. 3; Ellis, *Welsh Guards At War*, p. 98; and the 'Report of Operations 21st–24th May 1940: 2nd Battalion Welsh Guards' ('Welsh Guards' Boulogne War Diary'), given to me by Bill Heber Percy and Timothy Rose Price. As mentioned in Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*, p. 82, British training manuals suggested that the frontage allotted to a battalion should be about a thousand yards.
- 27 Fox-Pitt's Transcript, p. 11.
- 28 Neufchâtel is some six miles south of Boulogne, Samer is some five miles north-east of Neufchâtel, and Wirwignes is some two miles north of Samer.
- 29 Fox-Pitt's Transcript, pp. 12–13. The infantry mentioned to Fox-Pitt was a battalion of Queen Victoria's Rifles.
- 30 20 Brigade's Boulogne War Diary.
- 31 Report 'Le 48ème R.I. Dans Les Débuts De L'Offensive Allemande du 10 Mai' ('French 48th Regiment's War Diary'), in the Général Lanquetot documents, ('Lanquetot Documents'), in SHAT 1K 678.
- Étaples is some six miles south of Neufchâtel.
- 32 Oberleutnant Rudolf Behr, 'Dann Ist Uns Der Panzer Ein Eisernes Grab' ('Behr's

- Report'), in *Mit Den Panzern In Ost Und West*, pp. 189–90. It was brought to my attention by Jon Cooksey, author of *Boulogne: 20 Guards Brigade's Fighting Defence – May 1940* ('Cooksey, *Boulogne*'), as was much of the other material relating to the British and German forces fighting at Boulogne. The French 48th Regiment's war diary states that the Germans arrived at Nesles-Neufchâtel at 12.30 p.m. 22 May.
- 33 French 48th Regiment's War Diary.
Montreuil is some twelve miles south of Samer.
- 34 Cooksey, *Boulogne*, pp. 64–6, and Behr's Report.
- 35 Cooksey, *Boulogne*, p. 69.
- 36 Behr's Report.
- 37 Cooksey, *Boulogne*, p. 72.
- 38 Irish Guards' Boulogne War Diary, p. 3.
- 39 Fitzgerald, *History of the Irish Guards*, pp. 90–93.
- 40 *Ibid.*, p. 93.
- 41 Peter Hanbury, 'A Not Very Military Experience' ('Hanbury's Report'), p. 7. The words in italics are Hanbury's own, but they have been placed at the end rather than the beginning of the sentence to make the quotation easier to read.
- 42 Hanbury's Report, pp. 12–13.
- 43 'Journal de Marche de la 21ième D.I.', dated 14 February 1942 ('French 21 Division War Diary'), p. 11, in Lanquetot Documents.
- 44 French 21 Division War Diary, p. 12.
- 45 The Pioneers' formal title is Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps (AMPC).
- 46 20 Brigade's Boulogne War Diary.
- 47 Lieutenant-Colonel Donald Dean, 'Notes On Lt Colonel DJ Dean's Experiences in Late 1939 and Early 1940 with the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps' ('Dean's Report'), p. 15, brought to my attention by Lieutenant-Colonel John Starling, to whom I was introduced by Major Geoffrey Crook of the Royal Pioneer Corps Association.

16: Evacuation of Boulogne

- 1 'Operations Vice Admiral Dover, May 18th–24th 1940: Evacuation At Boulogne', ('Boulogne War Diary'), pp. 2–3, in NA/PRO ADM 199/795.
- 2 Boulogne War Diary, p. 3.
- 3 Lieutenant Lumsden's report ('Lumsden's Report') p. 6, in IWM Documents, 66/24/1. It was brought to my attention by Jon Cooksey.
- 4 Iain Nethercott, in IWM Sound Archive 7186, and in interviews he gave to me. These sources are together referred to subsequently in this book as 'Nethercott's Reports'.
- 5 The Bluebell girls were a glamorous dance troupe, founded by Irishwoman Margaret Kelly, during the early 1930s.
- 6 Nethercott's Reports.
- 7 Sam Lombard-Hobson, *A Sailor's War* ('Lombard-Hobson, *Sailor's War*'), pp. 82–9.

- 8 Ibid., pp. 79–80.
- 9 Ibid., p. 83.
- 10 Fort de la Crèche is around one and a half miles north of Boulogne's Gare Maritime.
- 11 Lombard-Hobson, *Sailor's War*, p. 83.
- 12 Fox-Pitt's Transcript, p. 23.
- 13 Ibid., and Boulogne War Diary, p. 3.
- 14 Boulogne War Diary, p. 4, and Fox-Pitt's Transcript, p. 34.
- 15 Boulogne War Diary, p. 4.
- 16 Don Harris's account, ('Harris's Report'), p. 2, in IWM Documents, 87/15/1. It was brought to my attention by Jon Cooksey.
- 17 Fox-Pitt's Transcript, p. 31.
- 18 This signal, whose time of issue is stated to be 18.32 on 23 May, is in IWM Documents, 93/28/4. The full signal is displayed in Cooksey, *Boulogne*, p. 118.
- 19 Lumsden's Report, pp. 6–7.
- 20 Harris's Report, p. 2.
- 21 Lumsden's Report, p. 7, and Boulogne War Diary, p. 4.
- 22 Lombard-Hobson, *Sailor's War*, p. 85.
- 23 Nethercott's Reports.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Harris's Report, p. 3. It seems that *L'Orage* only sank after 3 a.m. on 24 May, according to Hervé Cras, *Jaguar Chacal Léopard: La Deuxième Division de Contre-Torpilleurs À Dunkerque*, p. 43.
- 26 Lumsden's Report, p. 8.
- 27 Welsh Guards' Boulogne War Diary, p. 5, and 20 Brigade's Boulogne War Diary.
- 28 Transcript of Lieutenant-Colonel Stanier's taped account, pp. 90–91, in IWM Sound Archive, 7175. The bridge that was blown up appears to have been Pont Marguet.
- 29 20 Brigade's Boulogne War Diary.
- 30 Dean's Report, p. 16, and 20 Brigade's Boulogne War Diary.
- 31 20 Brigade's Boulogne War Diary.
- 32 Lombard-Hobson, *Sailor's War*, p. 85.
- 33 Boulogne War Diary, p. 4.
- 34 Lombard-Hobson, *Sailor's War*, pp. 85–6.
- 35 Ibid., p. 86.
- 36 Ibid., pp. 86–7.
- 37 Ibid., p. 87.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 Boulogne War Diary, pp. 5 and 7.
- 40 Franz Steinzer, 'Panzerregiment 3 im Kampf um Boulogne', given to me by Steinzer in 2001.
- 41 According to *Venetia's* war diary, after she was hit the flames from the resulting fire burned the searchlight platform at the back of the ship, then spread to the carley floats that were hanging nearby. They were dropped into the sea, and the ship's torpedoes were also released in case they exploded. Another shell hit

the ship's B gun, and this ignited another fire. This was 'the cause of many of the gun's crew being lost as they were blown over the side as they attempted to climb . . . down to the forecastle'. There was also bloodshed on the ship's bridge, where the commanding officer was seriously wounded and the navigating officer killed, 'probably . . . by the shrapnel sweeping across head high'. ('*Venetia* war diary', dated 30 May 1940 ('*Venetia's* War Diary'), in NA/PRO ADM 199/795.)

The 1st Lieutenant, Rudolf Wratislaw, eventually took over the command of the ship, but he was initially unaware that his commanding officer had been hit since when it happened he was aft, trying to control the fire. His report, however, describes how *Venetia* was saved: 'Sub-Lieutenant [Denis] Jones, who was in the charthouse, realized that the engines were not moving, and that no orders were being passed. He left the charthouse about a minute before it received a direct hit. He proceeded to con the ship from the wheelhouse, and at 20.48 went astern to get the bow which was aground . . . clear. He proceeded out of the harbour stern first, turning when he was well clear of the outer breakwater, and setting course for Dover . . . I returned to the bridge at 21.08, and found the commanding officer seriously wounded. I had felt the engines going astern at 20.48, and watched the ship leaving the harbour, and had been satisfied that the ship was under full control from the bridge. It was most unexpected to me to find Sub-Lieutenant Jones in charge.' *Venetia's* War Diary, pp. 3–4.

The gunners on HMS *Venomous* must take much of the credit for enabling *Venetia* to escape. On seeing that gun flashes were emanating from Fort de la Crèche to the north of the town, *Venomous's* 4.7-inch guns were immediately trained on this spot and, as the ship's war diary reports, 'the ship opened fire . . . The first salvo was over, but the second blew away the whole side of the fort and part of the hill. Pieces of guns and mountings were observed falling down the hillside.' ('*Venomous's* war diary', 26 May 1940, written by Lieutenant-Commander McBeath, commanding officer of *Venomous* ('*Venomous's* War Diary').) This report was brought to my attention by Lieutenant-Commander Robert J. Moore, author of *A Hard Fought Ship: The Story of HMS Venomous*.

Another shell was fired at the garden of a house near the fort where a light field gun had been located. *Venomous's* War Diary records that 'the first salvo blew down all the trees in the garden and set fire to the house beyond. Enemy were observed running from the spot. From this time all larger calibre gunfire ceased' until *Wild Swan* and *Venomous* had reached the open sea, the silencing of the German guns showing that all the risks run in bringing ships into the harbour had turned out to be worth while.

Before they left the port, each carrying over 400 men, *Venomous*, which during the action had been tied up alongside Quai Chanzy, and *Wild Swan*, which had been tied up to the west of the Gare Maritime, also knocked out a tank and two German columns. (*Venomous's* War Diary and Boulogne War Diary, p. 7.)

42 20 Brigade's Boulogne War Diary.

43 Charles Saunders, 2 Company, the 2nd Welsh Guards, who was talking to Sue Blackhall in the August 2001 issue of *Saga* magazine, p. 266.

- 44 My 2002 interview with Sidney Pritchard, who was in the 2nd Welsh Guards' 4 Company.
- 45 Boulogne War Diary, p. 7.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 Ibid., p. 6.
- 48 Dean's Report, p. 18.
- 49 While there may have been some 200 on the quay when *Vimiera* left, there were many more at dawn on 24 May. By the time Major Jim Windsor Lewis, commander of the Welsh Guards' 3 Company, made it back to the quay at dawn that day, he found the following personnel assembled: in addition to the two sections of guardsmen from his own company, who had accompanied him, and some stragglers from 2 and 4 Companies from his battalion, there were 200 Pioneers, 120 Royal Engineers, 120 French soldiers and 150 civilian refugees. (Windsor Lewis's report was made available to me by Welsh Guards' Sources.)
- If the commander of a French minesweeper he came across in the harbour had been kinder or braver, even some of these men might have been saved. However, the Frenchman refused to take them on board, and left them to their fate. These last survivors held out by barricading themselves inside the Gare Maritime until around 1 p.m. on 25 May when, fearing that 'a massacre would ensue', they finally surrendered to the Germans.
- That marked the end of the Allied resistance in Boulogne, the French General Lanquetot having surrendered with his force of around 6000 men in the citadel four and a half hours earlier. (The timing of the French surrender is specified in the 21^{ème} Division war diary, which can be found in the Lanquetot Documents, and the number of surrendering Frenchmen in the Boulogne citadel is specified in the article by Herr Kitzmüller, 'Boulogne Sur Mer Mai 1940', which was brought to my attention by Heinz Renk and Franz Steinzer on behalf of the 2nd Panzer Division's Veterans' Association.)
- According to Ellis, *Welsh Guards At War*, p. 12, a 'large proportion of two companies (over 300)' from the Welsh Guards failed to reach the ships in time and were captured.
- According to Fitzgerald, *History of the Irish Guards*, p. 99, the Irish Guards' 'casualties' totalled 201, including 174 'missing', out of 711 men who went to Boulogne.
- 50 Boulogne War Diary, p. 7.

17: Calais and the French Complaint

- 1 Austin Evitts, 'Calais 1940 Remembered' ('Evitts, Calais 1940'), in *Journal of the Royal Signals Institution*, Winter 1971, Volume X, No. 3, pp. 107–20, in LHC, Wright, LW1/2, brought to my attention by Leslie Wright, of the Royal Corps of Signals, who, like Evitts, was in Calais during the 1940 battle.
- 2 Major Theodore Timpson, second-in-command of the battalion at Calais, 'The 1st Bn. Queen Victoria's Rifles, at Calais, May 1940', in NA/PRO WO 217/4,

brought to my attention by Norman Hummerstone, the Queen Victoria's Rifles Association. Timpson also wrote what appears to have been an earlier version of the account entitled 'Calais, May 1940' while a prisoner-of-war in Germany. A copy of this earlier account, given to me by Timpson's grandson, Rupert Fordham, was only to be found in an archive in Russia until a copy was given to Timpson's family in 1997. I was put in touch with Rupert Fordham by Mary Burt, head of Defence Record 2, Ministry of Defence, Hayes, Middlesex. The two reports together are referred to subsequently in this book as 'Timpson's Reports'.

- 3 Timpson's Reports.
- 4 Captain Hugh O'Sullivan's account ('O'Sullivan's Report'), in NA/PRO WO 167/458, brought to my attention by Jon Cooksey, author of *Calais: A Fight To The Finish – May 1940* ('Cooksey, *Calais*'), as was much of the other material relating to British forces fighting at Calais.
- 5 Evans's Report.
- 6 Major Foote's account was brought to my attention by Jon Cooksey, Langmaid/Tank Museum and Fletcher/Tank Museum.
- 7 O'Sullivan's Report.
- 8 Timpson's Reports; and four reports by Keller ('Keller's Reports'). Three were brought to my attention by Jon Cooksey and Langmaid/Tank Museum; the fourth is in NA/PRO CAB 106/233.
- 9 Robert Watt's account was brought to my attention by Jon Cooksey, Langmaid/Tank Museum and Fletcher/Tank Museum.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Brownrigg's Report; and Holland's report, in NA/PRO WO 217/2, brought to my attention by Jon Cooksey.
 Boulevard Léon Gambetta runs more or less from east to west through what was referred to as Calais's New Town, ending up just to the north of Bastion 9 on the western side of the outer perimeter.
- 12 Keller's Reports.
- 13 Timpson's Reports.
- 14 Keller's Reports.
- 15 Ibid.
 St Omer is twenty-four miles south-east of Calais.
- 16 Major Bill Close, *View From The Turret: A History Of The 3rd Royal Tank Regiment In The Second World War* ('Close, *View From The Turret*'), p. 10, states that there were thirty cruisers in Calais. The cruisers' specifications are in Appendix A, pp. 539–40.
- 17 Keller's Reports; and Brigadier Nicholson's report ('Nicholson's Report'), in NA/PRO WO 217/1.
- 18 Bill Reeves, of 3 RTR, 'Tanks In Calais', given to me by Reeves, and information from my 2002 interview, are subsequently referred to as 'Reeves's Reports'.
- 19 Keller's Reports.
- 20 Richard Page gave me his account in 2004.
- 21 According to XIX Corps' war diary, p. 113 (using numbers in centre of page), in BA/MA RH21–2/41, the order to proceed towards Dunkirk was given to the 1st Panzer Division by Guderian at 11.30 p.m. on 22 May.

- 22 O’Sullivan’s Report.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Marquise is some five miles north-east of Boulogne.
- 25 Keller’s Reports.
Guînes is some five miles south of Calais.
- 26 Keller’s Reports; Reeves’s Reports; and a tape by the officer who, in 1940, was 2nd Lieutenant Hugo Ironside, in IWM Sound Archive 6616.
Hames-Boucres is around one and a half miles north-west of Guînes and Pihen-les-Guînes is some two miles west of Hames-Boucres.
- 27 Close, *View From The Turret*, p. 13.
- 28 Keller’s Reports.
- 29 O’Sullivan’s Report.
- 30 Close, *View From The Turret*, p. 13.
- 31 Documents, books and contacts relating to the roles played by the KRRC and Rifle Brigade at Calais have been given to me by Colonel Ian McCausland, Major Ken Gray and Richard Frost, whom I contacted via the Royal Green Jackets.
- 32 Grismund Davies-Scourfield, *In The Presence of My Foes* (‘Davies-Scourfield, *In The Presence of My Foes*’), p. 13.
- 33 Accounts by Rifle Brigade soldiers Doug Wheeler and Charles Green, supplied by Jon Cooksey and the historian David Lee, and Lieutenant-Colonel Miller’s report (‘Miller’s Report’), in NA/PRO WO 217/5.
The Gare Maritime in Calais was between Calais’s Bassin des Chasses de l’Est and the Avant Port de l’Est. See Map 12 on pp.526–7.
- 34 Miller’s Report.
- 35 My 2004 interview with Eric Chambers.
- 36 Miller’s Report.
- 37 At 2 p.m. on 23 May a group of some fifty men from the 1st Searchlight Regiment blocked the 1st Panzer Division’s attempt to cross the Calais–St Omer road near the village of Les Attaques. (This village is some three miles south-east of Bastion 6 on Calais’s outer perimeter). Using Bren guns, rifles and anti-tank rifles, as well as a bus and a three-ton lorry as barricades, the 1st Searchlight Regiment’s C Troop held up the German panzers for some three hours at this village before being forced to surrender.
German panzers were held up for another two hours by another group from the same regiment near the village of Le Colombier, one mile further to the north-west up the Calais–St Omer road. By the time this latter group retreated to Calais’s outer perimeter at 7 p.m., the 1st Panzer Division had registered that Calais was strongly held and could not be taken with a surprise attack.
It is possible that these actions by inexperienced British troops, fought against overwhelming odds, changed the course of the battle at Calais. Had the Searchlight Regiment not held its ground, the 1st Panzer Division’s commanders might have been tempted to turn towards Calais and, on finding the town only weakly defended, might have moved in to take the town there and then. It seems unlikely that at 2 p.m. on 23 May, when the first fighting against the Searchlight Regiment took place, the

second wave of British troops were ready for combat on Calais's outer perimeter. Miller's Report states that the KRRC and Rifle Brigade troops only disembarked in Calais at 1 p.m. on 23 May, and that the unloading of KRRC's vehicles and equipment only commenced at 5 p.m., and at least two of KRRC's companies were only finally in their allotted positions on Calais's outer perimeter between 6 and 6.30 p.m. Thus, any assault on Calais carried out during the early afternoon of 23 May would only have been faced with the relatively weak QVR.

Sources for the above are Airey Neave, *The Flames of Calais: A Soldier's Battle 1940* ('Neave, *Flames of Calais*'), pp. 39–43; Nicholson's Report; and Cooksey, *Calais*, pp. 77–82.

38 See note 21 for the order given to the 1st Panzer Division. The order confirming that the 10th Panzer Division should take Calais is mentioned in the entry for 4 p.m. 23 May in that division's war diary ('10 Panzer Division War Diary'), in BA/MA RH 21–10/9. This is probably according to German time, which means it was 3 p.m. French time.

39 Schick, *Die Zehnte P.D.*, pp. 159–60.

40 Miller's Report states that Nicholson told him at 7 p.m. on 23 May that defending Calais would be 'difficult', and that a withdrawal to Dunkirk the next day was 'probable'.

Nicholson's task was made even harder when the ship carrying the Rifle Brigade's vehicles and equipment was sent back to England with half of the vehicles and equipment still on board. According to reports by the Rifle Brigade's second-in-command Major Alexander Allan, one of which is in NA/PRO WO 217/3, and the other of which is contained in Major H. G. Parkyn (ed.), *The Rifle Brigade Chronicle 1945*, pp. 50–71 (subsequently together referred to as 'Allan's Reports'), the unloading of the vehicle ship did not commence until 4.30 p.m. on 23 May. The stevedores stopped working at 10 p.m., after being terrorized by the German shelling. They did not start work again until 3 a.m. on 24 May. At 7.30 a.m. orders were given to close the holds of the ship notwithstanding the fact that half of the Rifle Brigade's vehicles and equipment were still on board. The transport officer giving the order claimed that Nicholson had authorized him to do this. The ship sailed at around noon on 24 May.

Although the Rifle Brigade were able to pick up vehicles in Calais, the fact that they were deprived of half of their carriers may have been critical: it may have helped the Germans to break through into the inner perimeter during the afternoon of 25 May. As the main text of Chapter 18 confirms, one of the reasons for the breakthrough was that the Rifle Brigade did not have enough carriers and tanks to help them defend their line after they were deprived of the carriers they possessed for a counter-attack.

All books relating to the Rifle Brigade and KRRC were brought to my attention by Major Ken Gray, Curator at the Royal Green Jackets Regimental Museum.

41 Brigadier Giles Mills and Lieutenant-Colonel Roger Nixon, *The Annals of the King's Royal Rifle Corps, Volume VI 1921–1941*, ('Mills, *KRRC's Annals*'), p. 75.

42 Reeves's Reports.

- 43 Ibid.
- 44 Marck is some four miles east of Calais's Gare Maritime.
- 45 Jim Cornwell's account, 'Calais Party', which he gave to me.
- 46 Nicholson's Report, and Keller's Reports.
- 47 Keller's Reports.
- 48 Keller's Reports; O'Sullivan's Report; Mills, *KRRC's Annals*, p. 75; and Miller's Report.
- 49 27 May message from Dewing to General Ironside refers to this, in NA/PRO WO 106/1750.
- 50 Ibid.
- 51 The citadel in Calais was to the east of the battlements running between Bastions 10 and 11, which were on the western side of Calais's Old Town.
- 52 Le Tellier's report ('Le Tellier's Report'), dated 25 August 1940, p. 5, in SHM TTE 6, p. 5, and 'Notes du Général Fagalde: Commandant le XVIème C.A. sur les agissements anglais à Dunkerque, en mai et juin 1940' ('Fagalde's Report'), p. 2, in SHAT T604 and ANP 3W 289.
- 53 Marcel Delilis, who during the battle for Calais was in Bastion 12, 1940 report ('Delilis' Report'), in SHM TTE 10, and Capitaine de Corvette Lassarat, Commandant l'Artillerie du Front de Mer de Calais, report, in SHM TTE 6.
- 54 Enseigne de Vaisseau Jules Nivet, commander of the Batterie de l'Estran in Calais, 26 May 1940 report, in SHM TTE 6, p. 5; Enseigne de Vaisseau Georges Wiart, 2 September 1940, report, in SHM TTE 6.
- 55 Capitaine de Frégate Loic Petit de La Villeon, report, dated 5 September 1940, in SHM TTE 6 ('Petit's Report').
- 56 The 20 May order from Abrial is referred to in Dutfoy's Appeal.
- 57 Capitaine Michel Blanchardière, 1940 report, in SHM TTE 10; 'Défense Du Bastion 11 À Calais', Lanquetot Documents.
- 58 Aspirant Nielly, report made in June 1940, SHM TTE 6.
- 59 Coquelles is some three miles south-west of the port at Calais.
- 60 Delilis' Report. Lavier's story is described in Capitaine de la Blanchardière, 11 November 1940 report, SHM TTE 10; Dr Yardin, 'La Tragique Évacuation Du Bastion 2' ('Yardin's Bastion 2 Article'), in *La Voix Du Nord*, 25 May 1956, in SHM TTE 6.
- 61 The farm was known as Ferme Rousset, according to Yardin's Bastion 2 Article.
- 62 Report, in NA/PRO WO167/813, brought to my attention by David Lee.
Allan's Reports mention that during 24 May around 100 French soldiers were arrested after they tried to rush a British barricade. This appears to explain how he came to order that French soldiers without weapons should be arrested.
- 63 The aide was Enseigne de Vaisseau Roulet, according to Yardin's Bastion 2 Article.
- 64 Fort Nieulay is some one and a half miles south-west of the citadel.
- 65 According to Captain A. N. L. ('Tim') Munby's report, in IWM Documents, 87/25/1, he and his men only entered the fort at 9 p.m. on 23 May, which is after the time when the British had begun to evacuate their troops from Boulogne, and after the time when Lanquetot had complained to Abrial about the British failure to hold the outer perimeter around the east of Boulogne.

- 66 Le Tellier's diary, quoted in Nicolas Marliot, 'Calais: Fort Nieulay during the Second World War'. The article was made available to me by John Dexter of the QVR, who was in Fort Nieulay during the siege.
- 67 Le Tellier's Report, and Timpson's Reports.

18: Calais – Fight to the Finish

- 1 According to Nicholson's Report, the QVR platoons holding the roads leading into Calais withdrew to the town's outer perimeter, according to the following schedule: the three D Company platoons manning roadblocks on the roads to the south of Calais retired to the battlements between 3 p.m. on 23 May and 8.30 a.m. on 24 May, in some cases after the Germans had made contact with them. The B Company platoon that had been placed at Sangatte, some five miles to the west of Calais, was ordered to retire at 11 a.m. on 24 May. By 10 p.m. B Company had retired to Calais's western battlements. At least one of C Company's platoons, which had been on a road to the east of Calais, had retired to the battlements by 10 p.m. on 24 May. While these withdrawals are clearly described, movements by other QVR units are less easy to fathom from Timpson's and Nicholson's Reports. However, it seems that before noon on 24 May, the main defensive line around Calais was behind the battlements that constituted the town's outer perimeter.
- 2 Davies-Scourfield, *In The Presence of My Foes*, p. 23.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 26.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 27, with extra details from my interview with Davies-Scourfield.
- 5 *Ibid.*, pp. 30–31.
- 6 Neave, *Flames of Calais*, pp. 126–7.
Airey Neave was a troop commander in the 2nd Searchlight Battery, one of two batteries in the 1st Searchlight Regiment, according to Neave, *Flames of Calais*, p. 33.
- 7 Bassin de Batellerie is the waterway running from east to west, which is spanned by Pont George V, the bridge that, in 1940, was known as Pont Richelieu. It divides Calais's Old Town to its north from the New Town to its south.
- 8 NA/PRO WO106/1750.
- 9 'Narrative of operations conducted from Dover May 21–26, 1940: Calais' (the 'Calais War Diary'), in NA/PRO ADM 199/795.
The British destroyer sunk was HMS *Wessex*. The destroyers damaged were HMS *Vimiera* and *Burza*. *Wolfhound's* commander was Lieutenant Commander McCoy.
- 10 *Ibid.*
- 11 My 2002 interview with Hugo Ironside.
- 12 Calais War Diary, p. 3, NA/PRO WO 106/1693 and 1750. Fagalde's name was misspelt in the original.
- 13 NA/PRO WO 106/1697.
- 14 Petit's Report.

- 15 Keller's Reports.
- 16 Miller's Report and Allan's Reports.
- 17 Allan's Reports.
- 18 Schick, *Die Zehnte PD*, p. 164.
- 19 *Ibid.*, p. 161.
- 20 Evitts, Calais 1940.
- 21 The deadlines given to Nicholson and the time at which Nicholson gave his reply to the Germans are stated using French time, which is one hour behind German time.
- 22 NA/PRO WO 106/1750. This message was sent at 1.50 p.m. on 25 May. Evitts, Calais 1940, states that the message that arrived at 2.15 p.m. ended with the words 'worthy of any in the annals of British history'.
- 23 The 10th Panzer Division's war diary, in BA-MA RH27–10/9, states it was sent shortly after 4.30 p.m. If, as is likely, this refers to German time, it was sent shortly after 3.30 p.m. French time.
- 24 Schick, *Die Zehnte PD*, p. 167.
- 25 Place de Russie is at the northern end of the Old Town, a short distance to the south of the Avant Port de l'Est, and the Gare Maritime. The lighthouse is to the south of Place de Russie.
- 26 Harding, *A Cockney Soldier*, p. 132.
- 27 Allan's Reports.
- 28 Bassin des Chasses is north of Calais's Bastion 2.
- 29 Allan's Reports.
- 30 *Ibid.*
- 31 Rue Mollien runs west to east, meeting up with the ramparts on the east side of Calais just to the south of Bastion 3.
- 32 Report by Doug Wheeler in Cooksey, *Calais*, pp. 117–18.
- 33 Mills, *KRRC's Annals*, p. 85.
References to the left and right bridges are to the bridges on the left and right of the British front line respectively when facing south.
- 34 Captain Stanton was the man fatally wounded.
- 35 This message appears in an extract of messages between Dover and Calais according to a log kept by the Control Wireless Station of No. 12 Wireless Section, at Vice-Admiralty Dover ('12 Wireless Section Log Book'), in LHC, Wright, LW 1/1b.
- 36 The Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff was Vice-Admiral Phillips.
- 37 War Cabinet Defence Committee Operations, in NA/PRO CAB 69/1. The meeting commenced at 10 p.m. on 25 May.
- 38 Evitts, Calais 1940.
- 39 *Ibid.*
- 40 Calais War Diary, p. 4.
- 41 *Ibid.* The yacht was *Conidaw*.
- 42 Schick, *Die Zehnte PD*, pp. 168–9.
- 43 *Ibid.*

- 44 Ibid., p. 170.
- 45 James Ladd, *The Royal Marines 1919–1980*, p. 73, made available to me by Mathew Little, the Archivist at the Royal Marines Museum, Southsea.
- 46 Schick, *Die Zehnte PD*, p. 171.
- 47 ‘Défense de Bastion 11 à Calais’, in Lanquetot Documents.
- 48 Mills, *KRRC’s Annals*, p. 90.
 The cathedral is to the south of rue Notre Dame and to the north of rue Maréchaux. Rue Maréchaux is some 600 yards north of the ‘left’ bridge, Pont Faidherbe.
- 49 Holding on to the three bridges separating the Old Town and New Town for so long required dogged determination and not a little bravery.
 One KRRC officer was shot several times by the same sniper, yet nevertheless remained at the barricade he was holding opposite the central bridge, Pont Richelieu, until the position became untenable.
 Another officer by a barricade opposite the right-hand bridge, Pont Freycinet, was shot through the chest. The French stretcher-bearers available were too frightened to go up to the front line, but the danger did not deter another officer from rushing to his comrade’s aid. Unfortunately by this time the wounded man had died.
 (Details about the officer shot several times by a sniper, who was Major Godfrey Cromwell, and the officer killed opposite Pont Freycinet, who was Captain Claude Bower, come from 2nd Lieutenant Francis Williams’s account, ‘Calais 1940’, provided by his brother Gerald Williams.)
 The Germans had once again crossed Pont Freycinet before the KRRC retreated. As the tanks crossed, the men firing from houses around it melted away. This was not the result of cowardice, but because they did not have weapons at their disposal that could stop tanks. This was mentioned to me by Private Eric Chambers.
- 50 Davies-Scourfield, *In The Presence of My Foes*, pp. 51–63, describes how he was wounded; Mills, *KRRC’s Annals*, p. 90; and my 2004 interview with Eric Chambers.
- 51 Evitts, Calais 1940; Colonel Holland’s account, in NA/PRO WO 217/2; and the 10 Panzer Division War Diary.
- 52 Evitts, Calais 1940; and 19.56, 26 May entry, in 12 Wireless Section Log Book.
- 53 Leslie Wright, ‘Personal Experience In The Defence Of Calais’ (‘Wright’s Report’), LHC, Wright, LW, 1/3/2; Henry Granlund’s report (‘Granlund’s Report’), in IWM Documents, 84/45/1. It was brought to my attention by Jon Cooksey.
- 54 Wright’s Report.
- 55 Granlund’s Report.
- 56 Wright’s Report; Granlund’s Report; and the Calais War Diary.

19: Lucky Breaks

- 1 La Bassée is some sixteen miles north-east of Arras.
- 2 Watten is some five miles north-west of St Omer, and La Bassée is some thirty miles south-east of St Omer.
 Details of the brief given to General Curtis are from the Polforce Report. The protection of the line he held is first referred to in this book in Chapter 14.
- 3 Raches is some fourteen miles south-east of La Bassée.
 The *ad hoc* force that had guarded the line from Raches to La Bassée before it was taken over by General Curtis was 'Macforce'. It had been set up on 17 May, and initially covered the area between Raches and St Amand (some thirteen miles north-east of Raches), although this was later extended to include Raches to Carvin (nine miles north-west of Raches), and Carvin to La Bassée. (The source for all of this is the Macforce Report.)
- 4 The full-strength units initially made available to Curtis were one battalion (2nd/5th West Yorkshire Regiment) from 46 Division's 137 Brigade, and 50 Division's 25 Brigade.
- 5 Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*, p. 187, states that the canal line from La Bassée to Watten stretched for some forty-eight miles.
 If one assumes that the frontage allotted to a battalion should be about 1000 yards, the rough length mentioned in training manuals according to Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*, p. 82, the number of battalions necessary to guard forty-eight miles would be eighty-five, which is the number contained in nine to ten divisions.
- 6 Brigadier J. B. Gawthorpe '137 Infantry Brigade: A Formation of the TA in the First Year of the War, 1939/40' ('Gawthorpe's Report'), brought to my attention by Major David Harrap and Scott Flaving of the Duke of Wellington's Regiment. Gawthorpe was in command of 46 Division's 137 Brigade.
- 7 'St Omer – Activities of No. 3 Company 2 Div leave details, May 1940' (the 'St Omer Report'), in NA/PRO CAB 106/221.
 St Momelin is around two miles north-west of St Omer, and Arques is one and a half miles to the south-east of St Omer.
- 8 St Omer Report.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 The 24 May positions held by the Allies along the Franco-Belgian frontier are more or less the same as those shown in Map 10 on pp. 522–3. This map's main purpose is to show the positions on 26–7 May. This shows that the British sector comprised the northern sector of the Gort Line; this northern portion ran from Halluin to Bourghelles. Halluin is twelve miles north-east of Lille, and Bourghelles is some five miles south-west of Tournai.
 The British sector also included the southern portion of the Gort Line;

- it ran from Bourghelles to Maulde, until the French III Corps took it over on 23–4 May.
- 14 2, 44 and 48 Division's war diaries, in NA/PRO WO 167/203, NA/PRO WO 167/275 and NA/PRO 167/289 respectively.
- 15 Brigadier Guy Gough, *Thirty Days To Dunkirk* ('Gough, *Thirty Days*'), p. 46.
Avelette is one mile south-east of Hinges, and Hinges is some eight miles north-west of La Bassée. Cuinchy is some five miles south-east of Avelette.
- 16 John Horsfall, *Say not the Struggle* ('Horsfall, *Say not the Struggle*'), p. 62, states that Gough apparently took the wide front given to the Royal Irish Fusiliers as a 'signal mark of confidence'.
- 17 The officer who in 1940 was the Royal Engineers' 2nd Lieutenant Tony Younger (later Major-General Younger), whose men blew up the bridge, has shown me the order authorizing the demolition.
- 18 Gough, *Thirty Days*, pp. 58 and 70.
- 19 The Essars bridge was one mile east of Béthune.
- 20 Horsfall, *Say not the Struggle*, pp. 81–3; and my 2003 interview with John Horsfall's brother, Mike. Amanda Moreno of the Royal Irish Fusiliers Regimental Museum introduced me to the Horsfall brothers.
- 21 Gough, *Thirty Days*, p. 119.
- 22 Crossings identified include those at St Omer, and at the following places, which are the specified number of miles south-east of St Omer: Blaringhem, seven miles; Aire, eight miles; Isbergues, twelve miles; Robecq, sixteen miles; Avelette, twenty miles. (The sources for the above information include: St Omer, the St Omer Report; Blaringhem and Aire, Gawthorpe's Report; Isbergues, Polforce Report; Robecq, Dominique Faivre, 'Robecq-Saint-Venant et la région: De la drôle de guerre aux combats de mai 1940' ('Faivre, Robecq-St-Venant'), pp. 105–6, brought to my attention by Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Sinnett of the Royal Welch Fusiliers; Avelette, Gough, *Thirty Days*, p. 116.)
- 23 Army Group A War Diary, 22 May.
- 24 'Tagesberichte – 7 Panzer Division 1a Gefechts und Erfahrungsberichte, Frankreich 31 May – 21 November 1940', p. 20, in BA-MA RH27–7/44; and 21 May entry in the Rommelalbum.
- 25 Sources for the orders to the 1st and 10th Panzer Divisions to attack Dunkirk and Calais respectively: see Chapter 17, notes 21 and 38.
- 26 Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, p. 114.
- 27 *Halder Diaries*, 23 May entry, and Annex to Army Group A war diary, p. 116, in BA-MA RH19 1/38.
- 28 Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, p. 315.
- 29 German 4th Army documents, in BA-MA RH20–4/71, p. 174; and 4th Army war diary, in RH20–4/54, pp. 308 and 317.
- 30 The 24 May entry in the Army Group A War Diary states that the halt order proposed by von Rundstedt, and approved by Hitler, was confirmed at '12.45 hours'. This is probably German time, which is 11.45 a.m. French time. Pownall, *Diaries*, p. 337, states that the order was given at 11.32 a.m., the time mentioned in GHQ's war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/29. A copy of the order that was

given by Army Group A to the 4th Army is on p. 103, in BA-MA RH19 1/38; it states that the canal line running between Lens, Béthune, Aire, St Omer and Gravelines should not be passed.

All sorts of theories have been advanced to explain why the halt order was given. One has suggested that Hitler wanted to let the BEF off the hook so that he could negotiate a peace settlement with Britain, but it has never been backed up with conclusive evidence. It seems likely that, as expressly mentioned in the Army Group A war diary for 24 May, the Führer ordered the halt for the following specified operational reasons: (a) to let the infantry catch up; (b) so as not to make life more difficult for the Luftwaffe, which would have had a smaller target area if the tanks had been sent in; (c) to preserve the armour for the coming battles south of the Somme.

31 Army Group A War Diary, 25 May; and Jodl's Diary, 25 May.

32 Army Group A War Diary, 24 May.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid., 26 May.

35 Evans's Report. The attempt to cross the Somme on 24 May was made by the 4th Borders backed by the Queen's Bays of the 1st Armoured Division's 2nd Armoured Brigade, who attempted to cross at Dreuil, Ailly and Picquigny (north-west of Amiens).

36 Gort, Despatches, p. 5923.

37 Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*, p. 251, reveals that the officer in question was Lieutenant-Colonel Jock Whitefoord, the senior intelligence officer in Gort's command post.

38 Comines is some seven miles north-east of Armentières, and Menin is six miles north-east of Comines.

39 Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*, pp. 250–51.

40 Ibid., p. 251. The captured document appears to have been written at 11.30 p.m. on 24 May. A translation can be found in NA/PRO WO 167/29/3.

41 Ypres is eight miles north-west of Comines.

42 Alan Brooke, Notes, p. 166, and Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*, pp. 250–51.

43 Major-General Sir Edward Spears, *Assignment To Catastrophe* ('Spears, *Assignment To Catastrophe*'), p. 188.

44 Ibid., pp. 187–95.

45 Weygand, *Recalled To Service*, p. 81.

46 Gort, Despatches, p. 5923; Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*, p. 253; and 'Compte Rendu du Général Blanchard sur les rapports entre les forces Britanniques et le G.A. No. 1 pendant la période du 10 mai au 1er juin' ('Blanchard's Report'), in SHAT 1K130, in Carton 3, Dossier 11 of Weygand's file.

At the Attiches meeting (Attiches being six miles south of Lille), it was agreed the French were to retreat to the Lys using routes west of the line Armentières–Cysoing (Armentières being some six miles north-west of Lille, and Cysoing being just to the north-west of Bourghelles), and the BEF would use routes to the east of this line.

The French retreat was scheduled to be made in two discrete jumps. The night

- of 26–7 May: retreat of most of the troops to the line running from Cysoing to Pont-à-Marcq (Pont-à-Marcq being some six miles south-west of Cysoing), with the rearguard remaining on the Scarpe. The night of 27–8 May: retreat of most of the troops to the north of the Lys with the rearguard remaining on the Deûle. (French 1st Army documents, in SHAT 29N1.)
- 47 NA/PRO WO 106/1750, and 106/1698. Gort, Despatches, p. 5924, states that he received this message, which was sent at 4.10 a.m. on 26 May, at ‘about 10.30 a.m.’ on 26 May, after his morning meeting with Blanchard.
- 48 Gort, Despatches, p. 5924.
- 49 Reynaud, *Thick Of The Fight*, pp. 389–90, and Baudouin, *Diaries*, p. 58.
- 50 The discussion was brought to my attention by Andrew Roberts, ‘*The Holy Fox*’: *The Life of Lord Halifax* (‘Roberts, *Holy Fox*’), p. 216.
- 51 War Cabinet Conclusions: Confidential Annexes: 139th Conclusion, Minute 1, 26 May 1940, in NA/PRO CAB 65/13. It should be noted that in the minutes the quotation is preceded by a reference to the speaker’s title rather than his name. I have replaced the title with the speaker’s name to make the discussion easier to follow. It should also be noted that only extracts from the minutes of this meeting about the Mussolini peace initiative have been quoted. The same applies to the War Cabinet meetings about the peace initiative, which are in subsequent chapters.
- 52 The War Cabinet’s discussion after 2 p.m. on 26 May is in War Cabinet Conclusions: Confidential Annexes: 140th Conclusion, 2 p.m. 26 May 1940, in NA/PRO CAB 65/13.
- 53 It should be pointed out that the first sentence of this paragraph quoting Churchill was spoken before a break that was taken so that Halifax could speak to Reynaud about the approach to Mussolini. The subsequent words were said after Reynaud had departed during a more informal session held at Admiralty House.
- 54 Sent at 5.47 p.m. on 26 May, NA/PRO WO 106/1750.
- 55 Vice-Admiral Ramsay, 18 June 1940 despatch, published in the 17 July 1947 Supplement to the *London Gazette* (‘Ramsay’s Report’), p. 3299.
- 56 SHAT 27N78.
- 57 The reference to 4.05 p.m. may well be a reference to French time.
- 58 The enmity between the two nations reached its climax after the Royal Navy sank part of the French Fleet at Mers-el-Kébir on 3 July 1940.

20: Siege at Cassel

- 1 The order is mentioned and analysed in Chapter 19, note 30.
Merville is some sixteen miles south-east of St Omer, and Hazebrouck is some twelve miles east of St Omer.
- 2 Pownall, *Diaries*, entry for 24 May, p. 338.
- 3 Bergues is some six miles south-east of Dunkirk.
- 4 Report by Chef de Bataillon Miquel, commander of the 137th Regiment’s 2nd Battalion, in SHAT 34N135.

Watten is some twelve miles south-east of Gravelines. The Mardyck Canal, which is between Loon-Plage and Fort Mardyck, runs to the south-west from Mardyck, and the Canal de la Haute Colme runs north-east, from the point where it joins the Aa, to Bergues.

- 5 Gort, Despatches, p. 5917, refers to the theory of using ‘stops’ to delay the Germans.
- 6 Gort, Despatches, p. 5924, states that he expected the bulk of the BEF to be behind the Lys by 28 May. Subsequent events confirmed that withdrawing the BEF to the Dunkirk perimeter from the Lys was a manoeuvre that could be accomplished in one to two days.
- 7 Details of Brigadier Somerset’s movements come from the two accounts he wrote about the 1940 campaign, which were brought to my attention by his son, David Somerset. One of the accounts, which was written while the brigadier was a prisoner-of-war, was captured by the Russians and only returned to David Somerset in 1998. A typed version of it was given to me by Colonel John Stevens, a nephew of Captain Esmond Lynn-Allen, one of the Gloucestershire Regiment officers who served under the brigadier. The two Somerset accounts are together referred to in this book as ‘Somerset’s Reports’.
- 8 Rumegies is some three miles west of Maulde.
- 9 David Wild, ‘With the 145th Infantry Brigade: May 1940’ (‘Wild’s Report’), p. 22, was sent to me by Simon Troughton, the son of the officer who, in May 1940, was 2nd Lieutenant Charles ‘Dick’ Troughton of the 4th Battalion, the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry.
- 10 According to Somerset’s Reports, his headquarters at this point was in Landas, some two miles south-west of Rumegies.
- 11 Nomain is some four miles north-west of Rumegies.
- 12 Somerset’s Reports.
- 13 Wild’s Report.
- 14 The River Cherwell, in Oxfordshire, England, runs between Oxford and Banbury.
- 15 Somerset’s Reports.
- 16 Wild’s Report.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Melville Thomas, ‘Don’t You Know There’s A War On’ (‘Thomas’s Report’), brought to my attention by Lieutenant-Colonel David Stanley of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry (‘Stanley/Ox and Bucks’).
- 19 Bavinchove is around one and a half miles south-west of Cassel, and Zuytpeene is some two and a half miles west of Cassel. The blockhouse, which is about two miles north of Cassel, is around one hundred yards to the west of the road running from Cassel via Bergues to Dunkirk.
- 20 Somerset’s Reports; and 48 Division’s war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/289.
Wormhout is some six miles north of Cassel, Ledringhem is some two and a half miles south-west of Wormhout, and Arneke is some two miles south-west of Ledringhem.
- 21 4th Army war diary for 25 May, brought to my attention by Hans-Adolf Jacobsen,

- Dünkirchen*, p. 97, which states that von Kluge would have moved in quickly to capture Cassel, had it not been for the 24–6 May halt order.
- 22 Gort, Despatches, p. 5925.
- 23 Bridgeman's Report, pp. 344–5.
- 24 *Ibid.*, p. 340.
- 25 This quotation and the description in the next two paragraphs are from Fagalde's Report, p. 4.
- 26 Bridgeman's Report, p. 347; Abrial's account ('Abrial's Report'), pp. 51–2, in SHM 1BB2 207; and 'La 11ère Armée du 26 Mai au 4 Juin 1940' ('1st Army War Diary'), pp. 5–6, in SHAT 29N1.
- 27 Two accounts by the Glosters' Major Percy-Hardman. One was brought to my attention by the Glosters' Major Claud Rebbeck ('Rebbeck/Glosters'), and the other by the Glosters' officer who, in 1940, was 2nd Lieutenant Roy Creswell and his daughter, Sheila. Other Gloucestershire, Berkshire and Wiltshire Regiment personnel who have helped me find veterans and documents are: Captain Ian Spence, Leslie Davies and Major Phil Hall.
- 28 Maurice Gilmore's account (the 'Glosters/Gilmore Report') was made available by his son, Michael Gilmore. This report states that the bodies were discovered late on 27 May. Another report, by Captain E. Jones (the 'Glosters/Jones Report'), in NA/PRO CAB 106/292, states that the bodies, one of which was the remains of Private Winsborough, were found during the early morning of 28 May.
- 29 2nd Lieutenant Creswell's two accounts, one of which was brought to my attention by Rebbeck/Glosters – who also introduced me to Roy Creswell – and the other by Creswell and his daughter Sheila.
- 30 The report by Bombardier Wally Munn of the Worcestershire Yeomanry ('Munn's Report'), p. 7, states that his regiment's 209 Battery deployed eleven guns at Cassel. There was also one troop from his regiment's 211 Battery, which presumably had three or four guns. This account was sent to me by Stanley/Ox and Bucks and Sam Hardy of the Worcestershire Yeomanry.
- 31 Munn's Report. This is only his own estimate, presumably reached after discussion with his comrades.
- 32 *Ibid.*
- 33 Diary of Captain Bill Wilson ('Wilson's Report'), made available by his son, Bill Wilson junior. Lieutenant-Colonel John Stevens made available a typescript of the diary. The Glosters/Jones Report, pp. 88–90, refers to the attack by three tanks.
- 34 This account has been compiled using one version of Julian Fane's account, brought to my attention by Rebbeck/Glosters, a second version provided by Julian Fane, and interviews that Julian Fane gave me. All of these accounts and interviews are subsequently referred to in this book as 'Fane's Reports'.
- 35 Wilson's Report.
- 36 Thomas's Report.
- 37 My 2002 interview with Jim Loftus, introduced to me by Rebbeck/Glosters.
- 38 My 2001 interview with Bill Small of the Ox and Bucks.
- 39 Glosters/Gilmore Report, p. 44.

- 40 Major Rawdon Hoare, commander of K Battery in May 1940, ‘The Fighting Years’; the 4 October 1940 account by Douglas Williams, *Daily Telegraph*; and the 1945 account by Sergeant-Major Opie, brought to my attention by Major Rupert Swinhoe-Standen of 5th Regiment Royal Horse Artillery’s K Battery. Major Bill Clarke of the Royal School of Artillery, Kathleen Manning, daughter of Gunner Manning, one of those killed at Hondeghem, and my cousin David Sebag-Montefiore, a Royal Artillery officer, brought the Hondeghem story and the sources to my attention.
- 41 ‘Extracts From Diary Of Major E. (Elliott) M. Viney, DSO, 2nd i/c 1/Bucks’ and other accounts by this officer brought to my attention by Stanley/Ox and Bucks, and Ingram Murray.
- 42 The 1st Armoured Division’s previous attempt to cross the Somme on 24 May is mentioned in Chapter 19.
- 43 10th Royal Hussars war diary, in NA/PRO 167/446; and *The 10th Royal Hussars In The Second World War*, compiled under the direction of a regimental committee, pp. 12–17, brought to my attention by The King’s Royal Hussars’ Regimental Secretary Major Patrick Beresford.
- 44 Major-General W. R. Beddington, *A History Of The Queen’s Bays (the 2nd Dragoon Guards) 1929–45*, brought to my attention by Clive Morris and Alan Corfield, respectively Curator of the 1st The Queen’s Dragoon Guards Museum and Regimental Secretary of the 1st The Queen’s Dragoon Guards. The regiment’s history was also explained by veterans brought to my attention by the regiment’s Bill van Laun. Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*, p. 354.
- 45 Evans’s Report.
- 46 ‘The 25 May 1940 British Strategy In A Certain Eventuality’, WP(40) 168, in NA/PRO CAB 66/7.
- 47 31 May 1940: ‘Forces For the Defence of the United Kingdom: Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces (General Ironside)’, in NA/PRO CAB 89/12.
- 48 The 26 May 1940 rider to the ‘British Strategy In A Certain Eventuality’, memorandum mentioned in note 46 above, WP(40), 169, in NA/PRO CAB 66/7.
- 49 The text of Roosevelt’s letter is laid out in Reynaud, *In The Thick Of The Fight*, p. 406.
- 50 Roberts, *Holy Fox*, p. 222, reveals that Halifax asked to see Churchill in the garden at 10 Downing Street for a private talk after the Cabinet meeting. In the course of their chat he threatened to resign.

21: Surrounded at Le Paradis

- 1 2 Division’s orders are in its war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/203.
Aire is some ten miles south-east of St Omer. La Bassée is seven miles east of Béthune, the latter being some thirteen miles south-east of Aire.
- 2 4 Brigade’s War Diary, 31 May, Sheet 21, reveals losses during the entire campaign rather than just on the canal line: in NA/PRO WO 167/352.

- 3 5 Brigade's war diary ('5 Brigade's War Diary'), 29 May, in NA/PRO WO 167/354, reveals that the following number of men were still with their battalions on 29 May: 7th Worcestershire Regiment, nine officers, 126 other ranks; 2nd Dorsetshire Regiment, seven officers, sixty-four other ranks; 1st Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, six officers, seventy other ranks. Although some extra men did leave during the evacuation, these figures at least given some idea of the toll taken by the last-ditch fighting on the canal line.
- 4 Locon is some three miles north-east of Béthune.
- 5 Hastings's Report, volume 1, pp. 67–8.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 68.
- 7 4 Brigade's War Diary, Appendix T.
Avelette is some two miles south-east of Le Cornet Malo. Le Cornet Malo is some four miles north of Béthune. The Bois de Paqueaut is just to the west of the road leading from Le Cornet Malo to the canal.
- 8 Captain Charles Long, adjutant, Royal Norfolks, 'Battle of La Bassée Canal, 24–25–26–27 May 1940' ('Long's Report'), p. 6. It was brought to my attention by Kate Thaxton of Norfolk Museums and Archaeology Service.
- 9 Hastings's Report, volume 1, p. 70.
- 10 Le Paradis is one mile north-east of Le Cornet Malo.
- 11 See note 7 above for Le Cornet Malo's location.
- 12 Long's Report, p. 8.
- 13 Hastings's Report, volume 1, pp. 76–8.
- 14 *Ibid.*, p. 79.
- 15 The men were from the 1st Royal Scots' A Company, according to Muir, *First of Foot*, p. 66.
- 16 Hastings's account refers to 'Captain Busher', while in fact it was 'Major Bucher'. I have corrected the spelling of this name and the rank in the quotations given from Hastings's Report.
- 17 Hastings's Report, volume 1, pp. 80–81.
- 18 Muir, *First of Foot*, p. 68.
- 19 Hastings's Report, volume 1, p. 93.
- 20 *Ibid.*
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 94.
- 22 *Ibid.*
- 23 L'Épinette is some one and a half miles north-east of Le Paradis.
- 24 Hastings's Report, volume 1, p. 94.
- 25 Hallett's Report, p. 115.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p. 116.
- 27 *Ibid.*, p. 117.
- 28 *Ibid.*, p. 119.
- 29 *Ibid.*, p. 121.
- 30 My 2002 and 2004 interviews with Bob Brown.
- 31 *Ibid.*
- 32 *Ibid.*
- 33 Hastings's Report, volume 1, p. 95.

- 34 The position of the Regimental Aid Post is indicated on a drawing of the area by Hastings, which is with his report.
- 35 Long's Report.
- 36 Hastings's Report, volume 1, p. 96.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 4 Brigade's War Diary, p. 17, states that Ryder's last message to the brigadier was at 3.30 p.m. on 27 May.
- 39 Hastings's Report, volume 1, pp. 98–9.
- 40 4 Brigade's War Diary, Sheet 16, and Hastings's Report, p. 97.
- 41 Cyril Jolly, *The Vengeance of Private Pooley* ('Jolly, *Vengeance of Private Pooley*'), pp. 34–5.
- 42 Hastings's Report, volume 1, p. 99.
- 43 Ibid., p. 97.
- 44 Ibid., pp. 99–100.
- 45 Jolly, *Vengeance of Private Pooley*, p. 32
- 46 Ibid., p. 35

22: Massacre at Le Paradis

- 1 Faivre, Robecq-St-Venant, p. 106, and the 1st Royal Welch Fusiliers' war diary ('RWF War Diary'), in NA/PRO WO 167/843. These sources, other documents relating to the battalion, and battalion veterans were brought to my attention by the battalion's Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Sinnett ('Sinnett/RWF').
- 2 St Floris is seven miles north-west of Béthune.
- 3 St-Venant is some seven miles north-west of Béthune, and Robecq is some two miles south-east of St-Venant.
- 4 The account of what happened at Robecq is based on accounts by Royal Welch Fusiliers officers and men, including 2nd Lieutenants Philip Carrington, Michael Edwards and Desmond Llewellyn, and on the RWF War Diary.
- 5 6 Brigade's war diary ('6 Brigade's War Diary'), in NA/PRO WO 167/357. It should be noted that the time specified is different from that mentioned on p. 72 of the account by the RWF officer who, in 1940, was Captain J. Willes. It was given to me by David Bownes of the RWF's Regimental Museum in Caernarfon, Wales; Willes says the brigadier arrived at 9 a.m.
- 6 The RWF crossed the bridge at 'about 12.30 hrs', according to 6 Brigade's War Diary. Captain Walter Clough-Taylor, 'A Wartime Log', was made available by Sinnett/RWF.
- 7 The RWF War Diary, 14 June 1940; and the notice specifying the officers who were killed, wounded or missing, which was sent to the War Office on 8 June 1940. It was brought to my attention by Sinnett/RWF. Dominique Faivre, who had interviewed Captain Willes, told me where and when Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison was killed, and showed me where the RWF soldiers escaped over the bridge spanning the Lys Canal.
- 8 Cameron Highlanders', *Historical Records*, p. 136. It was made available by Major

George Burns, Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, who, with Lieutenant-Colonel Angus Fairrie, put me in touch with veterans from the regiment. Also the 2/Schützenregiment 7 War Diary.

- 9 Cuinchy is five miles south-east of Béthune.
 10 *Rommel Papers*, pp. 36–7.
 11 Cameron Highlanders' *Historical Records*, p. 138; Brigadier Gartlan's account ('Gartlan's Report'), p. 3, attached to 5 Brigade's War Diary; and 'Personal Diary', by the officer who, in 1940, was Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick Rose-Miller, which, along with a tape of his reminiscences, was given to me by his daughter Diana. The tape and the Personal Diary are subsequently referred to as the 'Rose-Miller Reports'.

Violaines is one mile north-west of the canal adjacent to La Bassée.

- 12 Gartlan's Report, p. 4.
 13 Camerons Highlanders' *Historical Records*, p. 140.
 14 Rose-Miller Reports; and Captain McBrayne, of the Camerons' C Company, account, in NA/PRO WO 217/15.
 15 Cameron Highlanders' *Historical Records*, p. 146.
 16 The 24 January 1947 report ('Paradis War Crimes Report') was brought to my attention by Kate Thaxton, of Norfolk Museums and Archaeology Service.
 17 Paradis War Crimes Report, p. 5.
 18 The Paradis War Crimes Report, p. 12, states that French witnesses found bodies of British soldiers who 'had obviously been murdered after capture in this area'. Also included in this report is the statement by Walter Schmidt, dispatch rider, Totenkopf Regiment 2. He mentioned that a comrade, Ernst Weissinger, told him that he had helped capture seventeen Englishman who had been found sitting in a hayloft, and had taken them back to Battle HQ, adding: 'But they have all had to bite the dust.'

It is possible that they were the same men mentioned by Lieutenant-Colonel Scotland, author of the Paradis War Crimes Report, in a letter dated 5 December 1948, which he sent to the Norfolks' Captain Hastings. Scotland mentioned that the French had dug up twenty-one bodies of Royal Scots soldiers who 'all' had neck wounds, implying they had been shot after capture.

Listed below are other incidents in the area where either war crimes were committed, or where they would have been if good fortune had not spared the potential victims.

First, a German war correspondent, who stated that his name was Tenius and that he had been accompanying the 2nd SS Company at Le Cornet Malo, reported that early on 27 May he had witnessed the shooting of a British prisoner-of-war, whose only crime was to have shot at the Germans from a house. This is in a series of documents, subsequently referred to in this book as the 'Paradis XVI Corps Investigation', included in the Appendix to the German XVI Corps' war diary, in BA-MA RH21-4/527.

Second, when the remnants of the Royal Scots' A Company were captured, Sergeant-Major Johnstone and his men, who had fought alongside the Royal Norfolks led by Captain Hallett near Le Cornet Malo, were lined up and about

to be shot when they were reprieved at the last minute by a staff officer, who happened to be passing. Johnstone was then congratulated for putting up such a brave fight, and told, ‘You fight like tigers.’ See Muir, *First of Foot*, p. 72.

Third, according to Hastings’s Report, volume 2, p. 13, Hastings had to save three sergeant-majors who were about to be shot because some German equipment, including respirators, had been found in a house that was believed by the Germans to have been a British HQ; this was said to be evidence that they had murdered their German prisoners. The sergeant-majors were only reprieved after Hastings confirmed that the house in question had not been used as a British headquarters.

- 19 The unit in question was the 3rd Company, the 1st Battalion, the SS Totenkopf Division’s 2nd Regiment.
- 20 Statements by Friedrich Sentker and Edmund Gluma, in Paradis War Crimes Report.
- 21 Report sent by Battle HQ, 2nd Regiment (presumably of the Totenkopf Division) to XVI Corps, in the Paradis XVI Corps Investigation.
- 22 Jolly, *Vengeance of Private Pooley*, p. 37.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Ibid., pp. 37–8.
- 25 Ibid., p. 38.
- 26 The two interrogated Germans who claimed to have been told what their battalion commanders had discussed were Gerhard Rumpen, then a *feldwebel* in 2 Company, and August Leitl, who had been with 3 Company’s 3 Platoon. Both units were within the SS Totenkopf Division’s 2nd Regiment’s 1st Battalion.
- 27 Rue du Paradis connects Le Paradis with Le Cornet Malo.
- 28 Jolly, *Vengeance of Private Pooley*, p. 40.
- 29 Ibid., p. 41.
- 30 Theodor Emke’s statement, in the Paradis War Crimes Report, mentions that it was Knöchlein who gave the order to fire, and that he was obviously in charge of the prisoners when they were taken to Louis Creton’s farm.
- 31 Jolly, *Vengeance of Private Pooley*, p. 42.
- 32 SS-Sturmann Max Schneider, in Paradis War Crimes Report.
- 33 Jolly, *Vengeance of Private Pooley*, pp. 42–3.
- 34 Ibid., p. 42.
- 35 Ibid., pp. 46–9.
- 36 This report – by a Major von Riederer – and all the subsequent documents describing the XVI Corps investigation are in the Paradis XVI Corps Investigation.
- 37 Gunter d’Alquen’s 19 February 1947 statement, made after the completion of the Paradis War Crimes Report, and given to me by Kate Thaxton of Norfolk Museums and Archaeology Service.
- 38 Eicke’s explanation, the questions posed by XVI Corps’ investigator and the 3 June 1940 letter passing the file to the 6th Army are in the Paradis XVI Corps Investigation.

23: Manhunt

- 1 Lieutenant-Colonel Davy's note to the Belgian General Nyssens, in the Keyes Files; and the 28 August 1940 note by Capitaine Quenard, who worked on the staff of General Champon, commander of the French Mission to Belgium ('Quenard's Report') in Carton 3, Dossier 13 of Weygand's files, in SHAT 1K130.
- 2 Keyes, Diary; also, a history of the 1940 campaign ('1940 Campaign History'), pp. 165–6, in NA/PRO CAB 106/222. King Leopold had stated on 26 May that only a counter-attack by the British between the Lys and the Escaut would avert a disaster. Keyes, Diary, states that at least five messages to this effect had been sent to Gort on 26 May. Keyes nevertheless sent Gort another message stating: 'They consider an immediate counter-offensive by BEF towards eastwards between the Escaut and the Lys is the only way of averting disaster.' Gort's Despatches, p. 5924, acknowledges receiving this message.
That night Keyes spoke to Churchill and Sir Archibald Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air, on the telephone to warn them both that if the Belgians were not supported by the RAF, they would crack and in the words of Keyes, Diary, were 'unlikely to stand another day'.
- 3 1940 Campaign History, p. 167, states that this message was sent at 13.12 on 26 May.
- 4 Quenard's Report.
- 5 Gort, Despatches, p. 5927.
- 6 Enclosure 10 to a note that Keyes sent to Gort on 12 June 1940, in the Keyes Files. It was received by Gort, according to Ellis, *War In France*, p. 198.
- 7 Meigem is some seven miles south-west of Ghent.
Lieutenant-Colonel Warmoes, 15th Regiment's commander, 'Rapport au sujet des événements du 25 mai 1940', dated 4 June 1940, in CDH.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Report by Felicien Rousseaux of the 7th Regiment, in that regiment's file in the CDH; 6 September 1949 letter, from Capitaine Commandant Léon Danze, commander of the 15th Regiment's 8th Company, to the Auditor General, brought to my attention by Peter Taghon.
- 10 Belgians who speak Flemish refer to the village as 'Vinkt'. French Belgians refer to it as 'Vynckt'.
- 11 Major Velghe, commander, 3rd Battalion, the 3rd Chasseurs Ardennais Regiment (a unit within the 1st Chasseurs Ardennais Division), 'Combats de Vynckt', in CDH; and 'La Bataille De La Lys', a multi-volume history of the battle, brought to my attention by Huygelier/CDH, in CDH.
- 12 'In Zake Vinkt – Not. Nr. 104–V/48' ('Vinkt Prosecution's Introduction'), which, like most of the material relating to the massacres at Vinkt, was brought to my attention by Peter Taghon and his book *Mai 1940*. He gave me all documents relating to the prosecution of Oberleutnant Lohmann and Major Kühner, includ-

- ing all statements made to the Commission des Crimes de Guerre ('Vinkt War Crimes Commission'), after finding them in the Archief van het Auditoraat General: Krijsgauditoraat in Brussels (the 'Krijsgauditoraat').
- 13 *Les Crimes De Guerre commis lors de l'invasion du territoire national Mai 1940: Les Massacres De Vinkt* (the 'Vinkt War Crimes Commission Report'), brought to my attention by Peter Taghon, p. 22.
- 14 Roman de Bouver, *2000 Duitse Soldaten Op Het Ehrenfriedhof Van Deinze En Vinkt*, brought to my attention by Peter Taghon.
- 15 Evidence given by Oberleutnant Franz Lohmann, according to a 1947 summary of the evidence against him by the war-crimes investigators. It was brought to my attention by Peter Taghon. It is filed in the Krijsgauditoraat.
- 16 Kurt Quell, who was in the 1st Company of the 377th Regiment's 1st Battalion, 20 September 1946 statement, recorded by the Vinkt War Crimes Commission.
- 17 Lieutenant Heinrich Klusmann, an officer in the 377th Regiment, 27 August 1946 statement, recorded by the Vinkt War Crimes Commission.
- 18 Elza Vermeulen, 21 June 1945 statement, given to the Vinkt War Crimes Commission.
- 19 Franz Lohmann, 4 March 1947 statement, given to the Vinkt War Crimes Commission.
- 20 Sergeant Albert Jansenne, 12 August 1945 statement, given to the Vinkt War Crimes Commission.
- 21 The Appeal Court decided on 18 April 1950 that Lohmann was an accomplice to the murder of the three other men killed at the Van Steenkistes' farm. It is not clear why the Vermeulens were not also mentioned in the judgement. The transcript was given to me by Peter Taghon. It is filed in the Krijsgauditoraat.
- 22 Vinkt War Crimes Commission Report, p. 28.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 50. The man killed was Camiel De Cock, and the description is based on evidence taken from Emiel De Vennet's widow.
- 24 *Ibid.* The second De Cock brother killed was Raoul.
- 25 Vinkt War Crimes Commission Report, p. 118; and Omer De Roo, 28 June 1945 statement, given to the Vinkt War Crimes Commission.
- 26 Heinz Pfluger, orderly officer, 376th Regiment, 14 October 1946 statement, given to the Vinkt War Crimes Commission; Vinkt War Crimes Commission Report, pp. 51–61.
- 27 Vinkt War Crimes Commission Report, p. 65.
- 28 *Ibid.*, p. 67.
- 29 Maurice Mertens' statement ('Mertens' Statement'), given to the Vinkt War Crimes Commission.
- 30 Marcel Claeys, 20 June 1945 statement ('Claeys' Statement'), given to the Vinkt War Crimes Commission.
- 31 Mertens' Statement.
- 32 *Ibid.*
- 33 Sources for the two survivors' stories are: Sofie De Smet's 2004 interviews with Hector Schollaert, to whom she and I were introduced by Joseph De Vlieger, and

- the statements Schollaert and Pieyns made to the Vinkt War Crimes Commission ('Schollaert's Statement' and 'Pieyns' Statement'). De Vlieger, to whom I was introduced by Peter Taghon, gave me most of the information about the Vinkt massacres that was not supplied by Taghon.
- 34 It would have been seventeen, had not three other men survived the initial shooting. Two were shot as they tried to escape; only one man from this group survived to tell his tale.
- 35 Frans Michem, *Vinkt in mei 1940*, pp. 69–76, brought to my attention by Peter Taghon.
- 36 Ibid.; Schollaert's Statement and Pieyns' Statement.
- 37 Overstraeten, *Albert I–Leopold III*, pp. 718–20.
- 38 Vinkt Prosecution's Introduction.
- 39 The sources for the events in the so-called Weide D'Oosterlinck (the Oosterlinck meadow) are: Sofie De Smet's 2004 interviews with Godelieve and Rudolf Corijn, siblings, to whom she and I were introduced by Joseph De Vlieger; and the Vinkt War Crimes Commission Report, pp. 108–12. The Corijns were in the meadow on 28 May 1940.
- 40 The witness was Godelieve Corijn.
- 41 Lieutenant-Colonel Davy's account of the campaign, in the Keyes Files; and 28 May, 11.30 a.m., War Cabinet Conclusions, in NA/PRO CAB 65/7.
- 42 27 May, 10 p.m., War Cabinet Conclusions, in NA/PRO CAB 65/7.
- 43 Although the minutes clearly note that this statement and the following sentence were spoken by Chamberlain, the content leads me to question whether the person writing up the minutes may have made a mistake. The sentiments quoted are those that one might have expected from Halifax, who was still arguing in favour of Reynaud's proposal, rather than from Chamberlain, who appears to have already decided that the proposal should not be taken up.
- 44 28 May, 4 p.m., War Cabinet Conclusions, Confidential Annexes, 145th Conclusion, Minute 1, in NA/PRO CAB 65/13.
- 45 Ben Pimlott (ed.), *The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton 1940–5*, p. 28.
- 46 Telegram to Sir R. Campbell, in Paris, sent at 11.40 p.m., 28 May 1940, for the French Prime Minister, in NA/PRO CAB 65/13.
- 47 29 May letter from General Spears to General Ismay, in NA/PRO CAB 21/1282.
- 48 30 May letter from Spears to Ismay, in NA/PRO CAB 21/1282.
- 49 Churchill's 4 June speech in the House of Commons, the transcript for which has been made available by the House of Lords, Record Office.

24: Crisis in the North

- 1 The account by Lieutenant-Colonel Whitfield, commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, in Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. H. Neville (ed.), *The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry Chronicle: Volume 1: September 1939–June 1940: The Record of the 43rd, 52nd, 4th, 5th,*

and 1st Buckinghamshire Battalions in the Second German War ('Neville, *Ox and Bucks Light Infantry Chronicle*'), p. 173.

- 2 War diary, 1st Battalion, the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, in NA/PRO WO 167/805.
- 3 My 2002 interview with the officer who, in 1940, was 2nd Lieutenant Christopher Weir. He was Major Weir when I interviewed him.
- 4 Lieutenant-Colonel George Gilmore, 'The Story of an Eventful Month, May 1940' ('Cameronians/Gilmore Report'), a series of articles in *The Covenanter* (the journal of the Cameronians), September 1957–March 1958, brought to my attention by Terry Mackenzie, Museum Collections Officer, South Lanarkshire Council. The events on 25–6 May 1940 are covered by Part 2 of the Cameronians/Gilmore Report in *The Covenanter*, November 1957, pp. 78–9.
- 5 The Cameronians' position is specified in Brigadier C. N. Barclay, *The History of the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) Volume 3, 1933–1946* ('Barclay, *History of the Cameronians*'), p. 37, reflecting the Cameronians' war diary ('The Cameronians' War Diary'), in NA/PRO WO 167/721. The north of the Cameronians' line on the canal was a stream, Roozebeek, half a mile south of Hollebeke.
Houthem is some two and a half miles north-west of Comines, and Hollebeke is one and a half miles further to the north-west.
- 6 The Cameronians' War Diary states that the battalion made contact with the Germans on the canal at 11.30 a.m. on 26 May.
- 7 Cameronians/Gilmore Report, Part 2.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 The German divisions that attacked British troops on the Ypres–Comines line were 61 Division on the British right, 31 Division in the centre, and 18 Division on the British left. They were all under the command of the German IV Corps.
- 10 Neville, *Ox and Bucks Light Infantry Chronicle*, pp. 118–20; 150 Brigade's war diary ('150 Brigade's War Diary'), in NA/PRO WO 167/402; 17 Brigade's war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/378; and 13 Brigade's war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/372.
- 11 Cameronians/Gilmore Report, Part 3, *The Covenanter*, January 1958, pp. 104–6.
- 12 Ibid. The ridge to be held has been identified as that at La Caleute, in Henri Bourgeois, 'The Battle Of The Ypres–Comines Canal 1940' (the 'Bourgeois Report').
- 13 Ibid., p. 22.
Warneton is some two miles south-west of Comines.
- 14 Brigadier C. N. Barclay, 'Dunkirk 1940: The Action of The 2nd Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) on the 27th May' ('Barclay's Report'), in *The Covenanter*, July 1957, pp. 27–8; and the Cameronians' War Diary.
- 15 Cameronians/Gilmore, Part 3.
- 16 My interview with the officer who, in 1940, was 2nd Lieutenant Christopher Weir. It is just possible that Gilmore's earlier description of the attack on the machine-gun posts relates to Weir's action.
- 17 Barclay, *History of the Cameronians*, p. 40.

- 18 Pat Hendriks's account, in a letter to his parents dated 4 June 1940, was made available by June McBain, his niece, to whom I was introduced by Colonel Hugh Mackay of the Cameronians.
- 19 Barclay's Report, and Barclay, *History of the Cameronians*, p. 40.
- 20 Barclay, *History of the Cameronians*, p. 41.
- 21 Franklyn's Report.
- 22 The two other battalions that counter-attacked during the evening of 27 May were the 6th Black Watch and the 2nd North Staffordshires.
- 23 Le Touquet is around two miles north-east of Armentières.
- 24 Ploegsteert is two and a half miles north-west of Le Touquet, and the Bois de Ploegsteert is just to the north of Ploegsteert.
- 25 Oliver Lindsay (ed.), *A Guards' General: The Memoirs of Major General Sir Allan Adair* ('Adair, *A Guards' General*'), p. 116, mentions that General Alexander's ADC was George Thorne.
- 26 Franklyn's Report.
- 27 The account by the officer who, in 1940, was Captain Brinckman was brought to my attention by Seymour/Mason/Grenadier Guards.
- 28 Lieutenant-Colonel Franklin Lushington, *A Short History of the Kent Yeomanry: Yeoman Service, 1939–1945*, p. 21, brought to my attention by the Seymour/Mason/Grenadier Guards.
- 29 The 6th Black Watch, supported by 7th Field Company, Royal Engineers, 13th/18th Royal Hussars and 59th Field Company, counter-attacked at around 7 p.m., according to Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*, p. 265.
- 30 This is a reference to the railway line that runs north-east–south-west parallel to the road linking Comines and Warneton.
- 31 Adair, *A Guards' General*, p. 117. It is possible that Adair has mixed up the two companies.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 118.
- 33 *Ibid.* It was 2nd Lieutenant Aubrey-Fletcher.
- 34 Forbes, *Grenadier Guards In The War*, p. 36.
- 35 The Grenadier Guards withdrew to the west at 10 p.m. 28 May, according to Adair, *A Guards' General*, p. 119. The numbers of remaining soldiers quoted come from Cunliffe, *History Of The Royal Warwickshire Regiment*, p. 64, and Forbes, *Grenadier Guards In The War*, p. 36.
- 36 17 Brigade's soldiers fought on until there were only some 150 left in the 2nd Northamptonshires, and some forty men in 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers, according to Brigadier W. J. Jervois, *The History of the Northamptonshire Regiment 1934–1948*, p. 68; and Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*, p. 274.
- St Eloi is some two and a half miles south of Ypres.
- 37 50 Division's war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/300; 150 Brigade's War Diary; and 3 Division's war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/218.
- Kemmel is some five miles south-west of Ypres. Mont Kemmel is just to the south-west of Kemmel.
- 38 Noordschote is eight miles north-west of Ypres.
- 39 David Smith's account ('Smith's Report') was initially made available by the Royal

Lancer officer who, in 1940, was 2nd Lieutenant John Clark Kennedy and is now Lieutenant-Colonel Clark Kennedy. When I interviewed David Smith, he too was a lieutenant-colonel.

- 40 Dixmude is some twelve miles north of Ypres.
 41 Stewart, *History of the XII Lancers*, pp. 366–7; and Smith’s Report.
 42 12th Royal Lancers’ war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/452.
 43 Nieuport is some sixteen miles north-east of Dunkirk.
 44 Stewart, *History of the XII Lancers*, p. 367; and my interview with David Smith.
 45 Smith’s Report.
 46 Mann’s group of armoured cars was only relieved at 10 p.m. on 28 May, by 59 Field Company, according to Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*, p. 273.
 47 2nd Lieutenant Bruce Shand and 2nd Lieutenant Tim Bishop fought actions similar to Mann at Schoorbakke and Stuivekenskerke, in each case with two armoured cars as specified in Stewart, *History of the XII Lancers*, p. 368.
 Schoorbakke is some five miles north of Dixmude, and Stuivekenskerke is some two miles north of Dixmude.
 48 Steenstraat is north-west of Ypres on the Yser Canal. Details of divisions’ moves during 28–9 May are from Major L. C. Gates, *The History of The Tenth Foot 1919–1950*, p. 38, brought to my attention by Captain John Lee of the Royal Anglian Regiment (Lincolnshire); Graves, *Royal Ulster Rifles*, p. 55; and 151 Brigade’s war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/402.

25: Up the Glosters

- 1 NA/PRO WO 106/1750. General Sir John Dill replaced General Ironside as Chief of the Imperial General Staff with effect from 27 May. General Ironside became Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces.
 2 NA/PRO WO 106/1698. The message was sent at 1 p.m. 27 May.
 3 NA/PRO WO 106/1750.
 4 The French unit in question was General Bougrain’s 2ième Division Légère Mécanique.
 5 Blanchard’s Report.
 The French translation of 2 Corps’ 27 May 1940 order is in the Army Group 1 file, in SHAT 28N2. The English original is in 2 Corps’ file, in NA/PRO WO 167/148.
 6 Blanchard’s Report.
 7 Gort, *Despatches*, p. 5927.
 8 Blanchard’s Report.
 9 Colonel Humbert’s note describing events on 28 May (‘Humbert’s Report’), in Annex no. 11 to Blanchard’s Report.
 Gort’s plan was to have the main BEF force retreat to the Poperinghe–Ypres line during the night of 28–9 May, and to the Dunkirk perimeter the following night, according to Pownall, *Diaries*, p. 349.
 10 Pownall, *Diaries*, pp. 347–8.

- 11 Ibid., p. 349.
- 12 Steenwerck is some three miles west of Armentières. Watou is one and a half miles to the south-east of Houtkerque.
- 13 Humbert's Report; also, Pownall, *Diaries*, p. 350.
- 14 According to a summary of the attempt by the French troops in III, IV and V Corps to escape to the north of the Lys, in SHAT 29N1, they were supposed to retreat in two stages. During stage one, on 26–7 May, these units were supposed to retreat to the area south of Lille. In most cases this was successfully accomplished.
- During stage two, on 27–8 May, the troops were supposed to cross the Canal de la Deûle, which runs diagonally from south-west to north-east across the required lines of retreat, to the Lys. The north-eastern part of the canal passes through Lille. Unfortunately for the French, the Germans captured the more southerly bridges over the Deûle, which had been allotted to IV and V Corps. Consequently these corps were cut off. The only organized formations to make it back to the Lys after crossing the Deûle were III Corps units, which had been ordered to use the northern bridges over the Deûle.
- Units that could not cross the Deûle ended up in and around Lille, with the prospect of fighting on until their ammunition was used up, if they could not break through the German cordon so that they could escape to the west.
- Sources include 'Journal des Marches et Opérations de la 12ème Division d'Infanterie Motorisée', in SHAT 32N76/1.
- Lomme is some four miles north-west of Lille. Lambersart is north-east of Lomme, Verlinghem is some four miles north-west of Lambersart, and Frelinghien is some three miles north-east of Armentières. Pérenchies is around two miles north of Lomme, and Houplines is some four miles north-west of Pérenchies.
- 15 Ledringhem is some fourteen miles south-east of Dunkirk.
- 16 Arneke is some two miles south-west of Ledringhem.
- 17 Wormhout is some two miles north-east of Ledringhem.
- 18 Anthony Scott, Cole Packer and J. Groves, *Record of a Reconnaissance Regiment: A History of the 43rd Reconnaissance Regiment (the Gloucestershire Regiment) 1939–1945* ('Scott, *Record of a Reconnaissance Regiment*'), p. 34. The book was brought to my attention by Don Pruett and Patricia Davies.
- 19 'Diary of Captain L. C. Hauting Adjt. 5 Glosters: 13–30 May 1940' ('Hauting's Report'), brought to my attention by Una Dowding, his daughter.
- 20 Scott, *Record of a Reconnaissance Regiment*, pp. 36–7, states that one of the German vehicles was knocked out before the vehicles retreated.
- 21 Ivor Organ, in Guy Rommelaere, *May 1940 In Flanders: Esquelbecq, Wormhout, Ledringhem: The forgotten massacre* ('Rommelaere, *May 1940*'), the English version of Guy Rommelaere, *Le massacre est oublié*, p. 27.
- 22 144 Brigade's war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/399.
- Wylder is some two miles north-east of Wormhout.
- 23 Bambecque is some three and a half miles north-east of Wormhout.
- 24 Rommelaere, *May 1940*.
- 25 Hauting's Report.

- 26 Michael Shephard's account of the counter-attack at Ledringhem was first published in June 1940 in the *Citizen*, 15 June 1940. It was brought to my attention by John Hamblett, to whom I was introduced by Brigadier Frank Henn.
- 27 Hauting's Report.
- 28 My 2004 interview with Charlie Smith, from the 5th Glosters ('Charlie Smith Interview').
- 29 Riet Veld is around one and a half miles east of Ledringhem.
- 30 Charlie Smith Interview.
- 31 Bill Haywood's account was brought to my attention by Major Bob Prophet of the Worcestershire and Sherwood Foresters Regiment. It was published in *Firm*, the regimental journal, July 1948, p. 109.

26: Massacre at Wormhout

- 1 Edward Jerram, 'Diary of Edward J. Jerram, Captain, The Royal Warwickshire Regiment: Commanding B Coy' ('Jerram's Report'), was brought to my attention by his son, Christopher Jerram.
- 2 Esquelbecq is one and a half miles west of Wormhout.
- 3 Jerram's Report.
- 4 Philip Hicks was in fact a major on 28 May. He had taken over as the commanding officer on 21–2 May, after Lieutenant-Colonel Dunn, who was suffering from a burst gastric ulcer, collapsed and was evacuated. Hicks was only made a lieutenant-colonel on 29 May. See Cunliffe, *History of the Royal Warwickshire Regiment*, pp. 34 and 59.
- 5 Noordpeene is some six miles south-west of Wormhout. The latter town is sometimes referred to as 'Wormhout.'
- 6 Captain Dick Tomes, 'Personal Diary' ('Tomes's Diary'), p. 27. It was brought to my attention by Dick Tomes, in 2001, by which time he was a colonel.
- 7 This bombing took place at 2 p.m. on 27 May, according to the 2 Royal Warwicks' war diary ('2nd Royal Warwicks' War Diary'), in NA/PRO WO 167/839.
- 8 Tomes's Diary, p. 28; and 2nd Royal Warwicks' War Diary.
- 9 The machine-gunners supporting the Royal Warwicks at Wormhout included the 4th Cheshire Regiment's D Company, and one platoon (8 Platoon) from its B Company, as is confirmed by Major Harry Kissack, 'D Company: Report of Action in Belgium: May 1940' ('Kissack's Report'), made available by his grandson, Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Blagbrough; also, Lieutenant Geoffrey Clemence, '8 Platoon 4th Cheshire', made available by his son, Alistair. Both reports were passed to me by Colonel Jimmy McGuinness, the Cheshire Regiment, who in May 1940 was Lieutenant McGuinness, the 4th Cheshires' intelligence officer.
- Those who have helped me work out the Royal Warwicks' positions, and other features on Map 14, include the Royal Warwicks' Alec Pugh, Doug Cordrey (nephew of Corporal Bill Cordrey whose account is cited in this chapter), and Guy Rommelaere, author of *May 1940 In Flanders* (see Chapter 25, note 21).

- 10 Jerram's Report.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Rommelaere, *May 1940*, p. 33, quoting from a statement by Max Wünsche who was in the car with Dietrich, and the extracts from the interrogation of Wünsche, in NA/PRO WO 309/30.
- The SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler war diary ('Leibstandarte War Diary'), in BA/MA RS4/1211, states that Dietrich took cover in the ditch at 11.50 a.m. I have presumed that this was according to German time, which would make it 10.50 a.m. French time.
- The Worcestershire Yeomanry's gunner who shot up Dietrich's car may have belonged to 210 Battery, which arrived in Wormhout on 26 May, according to D. R. Guttery, *The Queen's Own Worcestershire Hussars 1922–1956*, p. 25, brought to my attention and supplied by Colonel Stanford Cartwright, John Mason and Sam Hardy.
- 13 Leibstandarte War Diary.
- 14 Ibid., also, the statement made by Alfred Rodenbuecher, in the report, WC1U/IDC/1650, by the War Crimes Interrogation Unit on the Wormhout Massacre (the 'Wormhout Massacre Report'), pp. 44–5, in NA/PRO WO 309/1813. It superseded the original report, WCIU/LDC/1500, in NA/PRO WO 309/1813. Both were given to me by Doug Cordrey, the nephew of Corporal Bill Cordrey whose testimony appears in this chapter.
- 15 Leibstandarte War Diary.
- 16 Leslie Aitken, *Massacre On The Road To Dunkirk: Wormhout 1940* ('Aitken, Massacre On The Road To Dunkirk'), pp. 67–8.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Anonymous report, by a German from the 6th Company of the 2nd Panzer Division's 3rd Panzer Regiment, ('6th Panzer Company Report'), pp. 16–17 (using the numbers at the top right of the page) in BA-MA RH27–2/93. The same events are also referred to in BA-MA MSG2 2745.
- 19 Leibstandarte War Diary; also 6th Panzer Company Report.
- 20 Lieutenant Cord is referred to as Corder in the SS Leibstandarte Regiment report, p. 41, in BA-MA RS7/v.113, and Cords in the Leibstandarte War Diary.
- 21 Leibstandarte War Diary which states the rescue took place at "1600" (presumably 3 p.m. French time); also, the SS Leibstandarte Regiment report, p. 41, in BA-MA RS7/v.113.
- 22 Jerram's Report.
- 23 The location of the headquarters was given to me by the officer who, in 1940, was Captain Dick Tomes in the interviews he gave me in 2001 ('Tomes's Interviews').
- 24 My 2001 interview with the officer who, in 1940, was 2nd Lieutenant John Vaudrey, the Royal Warwicks' intelligence officer; Tomes's Diary; and a report by Philip Hicks, brought to my attention by John Vaudrey.
- 25 Tomes's Interviews.
- 26 2nd Lieutenant John Vaudrey's report, which he gave me.
- 27 Rexpoede is some five miles north-east of Wormhout.
- 28 Jerram's Report. According to Kissack's Report, just eighty-seven out of the 139

- men from the 4th Cheshires who had served under his command in Wormhout made it back to England in May–June 1940.
- 29 Wormhout Massacre Report, p. 3.
- 30 Oskar Senf's statement ('Senf's Report'), in the Wormhout Massacre Report, pp. 46–8.
- 31 Mohnke's predecessor as commander of the 2nd Battalion, the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Regiment, was Sturmbannführer (Major) Schuetzeck, as mentioned in the Wormhout Massacre Report, p. 3.
- Mohnke's link with the massacre was first brought to my attention by author Tom Bower's article in the *Daily Telegraph*, 21 April 1988, given to me by the Royal Warwicks' Alec Pugh.
- 32 The report by Oxley, who was in the 4th Cheshires' D Company's 15 Platoon, was made available to me by Geoffrey Crump, an Honorary Researcher at the Cheshire Military Museum, after it was brought to my attention by Brigadier Bernard Rigby's unpublished history of the Cheshire Regiment ('Rigby, Cheshires' Regimental History'), and by Colonel Jimmy McGuinness. Although Oxley made this report to the Cheshires' Major Kissack as soon as he returned to England in 1940, it, and in particular the times mentioned in it, which appear to be inconsistent with times mentioned in other accounts, has to be treated with some caution since it has not been corroborated by other soldiers' reports.
- 33 The letter was made available to me by Geoffrey Crump, the Cheshire Military Museum, with the agreement of Major Nigel Hine. I was alerted to its existence by the report, by Lieutenant James Beech, to which this letter is attached, by Colonel Jimmy McGuinness, and to the letter itself by Rigby, Cheshires' Regimental History.
- 34 Daley's statement ('Daley's Report'), in Appendix C of the Wormhout Massacre Report.
- 35 My 2000 interview with Tombs ('Tombs Interview'). I was introduced to him by Major Richard Mills, the Warwickshire Branch of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers; and Tombs's taped interview, in IWM Sound Archive 10725.
- 36 My interviews with Albert Evans in 2000 and 2004. I was introduced to him by Major Richard Mills.
- 37 Richard Parry's statements to the War Crimes Interrogation Unit ('Parry's Reports'), in the Wormhout Massacre Report, pp. 62–3 and 68.
- The information is also taken from Senf's Report.
- I have assumed that Harbour and Thompson stayed with Daley after they were captured together; they certainly all ended up in the barn where the massacre took place.
- 38 Parry's Reports.
- 39 Senf's Report.
- 40 Aitken, *Massacre On The Road To Dunkirk*, p. 77.
- 41 *Ibid.*, p. 78.
- 42 Daley's Report.
- 43 Evans's statement to the War Crimes Interrogation Unit, which is in the Wormhout Massacre Report, pp. 56–7; my 2000 and 2004 interviews with Evans.

- 44 Brian Fahey's account is partly taken from an interview he gave to the Imperial War Museum's Sound Archive, which he lent to me, and partly from my 2001 interview with him.
- 45 Daley's Report.
- 46 Aitken, *Massacre On The Road To Dunkirk*, p. 93. The man who felt sick was George Hopper.
- 47 Daley's Report.
- 48 Aitken, *Massacre On The Road To Dunkirk*, p. 94.
- 49 Tombs Interview.
- 50 Aitken, *Massacre On The Road To Dunkirk*, p. 113.
- 51 Cunliffe, *History of the Royal Warwickshire Regiment*, p. 62.

27: Escape to Dunkirk

- 1 There were times when Gort and his corps commanders did not fully control their divisions, as is apparent from 'Extract From Diary of Maj-Gen. E. A. Osborne, DSO ('Osborne's Diary'), with 44 Division's war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/275.
- 2 Vyfweg is some two miles south-east of Bergues. West Cappel is some four miles south-east of Bergues. Bambecque is some six miles south-east of Bergues. Caestre is some sixteen miles south-east of Bergues. Strazeele is some eighteen miles south-east of Bergues. Vieux Berquin is some two miles south-east of Strazeele.
- 3 1st Army War Diary.
- 4 The troops under the command of the French IV and V Corps, which were cooped up in and around Lille, had to break through the German cordon on the west side of the town if they were to make it back to the Lys.

Two principal attempts were made to cross the Deûle. At 7.30 p.m. on 28 May the 2nd North African Division (2 DINA) tried but failed to break out over the bridge leading to Sequedin, which is just to the south of Lomme.

At the same time 5 DINA tried but failed to cross the Moulin Rouge bridge, leading to Santes, which is to the south of Haubourdin. Haubourdin is to the south of Sequedin. A second attempt to cross was made the next morning. The bridge had been mined by the Germans, but two French tanks and two companies of infantry nevertheless crossed, only to be forced back. It was the last attempt to escape the encirclement.

Most of the sources for the above were brought to my attention by Jean-Claude Rogier, an expert on the fighting at Lille, Yves Teisseire, President of 5 DINA's 24ième Régiment de Tirailleurs Tunisiens (24 RTT) Veterans' Association, and Louis Betou, who served in the 24 RTT at Lille; also the report by Lieutenant Aubert from the 18ième Régiment de Dragons; and 'La Bataille d'Haubourdin' in *Bulletin Intérieur*, March 1972, the magazine produced by the Amicale Des Anciens Du 24 RTT.

- 5 General de La Laurencie, *Les Opérations Du IIIe Corps D'Armée En 1939–1940* ('La Laurencie, *Opérations Du IIIe Corps*'), p. 81; and the 1st Army War Diary, pp. 9–10.

- 6 La Laurencie, *Opérations Du IIIe Corps*, p. 82. The generals who initially said their troops were too tired were Louis Janssen and Maurice Lucas.
- 7 Osborne's Diary.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Humbert's Report, p. 4.
- 11 Osborne's Diary.
- 12 Mont des Cats is some six miles north of Vieux Berquin.
- 13 West Cappel is four miles south-east of Bergues.
- 14 Vyfweg is one and a half miles north-west of West Cappel.
- 15 Brigadier Norman's 'Memoirs', p. 60, brought to my attention by his son, Canon Bill Norman.
- 16 Rattekot is three miles south-east of Bergues.
- 17 1st Welsh Guards' 2 Company's War Diary, brought to my attention by Welsh Guards' Sources.
- 18 The château was owned by a Monsieur Jean Chocqueel, according to Ellis, *Welsh Guards At War*, p. 112.
- 19 1st Welsh Guards' 2 Company's war diary mentioned in note 17 above.
- 20 My 2001–2 interview with Rhidian Llewellyn.
- 21 'Glosters/Jones Report', p. 101.
- 22 Tom Carmichael's 'Active Service Diary 1940' ('Carmichael's Diary'), pp. 80–81.
- 23 Somerset's Reports.
- 24 Glosters/Jones Report.
- 25 Wilson's Report.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 My 2002 interview with Tom Carmichael; and Wild's Report.
- 28 Wild's Report, and Somerset's Reports.
- 29 Somerset's Reports.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 The Somerset Reports describe how Brigadier Somerset and his group were captured shortly before dawn on 30 May after trying to evade the Germans he and his group encountered in the dark.
- According to the Glosters/Gilmore Report, Gilmore and his group of Glosters were captured at about 11.30 a.m. on 30 May near the wood that he subsequently identified, probably incorrectly, as the Rue d'Ypres. The wood was possibly the Bois St Acaire, which is about one and a half miles north-east of Winnezele. (This is the wood named in Fane's Reports.)
- Wilson's Report reveals that he and his group of Glosters were captured at dawn on 31 May after crossing the River Yser, just to the west of Rousbrugge Haringhe, which is some six miles north-east of Winnezele.
- 32 Captain Brassington's report, in the Glosters' war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/742.
- 33 Wilson's Report.
- 34 Fane's Reports.
- 35 Wilson's Report.

- 36 Approximate figure calculated using facts in the Glosters' war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/742.
- 37 Oost Cappel is some eight miles south-east of Bergues.

28: The Dunkirk Armada

- 1 Brownrigg's Report.
- 2 Colonel G. H. P. Whitfield's account ('Whitfield's Report'), in NA/PRO WO 197/119.
- 3 Whitfield could not remember the general's name; it was not General Fagalde whom he did remember.
- 4 General Barthélemy, commander of Secteur Fortifié de Flandres, report ('Barthélemy's Report'), p. 27, and Capitaine Emile Dubie, report. Both reports are in SHAT 33N4.
Watten is some seventeen miles south-west of Dunkirk.
- 5 Whitfield's Report.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Lieutenant-Colonel J. Chabanier, chief of staff of 68 Division, 'Rapport sommaire des opérations de la 68e D.I. du 10 Mai au 4 Juin 1940', in 68 Division file, in SHAT 32N314.
- 8 Brigadier Clifton, 'Report On Operation In Vicinity of Nieuport 28–30 May 1940' ('Clifton's Report'), in NA/PRO WO 197/119.
Wulpen is some three miles south-west of Nieuport.
- 9 Clifton's Report.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Fryer of 1 Corps' 13th Survey Company describes the frustrated efforts of his engineers to blow up the two bridges on the north-eastern edge of Nieuport, in NA/PRO WO 197/119.
- 12 Clifton's Report.
- 13 Mr Edwards, report, dated 27 May 1940 ('Edwards's Report'), in NA/PRO MT 40/36.
- 14 W. J. R. Gardner (ed.), *The Evacuation From Dunkirk: Operation Dynamo 26 May–4 June 1940* ('Gardner, *Evacuation From Dunkirk*'), p. 16.
- 15 A. J. Barker, *Dunkirk: The Great Escape*, p. 87.
- 16 Basil Smith, account, in NA/PRO ADM 334/83.
- 17 Sheerness, on the Isle of Sheppey, is six miles to the south of Southend-on-Sea.
- 18 Ramsgate is some thirty miles south-east of Sheerness.
- 19 Edwards's Report.
- 20 Edwards's Report. Only some of those commandeered were used in Operation Dynamo.
- 21 Lieutenant A. Dann ('Dann's Report'), in NA/PRO ADM 199/788.
- 22 The series of statements, made by Eric Hamilton-Piercy, one of *Advance's* crew, in NA/PRO HO 144/21564. These statements were made after his arrest on 2 June 1940 under Defence General Regulation 13B, which enabled the British

police to arrest those who belonged to organizations that supported or had links with Germany. These statements were brought to my attention by Jeff Wallder, to whom I was introduced by John Slater of the Association of Dunkirk Little Ships.

- 23 C. P. Dick's report, in NA/PRO MT40/36.
 24 Dann's Report.

29: Beached

- 1 P. D. Elliman was in B Troop of the HAA Battery, 1st HAA Regiment.
 Poperinghe (written as Poperinge on some French maps) is some twenty-one miles south-east of Dunkirk.
- 2 Prioux's capture is mentioned in Prioux, *Souvenirs de Guerre*, p. 136.
- 3 Jacobsen, *Dünkirchen*, p. 154.
- 4 XIX Corps' war diary, pp. 163 and 165, in BA-MA RH21-2/41; and Jacobsen, *Dünkirchen*, pp. 144-4 and 150.
- 5 Malo-les-Bains is one and a half miles south-east of the base of Dunkirk's mole.
- 6 Rear-Admiral William Wake-Walker's report, dated 9 November 1941, in NA/PRO ADM 199/792.
- 7 Ramsay's Report, p. 3304.
- 8 HMS *Wakeful's* Commander Ralph Fisher, 30 May 1940 report ('*Wakeful's* Report'), in NA/PRO ADM 199/789, states that the ship was hit by one of two torpedoes fired at her at 00.45 on 29 May.
- 9 HMS *Grafton's* Lieutenant McRea, 3 June 1940 report ('*Grafton's* Report'), in NA/PRO ADM 199/786, states that *Wakeful's* wreck was first seen at around 2.30 a.m. on 29 May.
- 10 Lieutenant-Commander Haig, 7 June 1940 report (the 'Lydd/Haig Report'), in NA/PRO ADM 199/786.
- 11 *U-62's* war diary for 29–30 May; a copy was made available by Kate Tildesley and Jock Gardner at the Naval Historical Branch (NHB), London.
- 12 My 2001 interview with Kurt Wendler, one of *U-62's* crew ('Wendler's Interview'). Commander Robinson's actions are described in *Grafton's* Report.
- 13 Lydd/Haig Report.
- 14 *Wakeful's* Report; and the comments Commander Ralph Fisher wrote on a letter to him from the officer who in 1940 was Lieutenant John Hamer. This letter is in NHB.
- 15 *Grafton's* Report; and 9 June 1940 letter, from Captain G. G. Mallory, master of the personnel ship *Malines*, to the Principal Sea Transport Officer, Dover, brought to my attention by his son, Michael Mallory.
- 16 Gardner, *Evacuation From Dunkirk*, p. 48, states that Route X was the prescribed daylight route for ships after 16.06 29 May, though Route Z could be used at night.
- 17 Gardner, *Evacuation From Dunkirk*, p. 55.
- 18 Ramsay's Report, p. 3304.

- 19 Ibid., p. 3305.
- 20 Gardner, *Evacuation From Dunkirk*, p. 40. HMS *Jaguar* was in fact tied up to *Grenade*, which was in her turn tied up to the mole.
- 21 *Jaguar*'s Lieutenant-Commander John Hine, report dated 1 June 1940 ('*Jaguar*'s Report'), in NA/PRO ADM 199/786.
- 22 Arnold Saunders, letter to me, April 2001.
- 23 Ramsay's Report, p. 3302; and Gardner, *Evacuation From Dunkirk*, p. 38.
- 24 *Jaguar*'s Report.
- 25 My 2001 interview with the officer who, in 1940, was Lieutenant James Wood. *Jaguar*'s Report states that the bombing that put the ship out of action came near the end of a Luftwaffe raid, which terminated at 4.05 p.m.
- 26 HMS *Grenade*'s Commander Richard Boyle, 11 June 1940 report, in NA/PRO WO 197/118.
- 27 *Crested Eagle*'s Lieutenant-Commander Bernard Booth, 31 May report ('*Crested Eagle*'s Report'), in NA/PRO ADM 199/787.
- 28 'Report of Enquiry Into Circumstances Attending Loss of HM Paddle AA Ship "*Crested Eagle*" in Operation Dynamo', 4 September 1940, in NA/PRO ADM 199/793, and *Crested Eagle*'s Report state that the ship was bombed between 6 and 6.45 p.m. on 29 June.
- 29 My 2001 interview with Bob Bloom.
- 30 Wendler's Interview.

30: Entente Cordiale

- 1 Gardner, *Evacuation From Dunkirk*, pp. 209–10, mentions no less than five sets of Operation Dynamo evacuation statistics, each of them specifying a different number of soldiers evacuated. Even Admiral Ramsay, who used one of the five in his official report on the operation, admitted that the figures he was using were not complete. All of this suggests that it is wise to assume that these statistics are only best estimates.

The evacuation figures I have referred to in the main text of the chapters in this book, including the 58,000 evacuated men in the first paragraph of this chapter, are taken from Appendix IV of the document that Gardner, *Evacuation From Dunkirk* refers to as the 'Dover Report' sent by Ramsay to the Admiralty on 18 June 1940. It is in NA/PRO ADM 199/792. It stated that approximately 316,000 British and Allied soldiers were evacuated during Operation Dynamo (around 193,000 British, and 123,00 French and other Allied men). However, to give readers a feel for what is contained in those sets of statistics which include higher figures, I have also laid out some of the figures contained in the set produced by the Admiralty's Historical Section/Tactical and Staff Duties Department (HS/TSD), which are in Gardner's *Evacuation From Dunkirk*, Tables 2 and 3. The HS/TSD statistics state that approximately 338,000 men were evacuated during Operation Dynamo. The HS/TSD statistics are in Ramsay's Report, which appears to be an amended version of the Dover Report. Unfortunately the HS/

TSD statistics do not give separate daily evacuation figures for French and British soldiers.

Extracts from both the Dover Report and the HS/TSD statistics have been reproduced in this book's Appendix B, pp. 540–41.

Ramsay's Report, p. 3295, states that the Admiralty was expecting him to rescue 'up to 45,000 of the BEF' in the course of Operation Dynamo.

- 2 Signalman George Jones of the 1st Grenadier Guards, quoted in Patrick Wilson, *Dunkirk: From Disaster To Deliverance* ('Wilson, *Dunkirk: Disaster To Deliverance*'), pp. 101–2.
- 3 7 Brigade's war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/359.
- 4 Wilson, *Dunkirk: Disaster To Deliverance*, p. 101.
- 5 2nd Grenadier Guards' war diary ('2nd Grenadier Guards' War Diary'), 29 May 1940 entry. A copy of the relevant pages was given to me by Seymour/Mason/Grenadier Guards.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Francis Waldron's account ('Waldron's Report'), which he made available and interpreted during my 2003–4 interviews with him. The dates he mentions are confirmed by the 4th Berkshires' war diary, brought to my attention by David Chilton, Curator of the Royal Gloucestershire, Berkshire and Wiltshire Regiment (Salisbury) Museum, and John Shires, the regiment's assistant regimental secretary.
- 9 Elverdinghe is some four miles north-west of Ypres.
- 10 Information about Captain Douglas Jardine, commander of HQ Company, provided by Brigadier Bob Flood, the Royal Berkshire officer who, in May 1940, was 2nd Lieutenant Flood.
- 11 8 Brigade's war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/362; 10 Brigade's war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/366; and 4 Division's war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/230.
- 12 Waldron's Report.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 1st Coldstream Guards' War Diary, 30 May entry. A copy of the relevant pages was given to me by the Coldstream Guards' Major Edward Crofton; and the 2nd Grenadier Guards' War Diary.
- 15 Waldron's Report.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 La Panne is some three and a half miles north-west of Furnes.
- 21 2nd Grenadier Guards War Diary, 31 May entry.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Taped interview of Len Gibson, a 50 Division staff officer, in IWM Sound Archive 12183, brought to my attention by Peter Hart.
- 25 'Note On Conference At GHQ (La Panne) On Evening 30th May 1940' (the

- '30 May La Panne Minutes'), in NA/PRO WO 167/124. It appears to have been written by W. C. Holden.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Montgomery's report ('Montgomery's Report'), in IWM Documents, BLM 19 and 22.
- 29 30 May La Panne Minutes.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Montgomery's Report.
- 32 'Report by Major-General Hon. H. R. L. G. Alexander on the operations of 1st Corps BEF from 1200 31st May till midnight 2/3 June 1940' ('Alexander's Report'), in NA/PRO WO 167/124.
- 33 Churchill's message to Gort, in NA/PRO WO 106/1697.
- 34 Bridgeman's Report, pp. 381–2.
- 35 War Cabinet Conclusions, WM(40) 149, NA/PRO CAB 65/7.
- 36 Alexander's Report mentions that he spoke to Major-General Percival before leaving La Panne on 31 May and was told that he was to hold Dunkirk as long as possible, provided the safety of the BEF was not imperilled.
- 37 NA/PRO WO 106/1613.
- 38 Capitaine Georges Meric, the French liaison officer to 2 Corps, to Colonel de Cardes on 8 June 1940, in SHAT 27N188.
- 39 Voruz's 28 June 1940 account, addressed to General Georges, in SHAT 27N188.
- 40 R. Marklan, Sherwood Foresters, in IWM Sound Archive 13561.
- 41 Chef d'Escadron A. Zeller, report, in Dossier 12, SHAT 28N6.
- 42 Fagalde's Report; General Adam's 'Account of Operations of Adam Force', in NA/PRO WO 197/118; Alan Brooke, Diaries, p. 73.
- 43 Abrial's Report.
- 44 Uxem is some five miles south-east of Dunkirk.
- 45 Fagalde's Report. The minutes of the 31 May meeting at Bastion 32 are quoted in Commandant René Lehr, 'Historique Du 16ième Corps d'Armée Rédigé en Décembre 1940' ('Lehr's Report') in SHAT 30N179.
- 46 Alexander's Report.
Ghyvelde is seven miles south-east of Dunkirk.
- 47 Brigadier William Morgan, the Brigadier General Staff, later General Sir William Morgan, quoted in Nigel Nicolson, *Alex: The Life of Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis* ('Nicolson, Alex'), p. 106.
- 48 Alexander's Report.
- 49 31 May War Cabinet Defence Committee minutes, in NA/PRO CAB 69/1.
- 50 Nicolson, *Alex*, p. 106.
- 51 Alexander's Report.
- 52 NA/PRO WO 106/1698.
- 53 'Journal des Marches et Opérations de la 12ème Division d'Infanterie Motorisée', in SHAT 32N76/1; 32 Division's 'Journal des Marches et Opérations pendant la Campagne du 2 septembre 1939 au 25 juin 1940', in SHAT 32N202; and La Laurencie, *Opérations Du IIIe Corps*, pp. 84–5.

- 54 Army Group B war diary, English translation ('Army Group B War Diary') in IWM Foreign Documents, AL 1433, which was brought to my attention by Stephen Walton, the Archivist in IWM Foreign Documents: the 2 June 1940 entry states that at least 34,937 prisoners were taken.
- 55 Spears, *Assignment To Catastrophe*, pp. 289–302.
- 56 Abrial's Report, p. 58.
- 57 Fagalde's Report.
- 58 Ibid.

31: Evacuation

- 1 Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker's account of the evacuation from Dunkerque 29 May to 4 June 1940, in NA/PRO ADM 199/792.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Jimmy Dench's account, in NA/PRO MT 40/36.
- 4 Harold Porter's story, which appeared on p. 30 of a *Leigh Times* special issue, featuring the part played by Leigh-on-Sea's cockle-boat heroes in the evacuation. It was brought to my attention by Clare Harvey and Michael Feather.
- 5 See Chapter 30, note 1; and Appendix B for evacuation statistics.
- 6 George Jones's account in Wilson, *Dunkirk: Disaster To Deliverance*, p. 106.
- 7 Ibid., p. 107.
- 8 Sergeant Mitchell's account, in *ibid.*, p. 107.
- 9 2nd Grenadier Guards' War Diary.
- 10 Major Colvin's account ('Colvin's Report'), in Forbes, *Grenadier Guards In The War*, pp. 42–6.
- 11 Bray-Dunes is some seven miles north-east of Dunkirk.
- 12 Henry Cornwall, and H. J. Dibbens, in IWM Documents 82/33/1 and 80/30/1.
- 13 Colvin's Report.
- 14 HMS *Keith* was sunk at around 9.40 a.m., according to her Captain Berthon, 1 July 1940 report, in NA/PRO ADM 199/792.
- 15 Gardner, *Evacuation From Dunkirk*, pp. 94–5, states that forty-two ships were sunk on 1 June, in addition to other small ships, and, p. 55, states that thirty-six ships were sunk on 29 May, including fifteen destroyers and personnel ships.
- 16 See Chapter 30, note 1, and Appendix B.
- 17 John Beeley, a telegraphist on *Keith*, report ('Beeley's Report'), given to me by Beeley.
- 18 *St Abbs*, June 1940 report, in NA/PRO ADM 199/791, and *Basilisk's* Commander Maxwell Richmond, 2 June 1940 report, in NA/PRO ADM 199/792.
- 19 Lumsden's Report.
- 20 Colvin's Report.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Beeley's Report.
- 23 Nancy Harker, letter to me, in 2003.
Whalley is six miles north-east of Blackburn.

- 24 War Cabinet Conclusions for 1 June, in NA/PRO CAB 65/7.
 25 SHAT 27N78/2
 26 Ibid.
 27 Chiefs of Staff Minutes for 1 June 1940, Document COS (40) 162, in NA/PRO CAB 79/4.
 28 The signal to Alexander was sent to him via Tennant at 5.29 p.m. on 1 June, according to a copy of the message, in NA/PRO CAB 21/1184. The 7 June 1940 report by Captain Bill Tennant, the Senior Naval Officer at Dunkirk, in NA/PRO ADM 199/788A, states that it was received at 18.41 1 June.
 29 According to a note sent by General Percival, the Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff to General Dill, which is in NA/PRO WO 106/1618, this message, from Churchill to General Spears to pass on to Weygand, was sent by the War Office to Madelon at 6.45 p.m. on 1 June.

32: Rearguard

- 1 The 2nd Battalion, the Coldstream Guards, was in 1 Corps' 1 Division.
 2 Langley, *Fight Another Day*, pp. 43–5, and 2nd Coldstream Guards' war diary ('2nd Coldstream Guards' War Diary') given to me by Crofton/Coldstream Guards, 23 May entry, giving their position on the Gort Line, between Leers and Roubaix. Leers is south-east of Roubaix. Roubaix is some seven miles north-east of Lille.
 3 Langley, *Fight Another Day*, pp. 49–50.
 4 Ibid., p. 49.
 5 Ibid., p. 51.
 6 Ibid.
 7 No war diary clearly specifies which unit was on the 2nd Coldstream Guards' right at the moment described. It might have been the 5th Borders or the 1st East Lancashires, or another group of men who were put into the line to support the organized battalions.
 8 Langley, *Fight Another Day*, p. 53.
 9 Ibid., p. 52.
 10 Ibid., p. 53.
 11 Ibid.
 12 Ibid., p. 54.
 13 Ibid., pp. 54–5.
 14 Ibid., p. 51; D. C. Quilter (ed.), *No Dishonourable Name*, p. 33, includes the account by the 2nd Coldstream Guards' commanding officer, who in May–June 1940 was Lieutenant-Colonel Lionel Bootle-Wilbraham; and the 2nd Coldstream Guards' War Diary, 1 June entry.
 15 According to the entry in the 1st East Lancashire Regiment's war diary for the night of 31 May–1 June, the unit that relieved the East Lancs' right-hand company was the 5th Borders.
 16 Blaxland, *Destination Dunkirk*, p. 82.

- 17 Galghoeck is some five miles south-east of Dunkirk's mole.
- 18 My 2003 interview with John Arrigo ('Arrigo Interview'), to whom I was introduced by Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Peyman, a 2nd lieutenant serving in the South Lancashire Regiment during the 1940 campaign.
- 19 My 2001 interview with Charles Best.
- 20 Frank Curry gave me his accounts, including 'Escape From Dunkirk' by Frank Curry as told to Raymond Walsh, and was interviewed by me, in 2001. These accounts and interviews are together subsequently referred to in this book as 'Curry's Reports'.
- 21 Citation made available by Didy Grahame, the Victoria Cross and George Cross Association.
- 22 My 2001 interview with Joe Cêtre; his account, in *Anglo-Portuguese News*, 31 May 1990, was brought to my attention by Lieutenant-Colonel John Downham of the Queen's Lancashire Regiment.
- 23 Curry's Reports.
- 24 Arrigo's Interview.
- 25 Hondschoote is some ten miles south-east of Dunkirk.
- 26 3 Brigade's war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/350.
- 27 Brigadier C. N. Barclay (ed.), *The History Of The Duke Of Wellington's Regiment 1919–1952*, p. 284. It was brought to my attention by the Duke of Wellington's regimental secretary Major David Harrap, and Scott Flaving.
- 28 Duke of Wellington's war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/735.
- 29 The order issued to 1 Corps' troops at 10.30 a.m. on 1 June, in NA/PRO WO 167/124/3.
- 30 Alexander's Report.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 The evacuation of the BEF rearguard had to be delayed because:
- (a) the 5 p.m. 1 June ruling that there must be no evacuation other than during hours of darkness meant that the evacuation during the night 1–2 June had to cease at 3 a.m. on 2 June, which was earlier than previously envisaged. (Lieutenant-Colonel Winterton's report, in NA/PRO WO 167/126/2; Captain Tennant's report, 'Embarkation of the British Expeditionary Force', sent to Admiral Ramsay on 7 June 1940, in NA/PRO ADM 199/788A.)
- (b) the evacuation of 2 Corps' troops was slower than expected because Ramsay was not told until it was too late that the small boats he had assembled were needed west of La Panne; because Wake-Walker understood that the larger ships were required off the beaches rather than at the mole; because Bray-Dunes was shelled by German artillery, which had moved westwards as 2 Corps withdrew; and because French troops obstructed those troops attempting to go to the mole. (Ramsay's Report, pp. 3305–7; and Wake-Walker's reports, in NA/PRO ADM 199/792).
- 33 Spycker is some six miles south-west of Dunkirk.
- 34 See Chapter 30, note 1, and Appendix B.
- 35 F. C. M. Adams's account, in IWM Documents 67/254/1.

- 36 Langley, *Fight Another Day*, p. 55.
 Rosendaël is some two miles north-east of the base of Dunkirk's mole.
- 37 Major Philip Newman's report ('Newman's Report'), brought to my attention by his son, Richard.
- 38 Ibid.

33: Mission Accomplished

- 1 Confidential Annexes to War Cabinet Conclusions WM (40) 153rd Conclusions Minute 10, in NA/PRO CAB 65/13. Fighter figures quoted represent the aircraft available as at 2 June 1940.
- 2 Allan Wright read his account to me over the phone in 2003.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Martin Solomon's report ('Solomon's Report'), in NA/PRO ADM 199/788A.
- 5 Clouston's age has been provided by his son Dane.
- 6 Solomon's and Clouston's boat was Motor boat 243; the other boat was Motor boat 270.
- 7 Sub-Lieutenant R. Wake's report, dated 4 June 1940, in NA/PRO ADM 199/787 and his account supplied by his brother Sir Hereward Wake.
- 8 Solomon's Report.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Julian Warde-Aldam's report, brought to my attention by Jamie Warde-Aldam, to whom I was introduced by Crofton/Coldstream Guards.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Newman's Report.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Ramsay's Report, p. 3310.
- 15 Newman's Report.
- 16 Waldron's Report, p. 84.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Newman's Report.
- 19 See Chapter 30, note 1, Appendix B; Ramsay's Report, p. 3299.
- 20 Tennant's Report; Alexander's Report; and Gardner, *Evacuation From Dunkirk*, p. 108.

34: Payback

- 1 Arcole à Brumaire, 2 June, in SHAT 27N78/2.
- 2 Ramsay's message was sent out at 10.09 a.m. on 3 June. A copy of the original message was made available by Sarah Mason, daughter of Jack Mason. Her father slipped it into his pocket when he saw it in the dockyard office of the Commander, Minesweeping. It is also mentioned in Gardner, *Evacuation From Dunkirk*, p. 189.
- 3 Churchill's message quoted in Professor John C. Cairns, 'The French View of

- Dunkirk', in Professor Brian Bond and Michael Taylor (eds), *The Battle For France and Flanders 1940 Sixty Years On*, p. 98.
- 4 Gardner, *Evacuation From Dunkirk*, p. 109; and Wake-Walker's Reports.
- 5 See Chapter 30, note 1, and Appendix B.
- 6 'Lehr's Report', p. 357.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 362.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 363.
- 9 Chef de Bataillon Carbonnel, 'Le 3ième Bataillon du 143ième à la Contre-Attaque de Têteghem le 3 Juin 1940' ('111/143rd Regiment's Counter-Attack Report'), in SHAT 34N141.
- 10 Lehr's Report, p. 359.
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. 360.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 350.
- 13 The two battalions were the 143rd Regiment's 3rd Battalion, which advanced on the right, and the 122nd Regiment's 3rd Battalion, which advanced on the left.
- 14 111/143rd Regiment's Counter-Attack Report, and 'Rôle du 3ième Bataillon du 122ième constitué en Bataillon de marche sous les ordres du Capitaine Arbola, les 2 et 3 Juin' ('111/122nd Regiment's Counter-Attack Report'), in SHAT 32N202 Dossier 3.
- 15 111/122nd Regiment's Counter-Attack Report.
- 16 My 2003 interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Andrieu ('Andrieu Interview'), who had been a sous-lieutenant in 1940, and told me about his role in the counter-attack. I was put in touch with him by Lieutenant-Colonel Tim Carmichael, British liaison officer, Écoles de St Cyr Coëtquidan.
- 17 111/143rd Regiment's Counter-Attack Report.
- 18 Andrieu Interview.
- 19 Lehr's Report, p. 357.
- 20 *Ibid.*, p. 368.
- 21 *Ibid.*, pp. 368–9.
- 22 Barthélemy's Report, p. 50.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 51.
- 24 *Ibid.*
- 25 Ramsay's Report, p. 3311, states that the evacuation was to terminate at 2.30 a.m. I have presumed, rightly or wrongly, that this is according to French time.
- 26 'Rapport résumé du Chef de Bataillon Miquel Commandant le 2ième Bataillon du 137ième Régiment d'Infanterie', dated 23 December 1940, in SHAT 34N135; and 'Rapport sommaire du Colonel Andrei Cdt l'ID 68 sur tels opérations de la 68ième DI du 28 mai au 4 juin 1940', in SHAT 32N314.
- 27 Barthélemy's Report, p. 52.
- 28 Gardner, *Evacuation From Dunkirk*, p. 120; and 7 June 1940 report, commanding officer, *Shikari*, in NA/PRO ADM 199/786.
- 29 Commander Troup's account, in NA/PRO ADM 199/787.
- 30 The 40,000 figure mentioned in the 4 June entry in the Army Group B War Diary appears to be an estimate given to the Germans by the senior French officer in

Dunkirk. The figure quoted in the Appendix to the 18th Army war diary for 4 June, which is in BA-MA RH20-18/35, is as high as 80,000. The account by Staff Officer Hauptmann Drescher ('Drescher's Report'), which is in BA-MA RH20-18/37, states that 88,000 prisoners were taken.

31 Admirauté Français to Aurore, Arcole, in NA/PRO WO 202/4.

32 Drescher's Report.

35: Sacrifice of the 51st Highland Division

1 Gardner, *Evacuation From Dunkirk*, p. 121.

2 The 160,000 figure is a best estimate mentioned in a contemporary note, in NA/PRO CAB 120/246. It is more or less consistent with the following figures: Ellis, *War In France*, p. 305, states that 144,171 British servicemen were evacuated from south of the Somme. Some 8000 were captured at St Valery, as mentioned in this chapter, and more than 3000 are said to have been killed during the sinking of the *Lancastria*, as mentioned in Chapter 36.

3 Horne, *To Lose a Battle*, p. 639, mentions the 104 divisions, and the number of divisions available to the Germans is specified in NA/PRO WO 106/290, brought to my attention by Saul David, and his book *Churchill's Sacrifice*, as were most of the sources relating to the 51st Highland Division in this chapter.

4 Pierre Lyet, *La Bataille De France: Mai-Juin 1940*, p. 117.

5 As mentioned in Chapter 1, note 20, clear figures are not available for the German and French air forces. The British figures come from Spears, *Assignment To Catastrophe*, p. 365; and Reynaud's and Churchill's 5 June correspondence, in Annexes to the War Cabinet 156th Conclusions, Minute 2, 6 June 1940, 12.30 p.m., in NA/PRO CAB 65/13.

6 NA/PRO WO 167/413. The people who helped me contact Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (A and SH) veterans and their families, and to find out what happened to the A and SH battalions south of the Somme, included: Major Alastair Campbell, Bruce Cheape, Jeremy Inglis, Robin Malcolm, Archie Orr Ewing, Lieutenant-Colonel James Stirling, Geraldine Tomlinson and David Younger. Dr Tom Renouf and Alastair Campbell of Airds did the same for all the battalions in the 51st Highland Division.

7 Books on the subject are listed in David, *Churchill's Sacrifice*. It contains the most comprehensive account of the 51st Division's actions during the 1940 campaign.

8 The people who helped me contact Border Regiment veterans and their families, and helped me find out what happened to the regiment south of the Somme, included: Mike Brandwood, Robin Burgess, Stuart Eastwood, curator, the Regimental Museum at Carlisle, Major Anthony Farrell, J. Heap, Jean Hind, and John Turnbull.

9 Incheville is some sixteen miles south-west of Abbeville.

10 Le Tréport, which is on the coast, is some ten miles west of Gamaches, both being on the Bresle.

- 11 Major John Hopkinson, 'D Company, 4th Battalion: In France, May and June 1940' ('Hopkinson's Report'), brought to my attention by his son, Michael.
- 12 Eric Linklater, *The Highland Division*, p. 58.
- 13 Hopkinson's Report.
- 14 It was the 1st/5th Sherwood Foresters' A Company, according to that battalion's war diary, in NA/PRO WO 167/824.
- 15 Lieutenant E. Williamson's report, written in November 1940 while he was a prisoner, brought to my attention by Michael Hopkinson.
- 16 John Watton's account, brought to my attention by his son, John Watton junior.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Spears, *Assignment To Catastrophe*, pp. 385–6.
- 20 Lieutenant-General James Marshall-Cornwall's report, in NA/PRO WO 216/116. Robert Altmayer was the brother of General René Altmayer, V Corps' commander.
- 21 NA/PRO WO 106/1652.
- 22 Lyons-la-Forêt is some sixteen miles east of Rouen.
- 23 Lieutenant-General James Marshall-Cornwall, *Wars And Rumours Of Wars: A Memoir* ('Marshall-Cornwall, *Wars and Rumours*'), pp. 143–4, brought to my attention by his daughter, Lady Middleton, suggests he saw the intelligence on 6 June. However, his signal describing the documents, in NA/PRO WO 106/1652, reveals it was sent to the War Office at 10.20 p.m. on 7 June. Evans's Report confirms that the 1st Armoured Division's General Evans was shown the document on 7 June.
- Forges-les-Eaux is some twenty miles north-east of Rouen. Doudeauville is eight miles south-east of Forges-les-Eaux, and Formerie is eight miles north-east of Forges-les-Eaux. Conteville is five miles north-west of Formerie.
- 24 The report '2/6th Bn, the East Surrey Regiment TA, France 1940', based on recollections of the battalion's officers, brought to my attention by Saul David, and by the 2/6th East Surrey officer who, in 1940, was Lieutenant John Redfern. Aumale is some eighteen miles north-east of Forges-les-Eaux.
- 25 Marshall-Cornwall, *Wars and Rumours*, pp. 144–5.
- 26 Ibid., p. 145.
- Dieppe, which is at the mouth of the B ethune, is some seventeen miles south-west of Le Tr eport, which is at the mouth of the Bresle.
- 27 Marshall-Cornwall, *Wars and Rumours*, p. 146.
- 28 NA/PRO WO 216/116, includes the signal sent by Marshall-Cornwall to Fortune at 9.30 p.m. on 8 June, telling him to withdraw. This was around twenty-three hours after Marshall-Cornwall's 10.20 p.m. 7 June notice to the War Office about the German attack plans discovered on a dead German officer. (See note 23.)
- 29 Marshall-Cornwall, *Wars and Rumours*, pp. 146 and 148.
- 30 Ibid., p. 146.
- 31 4th Borders war diary, 8 June entry, in NA/PRO WO 167/714.
- 32 Lieutenant-Colonel Swinburn, 'History of the 51st Highland Division – 26 May to

- 12 June 1940' ('Swinburn's History'), was brought to my attention by Saul David. I was given permission to refer to and quote from it by Swinburn's son, Brigadier David Swinburn.
- 33 Le Havre is some fifty miles south-west of Dieppe.
- 34 Fécamp is some thirty-four miles south-west of Dieppe. Lillebonne is some nineteen miles south-east of Fécamp.
- 35 NA/PRO WO 106/1619.
- 36 Ellis, *War In France*, p. 286 and Swinburn's History.
Cany-Barville is some twenty-two miles south-west of Dieppe.
- 37 Message, in NA/PRO WO 106/1619.
St Valery-en-Caux is some sixteen miles south-west of Dieppe. The Durdent is some five miles south-west of St Valery-en-Caux.
- 38 Notes of the conversation between Butler and Percival, in NA/PRO PREM 3 188 3. The instruction from Weygand to IX Corps ordering the retreat to the Seine around Caudebec is in the Naval war diary, in NA/PRO ADM 199/2206.
- 39 'War Diary Relating to the Evacuation of the 51st Division from Havre and St Valery: 9th to 13th June 1940' ('Le Havre War Diary'), in NA/PRO WO 167/314.
- 40 NA/PRO WO 106/1619.
- 41 13 June 1940 note, from James to the Admiralty, in NA/PRO WO 106/1608.
- 42 10 June entry, in the Le Havre War Diary.
- 43 Operation Cycle report ('Cycle Report'), in NA/PRO ADM 199/2206.
- 44 Peter Scott, *The Eye Of The Wind*, pp. 127–9.
- 45 Grant's Diary.
- 46 Ouville-la-Rivière is fourteen miles east of St Valery-en-Caux.
- 47 The people who put me in contact with Seaforth Highlander veterans and their families, and helped me research what happened to them south of the Somme, included: Major Robin Campbell, Lieutenant-Colonels Alastair Cumming, and Angus Fairrie, Mike Gascoigne, Christopher and Malcolm Macrae, Mrs Patrick and Hector Munro, Jonathan Nason, Major-General Ian Robertson, Andrew Todd and Gerald Wombwell.
- 48 Grant's Diary.
- 49 Le Tot is around two and a half miles west of St Valery. St Sylvain is a mile south-east of Le Tot, and Néville is two miles south-east of St Sylvain.
- 50 Grant's Diary.
- 51 Mackenzie's Report.
- 52 Veules-les-Roses is some four miles east of St Valery. St Pierre-le-Viger is some four miles south-east of Veules-les-Roses, and Houdetot is some two miles south-west of St Pierre-le-Viger.
- 53 Grant's Diary.
Cailleville is some three miles south of St Valery.
- 54 Grant's Diary.
- 55 The people who helped me contact Gordon Highlander veterans and their families, and helped me research what happened to them south of the Somme, included: Melanie Brooker, Major Malcolm Ross, Bill Smith, Johnnie Stansfeld and David Watt.

- 56 Ogilvie's report, and my 2002 interview with him.
- 57 David, *Churchill's Sacrifice*, p. 193.
- 58 Grant's Diary.
- 59 Ibid.
- 60 David Philps' 'Try Try and Try Again', which was published in France as *Un Écossais Dans Le Maquis: une épopée fantastique à travers la France occupée*, brought to my attention by Thomas Smyth and Lieutenant-Colonel Stephen Lindsay of the Black Watch.
- 61 The people who helped me contact Black Watch veterans and their families, and research what happened to them south of the Somme, included: Ronnie Bradford, Lieutenant-Colonel Stephen Lindsay, Major Ronnie Proctor, Thomas Smythe and Mike Taylor.
- 62 NA/PRO WO 106/1619.
- 63 Le Havre War Diary, entry for 11 June.
- 64 Lieutenant-Commander House's report, in NA/PRO ADM 179/158.
- 65 NA/PRO WO 106/1608.
- 66 Captain Warren's 'Narrative Of Operation Cycle' ('Warren's Narrative'), sent to Admiral James on 15 June 1940, in NA/PRO ADM 179/158.
- 67 Details are in various reports, in NA/PRO ADM 179/158.
- 68 Warren's Narrative.
- 69 David, *Churchill's Sacrifice*, p. 219. Smith, who is quoted, was from the 4th Camerons. He climbed down the cliffs between St Valery and Veules.
- 70 Major Bertie MacLeay's report, brought to my attention by Saul David.
- 71 NA/PRO ADM 199/2206.
- 72 Cycle Report.
- 73 The people who helped me contact Cameron veterans and their families, and helped me research what happened to them south of the Somme included: Major George Burns, Lieutenant-Colonel Alastair Cumming, Lieutenant-Colonel Angus Fairrie, Sarah Hunt, Derek Lang's daughter, and Peter Loughton.
- 74 General Sir Derek Lang, *Return To St Valery: The story of an escape through wartime France and Syria*, p. 33. General Lang's children, Simon Lang and Sarah Hunt, have given me permission to quote from their father's book.
- 75 Cycle Report.
- 76 Warren's Narrative
- 77 John Pryor's account, given to me when I interviewed him in 2004.
- 78 Swinburn's History.
- 79 NA/PRO WO 106/1619.
- 80 David, *Churchill's Sacrifice*, p. 229.
- 81 5th Gordon Highlander Major Bruce, diary, shown to me by Saul David.
- 82 NA/PRO WO 106/1619, and Swinburn's History.
- 83 Message to that effect sent at 12.04 p.m. on 12 June, in NA/PRO WO 106/1608.
- 84 Cycle Report.
- 85 The reference to 8000 British prisoners, probably a best estimate, is in the 12 June entry in the 7th Panzer Division's files, in BA-MA RH27-7/220.

36: The Sinking of the *Lancastria*

- 1 Conclusions of 12 June War Cabinet, 163 (40), in NA/PRO CAB 65/7.
- 2 Le Havre War Diary; and the Cycle Report.
- 3 Spears, *Assignment To Catastrophe*, pp. 505–11.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 512.
- 5 Alan Brooke, Notes, p.198.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p.196.
- 7 Conclusions of 12 June War Cabinet, 163 (40), in NA/PRO CAB 65/7.
- 8 Captain Jack Lambert's account, brought to my attention by his daughter Fiona.
- 9 *Ibid.*
- 10 Alan Brooke, Notes, p. 198.
- 11 *Ibid.*
- 12 *Ibid.*, pp. 201–2.
- 13 Rennes is around 125 miles south-east of Brest.
- 14 Conches-en-Ouche is some thirty-two miles south-west of Rouen.
- 15 Alan Brooke, Notes, p. 204.
- 16 *Ibid.*, pp. 205–6.
- 17 *Ibid.*, p. 210.
- 18 Record of Dill's and Brooke's conversation at 7.45 p.m. on 16 June, in NA/PRO WO 106/1692.
- 19 Record of Dill's and Brooke's conversation at 10.30 a.m. on 17 June, in NA/PRO WO 106/1692.
- 20 *Rommel Papers*, pp. 77–9; and Marshall-Cornwall, *Wars and Rumours*, pp. 160–65.
Verneuil is sixteen miles south of Conches-en-Ouche, which is mentioned in note 14. Mortagne-au-Perche is twenty-two miles south-west of Verneuil.
- 21 Alan Brooke, Notes, p. 213.
- 22 Conclusions of 17 June and 21 June War Cabinets, 170 (40) and 174 (40), in NA/PRO CAB 65/7.
- 23 Nantes is some twenty-eight miles south-east of St Nazaire.
- 24 Brian James Crabb, *The Forgotten Tragedy: The Story of The Sinking of HMT Lancastria* ('Crabb, *Forgotten Tragedy*'), pp. 79 and 124, and my 2005 discussion with Crabb about exactly where the *Lancastria* wreck is lying.
- 25 Crabb, *Forgotten Tragedy*, pp. 8–9.
- 26 My 2004 interview with Jess Fenton ('Fenton Interview'), a Sherwood Forester who was on the *Lancastria* on 17 June 1940.
- 27 Harry Grattidge, *Captain Of The Queens* ('Grattidge, *Captain Of The Queens*'), p. 151.
- 28 *Ibid.*, pp. 152–3.
- 29 My 2004 interview with Joe O'Brien, who was a waiter on *Lancastria* on 17 June 1940. I was introduced to him, and most of the other *Lancastria* survivors I interviewed, thanks to the HMT *Lancastria* Association, and in particular thanks to its former chairwoman, Raye Dancocks, and Colin Clarke. In the notes that

follow witnesses and statements brought to my attention by them are marked with an asterisk.

- 30 My 2004 interview with Bill Hughes,* a baker on *Lancastria* on 17 June 1940.
 31 Joe Sweeney's account ('Sweeney's Report'), in IWM Documents 85/18/1.
 32 My 2004 interview with Stan Flowers,* an RASC engineer who was on *Lancastria* on 17 June 1940.
 33 Fenton Interview.
 34 Grattidge, *Captain Of The Queens*, p. 154.
 35 I. Macpherson's statement, in John L. West (ed.), *The Loss Of 'Lancastria'* ('West, *Loss Of Lancastria'*), p. 63.
 36 Grattidge, *Captain Of The Queens*, p. 154; and the account by Captain Barry Stevens, commander of HMS *Havelock*, quoted in Jonathan Fenby, *The Sinking of the Lancastria: Britain's Greatest Maritime Disaster and Churchill's Cover-Up*, p. 126.
 37 Captain N. Field, in West, *Loss Of Lancastria*, p. 32.
 38 Ibid.
 39 J. Mansfield's statement ('Mansfield's Account').*
 40 Tom Payne's account ('Payne's Statement').*
 41 A. Garretts's account ('Garretts's Statement').*
 42 Mansfield's Account,* Sidney Dunmall's account,* and Sergeant-Major A. Picken's account ('Picken's Statement'), in West, *Loss Of Lancastria*, p. 73.
 43 Grattidge, *Captain Of The Queens*, p. 155.
 44 Picken's Statement.
 45 Roger Legroux testimony, recorded for a BBC World Service programme on the *Lancastria* disaster produced by Lydia Syson ('BBC's *Lancastria* Programme'), in IWM Sound Archive, 18171.
 46 Emilie Henrotin (née Legroux) testimony, recorded for BBC's *Lancastria* Programme, in IWM Sound Archive, 18170.
 47 Picken's Statement.
 48 Captain Clement Stott, 'I Led Fifty Men To The *Lancastria*' ('Stott's Story').
 49 Payne's statement.
 50 Sweeney's Report.
 51 Mansfield's Account.*
 52 Sergeant H. Pettit's account ('Pettit's Statement'), in West, *Loss Of Lancastria*, p. 69.
 53 Pettit's Statement.
 54 Andrew Dixon's statement.*
 55 George Thompson, in IWM Sound Archive, 8647.
 56 Stott's Story.
 57 Garretts's Statement.
 58 Payne's Statement.
 59 Garretts's Statement.
 60 This included reports in the *Daily Telegraph* and *Daily Mirror*, on 26 July 1940.
 61 Alan Brooke, Notes, p. 215.
 62 Ibid., p. 217.

- 63 Ibid.
- 64 Ellis, *The War In France*, p. 305.
- 65 Ibid.
- 66 My 2004 interview with Sergeant Colin Dee.
- 67 Ibid.

Epilogue

- 1 Details from J. G. de Beus, *L'Invisible Informateur: Berlin 1939–1940*, France, 1980.
- 2 Details from Graf Romedio von Thun-Hohenstein, *Der Verschwörer: General Oster und die Militäropposition*, Munich, 1982; Harold C. Deutsch, *The Conspiracy Against Hitler In The Twilight War*, USA, 1968; Anton Gill, *An Honourable Defeat: The Fight Against National Socialism In Germany 1933–45*, USA, 1994.
- 3 Details from Hoenmanns' son and second wife.
- 4 Jolly, *Vengeance of Private Pooley*, pp. 174–232.
- 5 Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, pp. 140–429.
- 6 My interview with Bert Evans.
- 7 Jolly, *Vengeance of Private Pooley*, pp. 49–75 and 174–232.
- 8 Details provided by Richard Nicholson, his son.
- 9 Details from Langley, *Fight Another Day*.
- 10 Details from Philip Newman's son, Richard.
- 11 Weygand, *Recalled To Service*.
- 12 Figures from F. A. E. Crew, *The Army Medical Services: Volume 1*, London, 1953, brought to my attention by Squadron Leader Oscar Cornish.
- 13 Ellis, *War In France*, p. 327.
- 14 Horne, *To Lose a Battle*, p. 667.
- 15 Gardner, *Evacuation From Dunkirk*, pp. 158–61.
- 16 French, Belgian, Dutch and German casualty figures are from Horne, *To Lose a Battle*, pp. 666–7.

Maps

- 1 H. Amersfoort and P. Kamphuis assisted me with the Dutch lines; Huygelier and Muys/CDH and Peter Taghon with the Belgian lines.
- 2 Huygelier/CDH provided a large-scale map of the area around Fort Eben-Emael.
- 3 Karl-Heinz Frieser's maps of Sedan, in Frieser, *Guerre-éclair*, and the map in SHAT 32N253 which he brought to my attention enabled me to describe the approximate positions of French blockhouses and the main German thrusts over the Meuse.
- 4 Expert help provided by André Coilliot.
- 5 Expert help provided by Dilip Sarkar.
- 6 Documents provided by Lieutenant-Colonel Robin Bullock-Webster of the Irish Guards, Bill Heber-Percy and Timothy Rose-Price, included the Irish Guards' and Welsh Guards' positions at Boulogne (see Chapter 15, notes). Frédéric

Debussche and Léa Delsart from the Service Animation de l'Architecture et du Patrimoine de Boulogne-sur-mer gave me advice which enabled me to pinpoint features in Boulogne.

- 7 Jon Cooksey assisted me in working out the units' positions in Calais.
- 8 Dominique Faivre showed me where the Royal Welch Fusiliers retreated from the Germans at St-Venant. The Royal Norfolk soldier Bob Brown showed me the layout of the Royal Norfolks' positions in Le Paradis.
- 9 Guy Rommelaere showed me where the battle was fought around Wormhout, and Henri Becquart did the same at Cassel.
- 10 Lucien Dayan, President of the Memorial du Souvenir at Dunkirk, unearthed a contemporary map of the bastions at Dunkerque, which enabled me accurately to pinpoint the location of Bastion 32. The personnel at Dunkirk's Archives Municipales mentioned in the Acknowledgements helped me identify the location of certain features in the Dunkirk perimeter.
- 11 Peter Taghon and Joseph De Vlieger gave me information and large-scale maps that enabled me to produce a map of Vinkt with notes showing where the massacres took place. Sofie De Smet's interviews with Godelieve and Rudolf Corijn helped fill in gaps.
- 12 Saul David answered questions I put to him about St Valery.

Appendices

Appendix A

- 1 The information in this Appendix is from Saint-Martin, *Blindés français*; B. T. White, *British Tanks and Fighting Vehicles 1914–1945*; and Pierre Touzin, *Les Véhicules Blindés Français 1920–1944*. The latter two titles were brought to my attention by Fletcher/Tank Museum.
- 2 The 35t, and the 38t, were Czechoslovakian (tschechoslowakischen in German) tanks.
- 3 Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée.

Appendix B

- 1 Jock Gardner of the Ministry of Defence's Naval Historical Branch has helped me interpret the footnotes referring to these statistics in Gardner, *Evacuation From Dunkirk*, pp. 209–10.
- 2 The tables of figures in this Appendix differ from those in the Dover Report and the HS/TSD statistics in one respect: each row of figures in the Dover Report and the HS/TSD statistics only mentions the second of the dates specified in each row of the tables in this Appendix B. For example, the Dover Report mentions 27 May, and not 26–7 May, as the date when the 3373 men specified in the top row of the top table in this Appendix B were evacuated.

The following evidence suggests that the figures in each row of the Dover

Report and HS/TSD statistics might relate to the night ending on the date specified in these 'reports': the last 26,000 soldiers evacuated are said to have been rescued from Dunkirk during the night 3–4 June. The evacuation during this night appears to have commenced at around 10.30 p.m. on 3 June and terminated at around 3 a.m. on 4 June. The above reports both specify that around 26,000 soldiers were evacuated on '4 June'. This suggests that when the reports mention '4 June', they really mean the night of 3–4 June. If this is the case, then it is possible that the other dates given in the reports should be interpreted in the same way. In the extracts from the reports in this Appendix B, I have assumed that this is how the dates should be construed, but have explained my reasoning in this note to show that my assumption should be treated for what it is: an educated guess.

Acknowledgements

- 1 Vanwelkenhuyzen's article on the Mechelen incident is 'La Drôle De Guerre En Belgique: Des plans tombés du ciel', in *Histoire De Notre Temps – Toute La Vérité*, no.2, Été, 1967. His two books on the campaign are 1940: *Pleins feux sur un désastre*, and 'Miracle' à Dunkerque: *La fin d'un mythe*.